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Abstract 
This report investigates the effect of population ageing on public health- and long-term care 
expenditures, public pensions and government finances in EU countries in the projection period 
2002-50. The authors specifically consider new insights about the development of demography 
and health on these projections. In this regard, the view has been expressed that people may live 
substantially longer in the future than estimated by current demographic projections and may 
spend part of these additional years in better health. Both developments have obvious 
implications for the correct projection of public expenditures and finances. To assess the effects 
of living longer in better health, four core scenarios are developed: a base case and scenarios for 
living longer, living in better health and living longer in better health.  
The analysis also contains a number of new elements. First, it includes the costs incurred during 
the last years of life in the projections, which will be postponed by an increase in life 
expectancy. Hence, the calculations in the study correct for the overestimation of future health-
care expenditure that arises when no account is made for mortality-related costs. Second, the 
cost of mortality is disaggregated into a health- and long-term care component, which differs by 
age. Third, tax revenues are incorporated into the projections for government finances. With this 
information, the analysis is able to project government finances in the future and assess whether 
government finances are sustainable under current social policy rules.  
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Introduction 
GIR’s work package (WP) 4 focuses on the effects of population ageing on public 
health-care expenditure, public pension expenditure and the sustainability of public 
finances. It pays particular attention to the role of new insights concerning the relation 
between living longer and in better health and health consumption, health-care expenditure and 
pension expenditure. The view that life expectancy may increase further than the standard 
demographic projections have suggested to date has been argued by Vaupel (1998), Vaupel and 
Lundström (1996) and Held (2002) among others. Likewise, many authors, including Cutler and 
Sheiner (2001), Jacobzone et al. (2000) and Thomas (1999), have considered the incidence of 
declining disability among the elderly and more generally the fact that the health of older 
persons is improving. If the health of the older population improves further in the future this 
may lead to a smaller rise in health and pension expenditures than thus far projected. We 
combine both features to investigate how the ageing process may impact the future development 
of health and pension expenditures if we take account of these factors.  
WP4 builds a bridge between WPs 1, 2 and 3 on the one hand and WPs 5 and 6 on the other. 
WP4 aims at using the data collected in the first three work packages to make projections for 
public health and pension expenditures, using different assumptions with respect to 
demography, health and labour force participation. WPs 5 and 6 will draw upon these scenarios 
to come up with a discussion of policies that may cope with the population ageing problem.  
This report can basically be divided into three parts and is structured as follows. First an 
overview is presented of other studies and results in this field. We make use of the insights of 
these studies and also clarify the ways in which the current study differs. Thereafter the 
structure of the model is explained, and the various data and assumptions underlying the model 
are presented in chapters 2 and 3 respectively.  
In part I, chapter 4, the effect of population ageing on the development of health and pension 
expenditures in the base case scenario is projected, as well as its impact on the sustainability of 
government finances. We concentrate only on public expenditures and do not take account of 
any developments in private expenditures in these categories. These projections are, with the 
exception of some minor changes in several assumptions, in line with the latest projections of 
the European Policy Committee (EPC) (2001). We calculate projections for the individual EU 
countries (as far as data availability allows) and for the EU as a whole.  
In part II of the report different scenarios are presented to show how the projections in the base 
case scenario change when demographic circumstances change and a health trend is 
incorporated into the model. In chapter 5 we investigate how demography and more specifically 
an increase in life expectancy influence our base case results. This scenario is labelled the 
‘living longer scenario’. In chapters 6 and 8 we subsequently incorporate expected health 
improvements in our scenario, first in the base case scenario and then in the living longer 
scenario. The scenarios are respectively dubbed the ‘living in better health scenario’ and the 
‘living longer in better health scenario’. Chapter 7 presents the results of a scenario that is the 
opposite of the living in better health scenario, namely the ‘living in worse health scenario’. 
This may illustrate that it is far from easy to tell whether the future will indeed show 
improvements in the health status of the population. Following Jacobzone et al. (2000), the 
scenarios allow us to investigate the interplay between population ageing and health 
improvements on health-care expenditure, where we also focus on the impact of these processes 
on pension expenditures.  
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The various scenarios will impact government finances differently. For each scenario, we 
calculate the correction in primary surpluses (taxes or public spending) that is needed to keep 
government finances sustainable, the so-called ‘sustainability gap’, and how this compares to 
the sustainability gap found in the base case scenario.  
In part III of this report we investigate the sensitivity of some crucial determinants underlying 
our projections, such as the assumptions about the amount of the interest rate, the rate of 
productivity growth and the development of the labour force participation rate. In chapter 9, we 
assess the relation between population ageing and its possible effect on the interest rate and the 
rate of productivity growth, and how the incorporation of a more direct relation between 
population ageing and these two variables influences our base case results. In chapter 10, we 
consider some other factors that are likely to influence health-care expenditures and especially 
focus on the role of medical technological progress in this regard. In this chapter we also 
investigate how changes in the yearly cost parameters influence health-care expenditures. 
Finally, in chapter 11 we assess how a possible change in the labour force participation rate 
affects the base case results and present both a best- and worst-case scenario. The summary and 
conclusions section highlights the findings presented in the report.  
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Chapter 1 
An Overview of the Literature 
he demographic structure of populations will change quite dramatically during the next 
decades. Indeed, many industrialised countries will see their populations becoming older. 
The main reasons are the fall in fertility rates, the gradual retirement of the baby-boom 
generation and the ongoing increase of life expectancies. These factors will have profound 
effects on the health-care sector, the long-term care sector and on pension schemes. 
Furthermore, labour market participation is expected to decline, which will have an impact on 
both tax revenues and social security expenditure. Through all these channels, population ageing 
may have a huge impact upon the sustainability of public finances. 
This report critically examines several arguments that underlie this view. In particular, it focuses 
on the relevance of the mortality-cost argument (i.e. the fact that expenditure increases very 
quickly in the last years before mortality) for projections of health-care expenditure. It thereby 
distinguishes between health care and long-term care. It also explores the relevance of two 
additional arguments. The first is that life expectancy may increase in the coming decades much 
more than is recognised by official projections. The second is that the health of the population 
may improve in the coming decades, as it seems to have improved during the last decennia. To 
the extent that these arguments are true, they imply that health-care expenditure may rise at a 
much faster or slower pace in the future than expected thus far. 
Public finances may be affected not only through health-care expenditure, but also through other 
channels. Indeed, life expectancy will significantly impact pension expenditure. Improvements 
in health status will affect labour market participation rates and thus taxation and expenditure on 
social security. This paper carefully calculates the effects on public finances through all these 
channels of the idea that in the future people may live longer and in better health. 
1.1  Standard extrapolation method 
The method that can be used to calculate the effect of population ageing – called the ‘age-group 
projection’ method by Getzen (1992) – is fairly standard. It calculates the effect of changes in 
the age structure of the population under the assumption that in the future the expenditure by 
age profile will remain unchanged. The procedure is as follows. First, current health-care 
expenditure per age cohort is decomposed into the expenditure per capita and the size of that 
age cohort. Second, health-care expenditure at some future date is calculated by multiplying the 
projected fractions of the population in different age cohorts at that date with historical 
expenditure per capita in these age cohorts, i.e. the expenditure per capita in these age cohorts 
that were calculated in the first step of the procedure. The population ageing effect follows from 
comparing the projected future expenditure with current expenditure. 
Many studies have used the standard projection method to project the future rise in medical 
spending as a result of population ageing (Dang et al., 2001; Economic Policy Committee 
[EPC], 2001; Jacobzone et al., 2000). Dang et al. conclude that expenditure on health and long-
term care for a group of OECD countries may increase from a level of 6% of GDP in 2000 to 
9.3% in 2050. This would amount to a population ageing effect of about 55%. The EPC (2001) 
study focused on the EU area and calculated that the expenditure on health and long-term care 
may increase from 6.6% of GDP in 2000 to 8.8% in 2050, which implies an increase of 33%. 
Jacobzone et al. focused on the implications of population ageing for the expenditure on long-
term care. In particular, this study examined the hypothesis that the needs of elderly societies for 
long-term care services may decline, which would result in a smaller increase in expenditure.  
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Although the age-group projection method is widely applied, it has its weaknesses. In particular, 
it makes the crucial assumption that health-care expenditure by age profile will remain the same 
in the future. This assumption may be wrong for a number of reasons. A first reason relates to 
women giving birth. If population ageing is the result of declining fertility rates, one may expect 
age profiles to be reduced for those ages at which women give birth (Ahn et al., 2004a). A 
second argument pertains to the gender imbalance, i.e. the fact that women outlive men on 
average. Reductions in this gender imbalance – brought about by increases in male life 
expectancies that outweigh increases in female life expectancies – may expand the possibilities 
of care-giving at home, thereby diminishing the demand for formal long-term care (Lakdawalla 
and Philipson, 1999). 
The age profile of medical spending may also shift because of economic growth, medical 
technological progress and health-care sector price inflation. Cutler and Meara (1999) show that 
the age profile of health-care expenditure by Medicare beneficiaries in the US has grown and 
argue that this does not reflect changes in their health status. Instead, they find that the disability 
status of the eldest elderly (85+) is falling more rapidly than that of the youngest elderly (65-
85). 
What is most relevant in this report is that the age profile may also change in the case of an 
improvement in the health status of the population or an increase in life expectancy. Indeed, the 
scenario of living in better health reflects an improvement in the health status of the population, 
which may imply a downward shift of medical spending by age profile. This shift may be 
parallel or more specific if the health improvement occurs for particular ages. Next, the scenario 
of living longer reflects an increase in life expectancy, which may change the age profile of 
medical spending such that it increases less at middle ages and increases more steeply at higher 
ages. 
1.2  The ‘mortality-cost’ argument 
A major argument against the age-group projection method relates to health spending in the last 
years of life. There is widespread empirical evidence that medical spending in the last years of 
life relates to time to mortality (Lubitz and Riley, 1993; Zweifel et al. 1999; Cutler and Meara, 
1999). Older persons consume more health care because they are closer to their mortality, not 
because they are older. It is obvious that this mortality-cost argument may change the predicted 
effects of population ageing: if population ageing is driven by the increase of life expectancies, 
one may expect age profiles to go down for those ages at which mortality rates decline. 
Zweifel et al. (1999) have stated that health-care expenditure is completely independent of age, 
not only for individuals in the last years of their lives, but also for those of younger ages. If this 
is true, health-care expenditure per capita may decline because of population ageing. Most 
studies find that health-care expenditure per capita increases as mortality approaches, implying 
that health-care expenditure per capita decreases the longer the time to mortality. Think of 
ageing as an increase of the average time to mortality since it implies an increase in life 
expectancy. The effect of ageing would then be to reduce health-care expenditure per capita 
(Westerhout, 2004). In this implication, the time-to-mortality argument looks very strong. The 
same holds true for its assumptions, but these are partly unrealistic. 
Much more plausible is a weaker form of the time-to-mortality argument, asserting that time to 
mortality is the major driver of health-care expenditure for persons in the last years of their 
lives, but that for others the most important explanatory variable is age. The effect of ageing 
upon health-care expenditure in this weak form of the time-to-mortality approach is ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, what we do know is that it is less strong than under the standard projection 
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Roos et al. (1987) were probably the first to make projections using this weak version of the 
time-to-mortality approach. They split the population into those who died within the projection 
period and those who survived, made separate cost projections for the two population groups 
and then combined the two into one aggregate projection. Roos et al. calculated that the rate of 
increase of hospital usage in the 1976-2000 period would have amounted to 64% rather than 
73%, which would have applied if the projection had been made using the standard approach. 
The study by Van Ewijk et al. (2000) study (henceforth called the AIN study) calculated that 
health-care expenditure growth in the period 1998-2050 would decrease from 53 to 45% if the 
weak version of the time-to-mortality approach were substituted for the standard approach. The 
EPC (2001) study compared the standard scenario with a scenario that corrects for mortality 
costs for three countries, namely Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. In all three cases, the 
expenditure projections for 2050 were considerably lower under the mortality-cost corrected 
method. Serup-Hansen et al. (2002) found that including the mortality-cost argument would 
lower the projected increase of Danish health-care costs in the period 1995-2020 from 18.5 to 
15.1%. 
In the following chapter we elaborate more explicitly on the method we use to project future 
health-care expenditures, taking account of the findings in the previously mentioned studies.  
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Chapter 2 
Structure of the Model and Applied Methodology 
e use a relatively simple model to calculate developments in health, pension 
expenditure and government finances through time. We basically use the same 
approach that was used by the CPB in the AIN study and by the Ageing Working 
Group (AWG) among others. The latter group prepared projections for health and pension 
expenditure until 2050 for the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). Our study basically builds 
on the insights that were obtained in these studies. It improves upon these projections by taking 
account of factors such as the relation between health and retirement, the effect of health 
changes on health-care expenditure and a better split in the composition of health costs by 
including the cost of mortality. Below we briefly discuss the respective parts of the model. 
2.1 Demographics 
To simulate demographic changes, total population is decomposed into its three  respective 
arguments: first, net migration, which is immigration minus emigration; second, mortality; and 
third, fertility. Population in a given year t for a certain age (j) category can, aside for those that 
are aged 0,
1  be calculated as the sum of the population in the previous year plus any net 
migration, NMIGRand mortality,
σ
that occurred during the year itself. Or  
  ) , 1 , ( ) , , 1 ( ) , , 1 ( ) , 1 , ( ) , , 1 ( s t j s t j s t j s t j s t j POP NMIGR POP POP − + + − + × − + = σ
, with  99 0 ≤ ≤ j  (1) 
withsrepresenting gender. After reaching age 99 all persons are assumed to die. By changing 
the mortality rates for specific age categories we are then able to obtain a new demographic 
scenario, which can either represent an increase in life expectancy, i.e. a reduction in mortality 
rates, or a decrease in life expectancy, i.e. an increase in mortality rates.  
2.2 Health-care  expenditures 
As outlined in the previous chapter, projections for health-care expenditure in earlier studies 
were usually based on the standard extrapolation method. By decomposing current health-care 
expenditures into different age groups one could obtain an average health-care profile by age 
category. By multiplying this average cost profile by the respective sizes of the population in 
these age groups total health-care expenditures could be calculated. To calculate health-care 
expenditures at a future date, the projected fractions of populations by age at that time would be 
multiplied with the average cost profile by age category. A comparison of projected future 
expenditure and current expenditure would then give the population ageing effect.  
Our method differs in several respects and uses the insights of both the AIN and EPC studies. 
First, we have average health-care profiles by age category, but include the costs of mortality or 
the costs incurred during the lasts year of life in our calculations as in the AIN study. For this 
purpose we distinguish between total health-care costs, composed of health care and long-term 
care (as in the EPC study), of survivors and non-survivors. Here we define survivors as those 
persons who live during the whole year and non-survivors as those persons who die during the 
year. The number of survivors by age category can be calculated as the fraction of people who 
live during the whole year  ) 1 ( ) , ( t j σ − , i.e. 1 minus the age-specific mortality rate that varies by 
time, multiplied by the size of the population in that age category at that specific time. Likewise 
                                                 
1 The population at age 0 is equal to the respective number of births in that year.  
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the number of non-survivors can be calculated as the fraction of those persons who die during 
the year in a specific age category  ) , ( t j σ  (the age-specific mortality rate) multiplied by the size 
of the population in the specific age category at that time. Second, we decompose the cost of 
death D into a health-care and long-term care component that differs by age. This follows the 
reasoning that the split of the cost of mortality into health care and long-term care is different 
for someone who is for example aged 35 compared with a person who is aged 65.  
Table 2.1 shows the division we adhere to in our projections for D ,
2 which is based on findings 
by the Dutch WRR (1997).
3 The cost of mortality is defined here as the total health-care costs 
during the last four years of life. The division into health- and long-term care components can 
easily be made by grouping the various types of expenditures in the mentioned categories. The 
observed pattern of the cost of mortality by age and the respective health-care component also 
corresponds with the general findings of Roos et al. (1987) and Spillman and Lubitz (2000).  
Table 2.1. Division of costs of mortality by age category over health- and long-term care 
components (%) 
Age   Health care  ) ( j ε Long-term care ) 1 ( j ε −  
0-54 100 0 
55-64 93 7 
65-69 91 9 
70-74 88 12 
75-79 79 21 
80-84 67 33 
85-89 57 43 
90+ 44  56 
Source: WRR (1997). 
At young ages (0-54) the cost of mortality is thus in its total made up of health-care costs, while 
at higher ages a larger part of the cost of mortality is made up of long-term care costs.  
The health-care profile of a cohort of a certain age  j T can thus be constructed as follows: 
) , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) 1 ( k t j t j k t j t j k t j D U T × + × − = σ σ  
 with:  t
k j k t j g U U ) 1 ( ) , 0 , ( ) , , ( + × =  ,   t
k j k t j g D D ) 1 ( ) , 0 , ( ) , , ( + × =  and  ) , ( L H k ∈  (2) 
) 0 , ( ) , 0 , ( j j H j D D × = ε ,    ) 0 , ( ) , 0 , ( ) 1 ( j j L j D D × − = ε  
where U is the average health-care profile for survivors, H and  L  represent the health-care and 
long-term components and g is the constant yearly labour productivity growth. It is thus the sum 
of the respective cost of survivors and non-survivors multiplied by their respective weights, i.e. 
the survival and mortality fractions.  
                                                 
2 In chapter 4 we elaborate on the method we use in constructing the cost of death D by age category. 
3 As the WRR did not investigate the structure of the cost of mortality for persons younger than age 55, 
we made an assumption about this structure for those aged 0-54. Owing to the relatively small share of 
long-term care in the costs of mortality for those aged 55-64, we therefore assumed this to be zero for 
persons aged even younger. 8 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
To calibrate the model we use information from the EPC study on k j T , . Using this information 
we can calculate adjusted health-care cost profiles for survivors
4 by subtracting the costs of 
mortality at a specific age category from the respective health-care component from which the 
cost of mortality is made up. The adjusted health-care profile for survivors is thus calibrated as 
follows: 
 
) 1 (
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× −
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=   (3) 
If we multiply the health-care profiles for survivors and the health-care profile of non-survivors 
by age category with the respective size of the population in these age categories we ultimately 
obtain total health-care costs by specific age category. If we sum this up over all ages total 
health-care costs are obtained, which can be expressed as: 
  ∑ × =
j
t j H t j t POP T HCEXP ) , ( ) , , ( ) (    ∑ × =
j
t j L t j t POP T LTCEXP ) , ( ) , , ( ) (  (4) 
) ( ) ( ) ( t t t LTCEXP HCEXP THCEXP + =  
Total health-care expenditures in time thus vary because of both mortality changes and the 
associated population changes.  
2.3 Pension  expenditures 
Pension expenditures are calculated in a straightforward manner. In the base year the aggregate 
amount of public replacement revenues
5  for persons aged 55 and above is divided over all 
individuals, men and women, who are eligible for these arrangements. From this we obtain 
average pension expenditure or benefit per person or those eligible. The average pension benefit 
will be held constant through time and only increases with yearly indexation β , which may 
differ across EU countries. The development of pension expenditures by age category until 2050 
can then be calculated by multiplying the average pension benefit per person PB by the number 
of persons who are eligible for a pension in each respective year,  E , or:  
) , , ( ) ( ) , , ( s t j t s t j E PB PEXP × =  
 with  t
t g PB PB ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) ( β + × =   ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( s t j s t j s t j LFP POP E − × =
 
(5) 
for  64 55 ≤ ≤ j  and  ) , , ( ) , , ( s t j s t j POP E =  for  65 ≥ j  
Total pension expenditures can then be obtained by summing up expenditures over age and 
gender categories or: 
  ∑∑ =
js
s t j t PEXP TPEXP ) , , ( ) (  (6) 
                                                 
4 The initial health-care profiles for health and long-term care comprise total health-care costs and make 
no division between the cost of survivors and non-survivors. Since we construct separate profiles for 
survivors and non-survivors, the costs of the latter have to be subtracted from the initial health-care 
profiles to obtain an adjusted health-care profile for survivors.  
5 These expenditures include outlays on disability benefits, unemployment benefits, early retirement 
benefits and public pensions. Expenditures on public pensions comprise the largest part of these 
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The number of persons eligible for pension benefits changes every year owing to both labour 
market developments,  ) , ( t j LFP , which differ by sex s and changing demographic circumstances 
captured by ) , ( t j POP . An increase in the labour force participation of women aged 55 and over 
for example will lead to a decline in the number of women who make use of social security 
services and will lead to a decline in the number of persons who are eligible. Changes in 
demography can either lead to an increase or decrease in the number of persons in specific age 
categories with different impacts on the number of persons who are eligible for benefits. In 
calculating pension expenditures no account is taken of any policy changes that could influence 
the eligibility or rules of pension systems. We thus assume a policy-neutral environment.  
2.4  Relation between a change in health status and labour force 
participation  
The change in labour force participation resulting from a change in health is given by the 
following equation: 
oh s t j
s t j
s j
s j
s j s j
s t j health LFP
OUTFLOW
OUTFLOW
DI ER
LFP ε θ × × ×
+
= ∆ ) , , (
) , , (
) , (
) , (
) , ( ) , (
) , , (
 
oh ε θ µ × × =  
  with  
HEALTH
HEALTH HEALTH s t j s t j
s t j
) , 1 , ( ) , , (
) , , (
− −
= θ  (7) 
] 1 [
^
oh LFP LFP ε µ× + × =  
with  64 20 ≤ ≤ j  
with  ER , DI  and OUTFLOW respectively presenting early retirement, disability inflow and the 
yearly outflow from the labour market. The first two terms on the right-hand side of the 
equation reflect the number of persons who exit the labour force each year by respective age and 
gender and whose decision to do so may be altered if their health improves, for convenience of 
notation we shall term this µ . It thus presents the potential number of persons who might be 
influenced by any health change. As can be gauged from the first term, we implicitly make the 
assumption here that only those who make use of early retirement or disability schemes are 
likely to change their exit decision if their health improves, i.e. individuals who make use of 
unemployment schemes will not be affected by any health changes.
6 The third term on the right 
hand side of the equation represents the average health change that occurs in the respective year 
by respective age and gender as given byθ . The fourth term represents the elasticity oh ε   
guiding the relation between the number of individuals who exit the labour force and health, 
which is the same for all age categories and for both genders. The respective change in labour 
force participation resulting from a change in health can then be used to correct for the number 
of persons who are eligible for pension expenditures at ages 55 to 64. Pension expenditures can 
then be written as:  
 
) 1 ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) ( ) , , ( oh s t j s t j s t j t s t j E PB PEXP ε θ µ × × − × × = , for  64 55 ≤ ≤ j  (8) 
                                                 
6  In some countries, however, persons with health problems also use unemployment schemes as an 
alternative exit route, which is for example the case in the Netherlands. We will nevertheless assume that 
the majority of persons with health problems use the disability schemes and therefore disregard any 
influence of health changes on unemployment exits.  10 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
That is, an improvement in health will lead to more labour force participation captured by the 
term between brackets and reduce the number of persons receiving pension benefits E . 
2.5  Relation between health changes and health-care expenditures  
The relation between health changes and health-care expenditure can be calculated in a similar 
manner as the relation between health and labour force participation. It can be expressed as: 
  ] 1 [ ) , , ( ) , ( ) , (
^
s t j hh k t k t THCEXP THCEXP θ ε × − × =  (9) 
The first term is equal to total health-care expenditures as calculated before. This term is 
however multiplied by a factor to take account of any health improvements occurring in the 
respective year. This latter term is equal to one minus the product of the respective health 
change in the respective year θ with the respective elasticity  hh ε   representing the relation 
between health and health-care expenditures. This elasticity differs between broad age groups. 
In the scenarios where no health improvements take place θ  is 0 and health-care expenditures 
are calculated as before. 
2.6 Government  finances 
To calculate the impact of population ageing on government finances we have to make 
assumptions on how government revenues and expenditures are likely to develop in the future. 
Starting first with the revenue side, total government revenues TOTREV are divided into three 
categories, i.e. direct tax revenues DTREV , indirect tax revenues ITREV  and other revenues 
OTREV (including such items as corporate taxes, profits on land sale, seignorage and so on). 
Direct tax revenues and other revenues are assumed to grow at the same rate as GDP, as these 
revenue categories are closely related to changes in economic growth. Indirect tax revenues, 
however, are more related to the level of consumption, which is better reflected by changes in 
population. The indirect taxes are therefore related to population changes. We thus have: 
t
t g DTREV DTREV ) 1 ( ) 0 ( + × =
, 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( g p ITREV ITREV t t + + × = −  (10) 
t
t g OTREV OTHREV ) 1 ( ) 0 ( + × =
 
and  t t t t OTHREV ITREV DTREV TOTREV + + =  
with g and p respectively representing economic growth and population growth.  
On the expenditure side, total expenditures TOTEXP   are divided into seven different 
expenditure categories. These are health-care expenditures THCEXP , pension expenditures 
TPEXP , expenditures on disability benefits DBEXP   , expenditures on other social security 
benefits, SSEXP  (a mixture of unemployment, sickness and other social transfers, etc.), other 
expenditures OTHEXP (including expenditures on infrastructure, defence and so on), education 
expenditures  EDEXP   and finally expenditures on interest payments I . Health-care 
expenditures develop according to the equation described in chapter 3 (under the heading of 
relation between health and health-care expenditures section) where θ  has the value of 0 if no 
health improvement takes place. Pension expenditures develop as described in chapter 3 (under 
this heading). Expenditures on disability benefits rise in line with economic growth and are also 
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expenditures rise in line with economic growth. Education expenditures rise in line with 
economic growth and are also related to changes in the number of young persons, i.e. those aged 
5-24. Interest payments are calculated by multiplying the nominal interest rate with the debt 
level. We thus have: 
[ ] [ ] ∑ × − × × =
j
s k t j hh t j k t j k t POP T THCEXP ) , , , ( ) , ( ) , , ( ) , ( 1 θ ε
 
∑∑ × × − × =
js
oh s t j s t j s t j t PEXP TPEXP ) 1 ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( ) ( ε θ µ
, for  64 55 ≤ ≤ j  
∑∑ =
js
s t j t PEXP TPEXP ) , , ( ) (
, for  j ≤ 65  
  ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
−
− × + × =
t
t
t t LFP
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g DBEXP DBEXP
 (11) 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( g SSEXP SSEXP t t + × = − , 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( g OTHEXP OTHEXP t t + × = −  
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t
t
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) 1 ( − × = t t t B r I
 
t t t t t t t t I EDEXP OTHEXP SSEXP DBEXP TPEXP THCEXP TOTEXP + + + + + + =  
From the development in government revenues and expenditures the development in the 
government deficit DEF , the primary deficit pt  and the debt B can be deducted in the usual 
manner: 
t t t TOTREV TOTEXP DEF − =  
  t t t I DEF pt − =  (12) 
t t t DEF B B + = − ) 1 (  
As we are interested in the impact of population ageing on government finances and specifically 
on the sustainability of government finances under current social policy rules, we construct a 
measure that expresses this sustainability – the so-called ‘sustainability gap’.
7 This sustainability 
gap measures the difference between the tax level in the starting year of the projection and the 
tax level in that year that is needed to cover future public expenditure if government policy 
remains unchanged. A positive sustainability gap indicates the need to raise taxes to absorb an 
increase in debt levels during and at the end of the projection period. The opposite holds for a 
negative sustainability gap.  
                                                 
7  This measure was also used in the EPC (2001) study Budgetary Challenges Posed by Ageing 
Populations. For a detailed exposition on the way this variable is constructed see annex 6 in that report. 12 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
The sustainability gap for government finances of European Union countries under the 
prevailing social policies can therefore be calculated in the following manner: 
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 (13) 
where  0 g t
 is the sustainability gap at time 0, r is the nominal interest rate, g the rate of nominal 
growth, B0 is the original debt position and  t pt  is the primary deficit at period t. The second 
term in the bracket represents the present value of the primary deficit until 2050, where the 
beginning of our projection period is set at 2004. The third term presents the present value of the 
period from 2050, to say infinity, to take account of the development in the primary deficit after 
2050. From 2050 we assume that demographic and economic developments have stabilised and 
the economy and population grow at constant rates. This justifies the use of a constant interest 
rate and rate of productivity growth to calculate the present value of the primary deficits in the 
period after 2050.  | 13 
Chapter 3 
Demography and Data 
n this chapter we first briefly consider the demographic developments in Europe in the 
period until 2050 and then explore the data and methodology that is used in our projections 
in more detail.  
3.1  Demographic developments in the EU 
In this section we describe some of the demographic developments awaiting the EU in the next 
50 years. First the ageing of the population, caused both by an increase in life expectancy and 
the retirement of the baby boom generation, will lead to a substantial increase in the number of 
elderly persons in the population of the EU. Second, the fertility rate is expected to decline, 
leading to fewer births and this will put pressure on the growth capacities of economies in the 
future as the labour supply will decline. Third, the above-described developments will lead to a 
decline in the working-age population, which reduces the capacity to pay for the increase in 
expenditures associated with ageing, specifically those of health care and pensions. This is 
because most of these expenditures are financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis in EU 
countries and thus have to be financed by the working-age population at that time. Below we 
briefly consider each of these developments.  
Old-age dependency ratio  
Figure 3.1 shows the development of the old-age dependency ratio in the EU, where it is defined 
as the ratio of elderly persons (65 and over) to the working-age population (20-64).
1 For all 
countries of the EU this ratio will increase substantially, but the differences across countries are 
marked. The countries that will see the largest rise in the number of elderly persons are Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Austria, which will see their old-age dependency ratio increase by 39%, 38%, 
31% and 30% respectively. On the other hand the old-age dependency ratio in countries such as 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg compares favourably with the average 
trend seen in the other EU countries, with respective increases of 16%, 17%, 18% and 18%. In 
all countries it is the case that the old-age dependency ratio for men increases more sharply than 
for women, owing to the expected larger increase in life expectancy for men compared with 
women in the period up to 2050.  
Youth dependency ratio  
The development of the youth dependency ratio can be seen in Figure 3.2, where this ratio is 
defined as the ratio of young persons (aged 0-19) to the working-age population (aged 20-64). 
In most EU countries this ratio declines although usually by small margins. The decline is 
strongest in Ireland and Austria, with respective decreases of 12% and 5%.  
 
                                                 
1 The old-age dependency ratio is also often expressed as the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to 
the population aged 15 and 64. The OECD (2004) has recently introduced an alternative definition for the 
working-age population to take account of the fact that many people aged 65 and over are still working 
and should therefore not be counted as dependent. The old-age dependency ratio should thus be defined 
as the ratio of inactive individuals aged 65 and over to the total labour force aged 15 and over. The new 
definition would lead to higher old-age dependency ratios, as it is measured over a larger total labour 
force.  
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Figure 3.1 The development of the old-age dependency ratio in the EU  
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Figure 3.2 The development of the youth dependency ratio in the EU  
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Figure 3.3 The development of the working-age population in the EU  
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In several countries the youth dependency ratio is expected to increase, which is the case for 
Italy and the Netherlands, although the increase is very small at 1%. The youth dependency 
ratio will stabilise in Denmark and Portugal. As the working-age population has to pay for both 
the young and the old, the overall impact of the demographic changes on the number of elderly 
and young persons indicates that the financial burden on the working-age population will 
increase significantly as the increase in the number elderly persons is far larger than the 
decrease in the number of young persons. 
Working-age population   
Figure 3.3 shows the development of the working-age population, defined as the number of 
people at working age (20-64) to the total population (aged 0-99). As can be concluded from the 
figure, this ratio will decline in all EU countries. Especially Italy and Spain will see their 
workforce decline at a relatively high rate. In 2050 their workforces will have declined by 12% 
and 11% respectively. The other countries can be distinguished in two groups: those that will 
face relatively high or low declines in their working-age population compared with the EU 
average. The former group includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece and Portugal. 
The latter group includes Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the UK; obviously these countries are better situated to face the challenges of population ageing 
than the first group. 
3.2 Data   
Demography 
Population, mortality, migration and fertility figures were based on Eurostat 2000 data, the 
central variant, and are presented in the appendix. These figures are projected until the year 
2050 by specific age category, i.e. age 0 to 90+. Because of the importance we attach to the 
oldest group in accurately determining the development of the use of health-care services and 
thereby expenditures, a further split in the oldest age group, i.e. 90+ was needed. In the 
appendix a description is given of the methodology that was used to obtain this desired split.  
Table 3.1 shows the development of the mortality rates for four broad age groups in the period 
between 2002 and 2050. As one can see, the decline in mortality rates differs widely between 
EU countries when looking at a specific age group. The expected declines become smaller as 
age increases but are still quite substantial for the oldest old. 
Table 3.1 Decline in mortality rates for four age categories to 2050 
0-64 65-79 80-89 90+
Austria 49% 45% 33% 26%
Belgium 45% 42% 28% 19%
Denmark 41% 38% 23% 7%
Finland 46% 42% 28% 18%
France 43% 40% 28% 12%
Germany 44% 39% 27% 15%
Greece 43% 41% 30% 22%
Ireland 44% 43% 29% 13%
Italy 44% 41% 30% 18%
Luxembourg 48% 42% 27% 0%
Netherlands 24% 29% 17% 7%
Portugal 47% 45% 31% 10%
Spain 34% 32% 21% 10%
Sweden 45% 43% 28% 8%
United Kingdom 45% 42% 29% 27% 
Source: Eurostat (2000). 18 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
Health-care profiles  
The age profiles for public health-care expenditure and long-term care expenditure were taken 
from the EPC (2001) study, which gives these age profiles for five-year age cohorts as a share 
of GDP per capita for most EU countries.
1 The first type of expenditures refers to the costs 
associated with cure activities and the latter to the costs associated with care activities or the 
costs that are required to help persons perform the essential tasks of living, which may be 
hampered through disability or other chronic illnesses.
2  These five-year age averages were 
divided to the respective age groups within those five years on an equal basis to obtain age 
profiles by age category.   
As we do not have information on the age profiles of health-care expenditure and long-term care 
expenditure for every EU country, but for some countries we do have information on the 
aggregate figure spent on these components, we make some simplifying assumptions to 
construct age profiles for these countries. Since we do not have any information on health-care 
expenditures for Luxembourg, even on an aggregate level, we are not able to perform 
projections for this country and leave it out of the exercise. From the EPC study we have data 
by age profile on health-care expenditure for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Aggregate figures are available for 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. To construct age profiles for these countries we use the average 
age profile of the 11 EU countries for which we do have information and apply this profile to 
the three countries mentioned. If we multiply the age profiles (0-4 to 95+) for each respective 
age category with the associated population figures, total health-care expenditures can be 
derived. The age profiles are then corrected by a factor if the total health-care expenditures 
calculated in this way deviate from the original figures to resemble the original total health-care 
expenditures.  
For long-term care we apply the same procedure to construct age profiles for the countries for 
which we have aggregate information but no age profiles. In this case we use the age profiles we 
have on long-term care for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Sweden to construct age profiles for France, Ireland and the UK. For Germany we prefer to use 
the figures provided by the DIW (the German partner in the AGIR project). These figures were 
constructed to closely match the definitions for health and long-term care costs as postulated by 
the EPC for this purpose.  
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the age profiles of health and long-term care for the EU countries for 
which we have information. As can be expected, both categories of costs rise with age. We can 
see that the difference between countries can become quite large, especially at higher ages. 
While health-care costs rise gradually with age, the increase in long-term care costs is very steep 
after the age of 75. This can be explained by the fact that at that age people start to consume 
long-term care services on a large scale, such as nursing home services. As age increases from 
there onwards it will become more likely that individuals need more institutionalised care in a 
rapid manner.  
 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Declan Costello of the EPC for supplying this information. 
2 For a precise definition of the kinds of services that belong to either health or long-term care, see the 
EPC (2001) report, annex 4.  ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 19 
Figure 3.4 Health-care expenditures by age profile  
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Figure 3.5 Long-term care expenditures by age profile  
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Cost of mortality, or total health-care costs during the last year of life 
As reported in chapter 1, the inclusion of the cost of mortality either in a strong or weak form 
significantly influences the projection of health-care expenditures. The exclusion of these costs 
would lead to an overestimation of health-care costs if life expectancy and thus time remaining 
to mortality improves. Health-care profiles thus have to be adjusted correctly to take account of 
changing mortality rates, as was done in chapter 2. In that chapter, however, we did not pay 
explicit attention to how these costs of mortality were constructed, which we turn to now. 
The studies mentioned in chapter 1 have either used hospital or insurance records to calculate 
the level of mortality costs by specific age category and sometimes by gender and race. In 
general these figures are expressed in either $USD figures or as a percentage of total budget 
expenditures. Owing to the difficulty of relating the precise outcomes in these studies to the 
health-care profiles we have,
3 as shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we use the general implications 
that follow from these studies. Below we discuss some of the studies that have investigated 
patterns in the cost of mortality, usually both by age and specific expenditure category.  
Serup Hansen et al. (2002) for example have investigated the difference in the costs of health 
care for survivors and non-survivors in Denmark for all ages, for both primary health-care 
services and hospital inpatient services. Owing to data limitations they did not include long-term 
care costs. They found that the costs of non-survivors, i.e. the costs of mortality, are 
substantially higher than for survivors for both health-care categories, although the differences 
are more marked for inpatient services. Moreover, they find that these costs decline with age 
and are highest at very young ages. Specifically, at young ages they find a large difference 
between the costs of survivors and non-survivors. At higher ages the average expenditures of 
both survivors and non-survivors are very similar. One possible reason they offer for these 
results regarding inpatient services is that individuals at younger ages may receive higher 
priority relative to older age groups, thus pushing down average expenditures by age category.  
Levinsky et al. (2001) find similar evidence that health-care expenditure for decedents declines 
with age in an American study for California and Massachusetts. Their study embodies all kinds 
of Medicare expenditures for persons aged 65 and over. For example, they find that while the 
expenditures of non-survivors during the last years of life is on average $35,300 for those aged 
65-74, it is lower for older age groups – $30,900 for those aged 75-84 and $22,000 for persons 
aged 85 and older. They do not, however, relate the amount of these costs to those of survivors 
in these age groups and do not include long-term care costs in their analysis.  
Roos et al. (1987), in one of the earliest studies focusing on the importance of the cost of 
mortality when projecting future health-care expenditure, explore the difference in health costs 
between survivors and non-survivors during the last four years of life. They include hospital 
usage, nursing home usage and visits to physicians in their study of Manitoba in Canada. Not 
only do they find a significant difference in health-care usage between survivors and non-
survivors, which increases as the time span until mortality becomes shorter, they also find that 
total health-care costs among decedents increase with age. This can be mainly attributed to the 
increase in mean days of residence in nursing homes, which increases rapidly with age. They 
find for example that while male decedents aged 45-64 stayed on average 7.2 days in nursing 
homes during the last year of their life, men aged 85 years and older stay on average 110.8 days. 
Similar results were found with regard to women. Overall, they find that the costs in the last 
                                                 
3 This difficulty is among other reasons caused by the specific health-care and long-term care services 
investigated in the various studies, which do not match the composition of health-care and long-term care 
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four years of life of those aged 85 years and older are approximately 31% higher than those of 
individuals aged 75 to 84 and 79% higher than those of individuals aged 65 to 74.  
Spillman and Lubitz (2000) analyse expenditures in the last two years of life for Medicare 
services as well as nursing home care and a variety of other services in a broader study on the 
effect of longevity on spending for acute and long-term care. They find the same decline in 
expenditures of health care with age, measured from age 65 to 100, as in Levinsky et al. (2001) 
and Serup Hansen et al. (2002), but like Roos et al. (1987) they also find a steep increase in 
nursing home care with age. On balance the rise in these long-term care costs outweighs the 
decline in Medicare services and leads to an upward trend in total health-care cost with age. 
Their study does not relate these figures to those of survivors at these ages and also only 
concentrates on those persons aged 65 and over.   
From these studies it can be concluded that the cost of mortality can best be portrayed as a kind 
of u-shaped curve if related to age. At young ages the costs of mortality are relatively high 
owing to expensive high-tech medical treatments that are at that age usually used in order to 
save a young person’s life. From a certain age these costs then gradually decline. At higher 
ages, however, long-term care costs become important during the last years of life and result in 
an upward rise in total mortality costs by age.  
As previously mentioned, we do not know the exact age profiles for the costs pertaining to non-
survivors for the different EU countries and how these relate to the health-care profiles we do 
have, so our procedure is as follows. To obtain comparable results across countries, we follow a 
standard approach for each EU country. First we divide total population into four broad age 
groups, those aged 0-34, 35-64, 65-84 and 85+, to reflect the young, the middle-aged, the old 
and the oldest-old age categories respectively. The cost of mortality will differ between these 
four age groups but is the same within an age group. Second, we assume a constant cost of 
mortality as a benchmark that equals the highest average total cost of health and long-term care, 
i.e. those of a person aged 95 and older as can be seen in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. We then at least 
know that the cost of non-survivors will be higher than the cost of survivors for all age groups 
under 95 as total health costs increase with age and reach their maximum at age 95. To reflect 
the difference in the average mortality cost between ages we then multiply this benchmark cost 
by different factors to obtain a sort of u-shaped curve. In appendix A.3 we test the sensitivity of 
the assumption embodied in this chosen approach by using either lower or higher mortality costs 
for certain age categories.  
In our projections we now assume that the costs of mortality for the 0-34 age group equals twice 
the amount of our benchmark cost of mortality (that is the average health-care costs for a person 
aged 95), for those aged 35-64 it is equal to the benchmark, for those aged 65-84 it is one and a 
half times that amount and for those aged 85 and older it is twice that amount. This approach 
obviously has its shortcomings in that it may not adequately represent the real mortality costs; 
however, we prefer to include some measure of mortality costs in our model rather than none at 
all. Nevertheless, further investigation about the difference in mortality costs by age and, 
especially at ages under 65, specific country and specific composition in health-care and long-
term care components seems warranted.  
Various studies have found the costs of mortality to be relatively constant through time when 
corrected for any yearly cost increases
4 so we also assume them to be constant. A change in 
mortality costs affects health-care expenditures. 
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As the costs of mortality or the costs incurred during the last years of life consist of both health- 
and long-term care expenditures and the composition of total expenditures in both categories 
varies by age, the costs of mortality will be subtracted from these respective components by 
different percentages at different ages as explained in chapter 2. We use the division made in 
Table 2.1 for every EU country. Thus at age 65-69, the mortality costs are subtracted by 91% 
from the health-care costs and by 9% from the long-term care costs. As can be seen, at older 
ages a large part of the costs of mortality is subtracted from the average long-term care costs of 
an individual. Figure 3.6 shows this total mortality cost decomposed into health-care and long-
term care for an illustrative
5  EU country with average mortality costs of €30,000. Here D 
represents total mortality costs, DH and DL the respective health-care and long-term care 
components to make up these total mortality costs. 
Figure 3.6 Division of mortality costs into health- and long-term care components 
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Costs of health per person 
Figure 3.7 presents the costs of health care per person for an illustrative EU country and the 
various components it comprises as discussed in the previous paragraphs. D as in Figure 3.6 
represents the cost of mortality. T represents total health costs and increases with age; it is the 
sum of mortality-related expenditures D and medical-related expenditures U. Using the age-
specific mortality rates, U is calculated by subtracting the fraction of costs related to mortality 
from total medical expenditures. This fraction can be calculated as a weighted average of the 
probabilities of surviving and not surviving multiplied by the respective associated costs. As 
mortality rates increase with age, T and U  diverge at later ages as a bigger part of total 
expenditures is then made up of costs related to mortality, which rise from age 65 and onwards. 
DH,  DL,  UH and UL in turn are the health-care costs and long-term care costs of which 
respectively the mortality costs D and total medical expenditures U are made up. UH and UL 
                                                 
5 The illustrative EU country is a weighted average of the EU countries for which we have all the desired 
data needed to perform our projections. Countries for which we have no long-term care profiles, for 
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are corrected to include the cost of mortality component and thus decline at later ages when both 
mortality rates and the level associated with the cost of mortality increases. (For an overview of 
the various relations see also chapter 2.) 
Figure 3.7 Costs of health per person for an illustrative EU country 
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Pension expenditures 
Aggregate figures for pension expenditures are taken from the EPC (2001) study. Public 
pension expenditure including most public replacement revenues is given for those persons aged 
55 and over as a percentage of GDP in the year 2000 for every EU country. As we want our 
base case scenario to resemble the 2050 figures for pension expenditures in the EPC study, we 
use the yearly indexation as a calibration tool to arrive approximately at these figures.
6 These 
calibrated yearly indexation figures are shown in Table 3.2. Thus both the figures in the 
beginning as well as at the end coincide largely with those of the EPC study in our base case 
scenario. The time path between these periods will, however, differ owing to the different 
dynamics of our own model. 
As explained in chapter 2, we use the base figures of the EPC study to calculate average pension 
expenditures per person and from there on we are able to develop our own model from which 
we can calculate the development of pension expenditure until 2050 under different scenarios.  
                                                 
6 Pension expenditures in 2050, expressed as a percentage of GDP, deviate marginally from the EPC 
(2001) projections in 2050 owing to our wish to obtain relatively straightforward indexation-percentages 
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Table 3.2 Yearly calibrated indexation percentages for EU countries   
Austria 0,7% Italy  0,4%
Belgium 1,3% Luxembourg 1,4%
Denmark 1,2% Netherlands 1,9%
Finland 1,2% Portugal  1,3%
France 1,2% Spain 1,6%
Germany 1,4% Sweden  1,2%
Greece 2,1% United  Kingdom 0,2%
Ireland 1,8%  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The model used in the EPC (2001) study to calculate pension expenditures incorporates a much 
finer structure and is based on richer and more detailed information than our calibration 
procedure. For example, we do not exactly know the number of beneficiaries aged 55 and older 
who are entitled to a pension, a pre-retirement, disability or unemployment benefit. To 
approximate for this number, we assume that everyone aged 65 and over, women and men, 
receive a pension as this is the most common mandatory retirement age in the EU for both. We 
revise this figure to account for any labour force participation that takes place at ages older than 
65, since those persons will in general receive no pension benefits. For persons aged 55 to 64 
we use data from wave 7 of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to obtain the 
percentage of those in this age category who receive either a pre-retirement pension, disability 
or unemployment benefit. We use the questions on income to retrieve the respective percentages 
of those who are unemployed, disabled or who have retired early by age category. We are then 
able to approximate for the number of persons who receive a benefit and thus are able to 
determine the total number of individuals who are eligible.  
The number of persons who are eligible for a benefit may be overestimated in our model for 
several EU countries, which will lead to a lower average expenditure per person. This is 
especially true for those countries where for example a large number of women receive no 
pension or for those countries that have a relatively large percentage of persons out of the labour 
force who receive no entitlements. But the lower average pension expenditure per person that 
results from this overestimation will be corrected for in the projections by a larger number of 
persons who receive a benefit. A second shortcoming in our model is the use of uniform average 
pension expenditure per person, as this does not take account of the large differences that exist 
between persons who receive entitlements and pension systems across the EU. The level of the 
pension benefit depends on the work history of each individual and the amount of the respective 
salary before retiring in many EU countries, among other factors. Heterogeneity between 
persons is thus lost.  
Yet we would like to emphasise that while our model may lack certain features that give it a 
more realistic character, its main quality lies in projecting the future trends for which it was 
designed. Thus while it may be wrong on the micro level, it is right at the macro level, which is 
most relevant for our projection exercises. 
Health indicator  
As has been extensively described in WP1, it has been difficult to both measure the health status 
of the population and predict the trend of the health status in the future. Although self-assessed 
health data are readily available for most countries from national sources and show consistent 
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shortcomings in terms of subjectivity and comparability through time. As FEDEA concludes in 
WP1, Bio-Demographic Aspects of Ageing (Ahn et al., 2004b), it is very hard to establish any 
clear trend in health status or health expectancies from the examination of data from national 
health surveys. Recent figures from the OECD (2003b) confirm this result for the variable 
perceived health status in the period ranging from 1978 to 2000. For the most part, a clear trend 
is not observable through time for a lot of countries and there are contradictory results when 
looking at specific age groups. For example, OECD data show a decline in perceived health 
status for the 15-24 age group for the countries for which data are available, a stabilisation or 
decline for the 25-44 age group, an increase in perceived health for the 45-64 group and no clear 
trend for the group aged 65+. The difference rather seems to point to a generational gap in 
interpreting one’s own health than a real difference or trend. Self-assessed health data are also 
difficult to compare through time because people will adjust their view on health as they 
become used to receiving better care and cures as welfare improves. The perception of health 
thus may change through time. For a review of the reliability of self-assessed health data see 
also Ahn et al. (2004b) and Bound (1991).  
To obtain a more objective measure for the change in health through time we therefore use the 
more standardised data calculated by FEDEA in Ahn et al. (2004b), which is life expectancy in 
good health. We use the projections that are calculated on the hypothesis of compression of 
morbidity. This compression theory points to the fact that while on average people will live 
longer as time elapses, the maximum age people can reach will stay the same. The above-
mentioned expectancies are given at both age 15 and age 65 for both sexes. Our aim is to use the 
change in health status, which can be derived from changes in the remaining life expectancies, 
to measure the impact of changed health on labour force participation on the one hand and on 
the other hand to relate health changes to health-care expenditures. In the latter case we do not 
have separate health-care profiles for men and women and therefore use the aggregate figures 
that follow from the trend for men and women for life expectancy in good health. Table 3.3 
shows the evolution of these indicators until 2025 and the implied percentage change in health 
status that can be derived from these developments, i.e. between 1996 and 2025. As we perform 
projections until 2050, we assume that health will develop at the same annual rate in the period 
between 2026 and 2050 as in the period between 2011 and 2025. For the countries for which 
this information is not available we have assumed that the health change corresponds to that of 
the unweighted EU average. This is the case for Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden.  
Table 3.3 Remaining life expectancy in good health, until 2025  
1996 2010 2025 1996-2010 2011-2025 1996 2010 2025 1996-2010 2011-2025
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,67 4,21 n.a. n.a. n.a. 28,6 19,2
Belgium 44,6 47,3 49,1 6,12 3,78 7,6 9,3 10,5 21,6 13,1
Denmark 46,2 48,6 50,3 5,18 3,54 8,2 9,6 10,7 16,2 11,8
Finland n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,67 4,21 n.a. n.a. n.a. 28,6 19,2
France 36,6 39,0 40,8 6,75 4,60 5,3 6,7 7,8 26,1 17,2
Germany 28,6 32,1 33,9 11,98 5,48 3,0 4,7 5,9 59,4 26,0
Greece 47,4 48,4 50,1 2,22 3,51 5,8 6,8 8,0 16,9 17,9
Ireland 48,4 50,9 52,7 5,01 3,61 8,3 10,0 11,3 20,0 13,0
Italy 35,9 38,0 39,8 5,95 4,58 3,4 5,0 6,2 44,8 24,7
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,67 4,21 n.a. n.a. n.a. 28,6 19,2
Netherlands 45,0 47,0 48,6 4,30 3,46 7,7 9,2 10,4 19,6 12,5
Portugal 29,3 31,3 33,4 6,87 6,40 1,7 2,7 4,0 62,2 48,4
Spain 40,7 41,6 43,0 2,27 3,24 5,4 6,2 7,1 15,6 14,1
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,67 4,21 n.a. n.a. n.a. 28,6 19,2
United Kingdom 42,9 45,4 47,3 5,71 4,10 9,3 10,4 11,8 12,1 12,8
% change by period  % change by period 
Age 15 Age 65
 
Source: Ahn et al. (2004b), figures for Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden are unweighted 
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Relation between health and participation  
As many studies have shown,
7 better health is positively correlated with actively being at work, 
especially at later ages. Persons with bad health are more likely to retire at earlier ages either 
through disability or unemployment schemes. Along with financial incentives,
8 health is the 
most important variable explaining the transition out of work before the legal retirement age.  
For our projections we are especially interested in the impact of health on the decision to leave 
the labour force. For this purpose we use existing studies on this subject to calculate elasticities 
that present this relation. In our projections in chapters 8 and 9 we use the results found by 
Börsch Supan (2000). In a multi-period probit model of the retirement decision, he relates the 
dependent variable labour-force status ‘retired’ to such variables as financial incentives, health, 
age, education and a variety of other socio-economic variables. We use the results he finds in 
Table 2, model 1 of the report to calculate exit probabilities by age and health category, which 
ranges from 0 for very poor to 10 for excellent. Coupled with the respective population figures 
in the different health categories, we can calculate how many persons exit the labour force for 
each respective health category. We also have the average health status of the sample that he 
uses for his estimations. If we then simulate a health change, by for example letting 30% of the 
persons belonging to a certain health category move up a health category, from 1 to 2, from 2 to 
3, etc., we can calculate how this influences the number of persons who exit the labour force. If 
the change in the number of exits is related to the respective average health change, elasticities 
guiding this relation can be obtained. For the research done by Börsch Supan we found an 
elasticity of 0.8. A 1% increase in average health would thus lead to 0.8% fewer persons 
quitting the labour force. By varying the health changes in the simulations we tested the 
sensitivity of this relation and found that this was robust to different changes and ages. This 
elasticity is applied in a uniform manner in all EU countries. (See also chapter 2 for a specific 
description of the effect of a health change on labour force participation.)  
Heyma (2001) has also investigated the effect of simulated health effects on retirement using the 
Dutch panel data of CERRA. Using a multinomial logit model in which he distinguishes 
between three alternative exit routes, which are early retirement, disability and unemployment 
schemes, he calculates how a health change affects the probability of exit into any of these 
routes. He finds that the effect of a health change has the biggest impact on either entry to or 
exit from disability schemes (depending on whether health deteriorates or improves), with an 
elasticity of approximately 0.55 if health improves from the observed situation to a situation in 
which everyone has perfect health. The effects of improvements in health on early retirement 
are nevertheless very small (elasticity of about 0.1) indicating that the decision to retire earlier is 
not influenced much by health considerations. These effects are broadly consistent across ages.  
These results show that the relation between health and labour force participation may 
substantially differ among countries and exit routes. Among other factors it will depend on the 
generosity of the available exit routes and the strictness of the eligibility requirements. More 
specific research in this field is needed.  
Relation between health and health-care expenditures  
Healthier persons are assumed to consume health-care services to a lesser extent than those with 
a worse health status. An improvement in health over time would thus lead to a decline in 
health-care expenditures for the average person. The magnitude of this change depends on 
                                                 
7   See for example Börsch Supan (2000) and Kerkhofs et al. (1999). For an overview of the 
retirement/health literature, see Heyma (2001). 
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several factors. It is linked first of all to the cause of this health improvement, whether this is 
achieved for example by undergoing better treatment or more medicines or by a genuine 
exogenous improvement in health without any associated increase in medical treatment or 
similar expenditures (for example owing to changed health behaviour in the past). Age will 
likewise be a determining factor. The older a person is, the more likely it is that the increase in 
health is related to more-intensive medical treatment and the less the eventual reduction in 
expenditures on health care is deemed to be. As Table 3.3 shows, we have life expectancies at 
both age 15 and age 65 and to keep things simple we therefore only use two percentages that 
relate health improvements to health-care expenditures, i.e. one for age 0 to 64 and one for age 
65 and older. As we do not have specific information about the exact relation between health 
status and health-care expenditures we apply the same procedure as in the last paragraph and 
use results found in the literature, and apply this in a general manner to all EU countries for 
which we perform projections.  
Lubitz et al. (2003) investigate the relation between health, life expectancy and health care for 
persons aged 70 and over for Medicare beneficiaries in the US. This study concentrates on the 
difference in lifetime expenditures between persons with various health states,
9 but  average 
health-care expenditure by health status per broad age group is also reported. As we have 
already incorporated demography developments in our model, it is precisely the annual 
difference in expenditures between various health states that we are looking for. 
Lubitz et al. for example find that active persons with no limitations spend on average $4,600 
per year on health care, while persons with a Nagi limitation
10 spend on average $5,800 per year 
on health care. Healthier individuals thus spend on average 20% less on health care than those 
with a Nagi limitation. We use this relation to relate health changes to health-care expenditures 
for those persons aged 65 and over. A positive average health change, of for instance 5% per 
year, will then lead to a 1% reduction in total expenditures. For persons below that age we have 
no specific information. Using the fact that people are on average healthier at younger ages, we 
assume that their improvement in health can for 30% of the time be attributed to exogenous 
factors. A 1% increase in health will thus lead to 30% less expenditure on total health care.  
Government statistics  
Total government revenues, expenditures and debt figures for the year 2001 to 2004 are taken 
from the OECD (2003a) general government statistics. To calculate the amount spent on 
disability benefits and other social security benefits we use the percentages found in the social 
expenditure database of the OECD (2001), which gives the percentages of GDP spent on public 
social expenditure. Pension and health-care expenditures follow from our own calculations. 
Education expenditures as a percentage of GDP are taken from the EPC study in 2003. In this 
report the individual member states have supplied information on the development of education 
expenditures until 2050. Because the number of young persons will decline, in most member 
                                                 
9 They find that lifetime expenditures on health care do not differ between persons with different health 
states. This can be attributed to the fact that while persons in good health on average spend less on health 
care per year compared with those in bad health, they tend to live longer. Overall expenditures are 
therefore found not to differ much between various health states if one looks at health-care costs paid 
during the remaining lifetime.  
10 A Nagi limitation was defined as the difficulty performing or inability to perform at least one of five 
activities: stooping, crouching or kneeling; lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 4.5 kg (10 lb); 
extending the arms above the shoulder; grasping small objects; and walking two to three blocks (Lubitz et 
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states these expenditures are also expected to decline.
11 We apply the specified reduction by 
each country to these expenditures between 2002 and 2050 to incorporate this effect. From 2004 
onwards government finances will develop as sketched out in chapter 2.  
3.3  The assumptions in the base case scenario 
Labour productivity 
Labour productivity is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 1.75% for all EU countries. No 
difference is made between age categories, so that productivity does not rise with age. In 
chapter 8 we investigate how ageing may influence productivity and how this changes our base 
case results.  
Labour force participation  
The projection of labour force participation rates for the base case scenario are based on 
estimates used by the Economic Policy Committee of the European Commission as prepared by 
the working group on ageing. These are in part based on projections by the International Labour 
Organisation until 2010 and are adjusted from 2010 onwards in order to take account of the 
expected increase in the participation rates of women. The rise in labour force participation rates 
can thus be fully attributed to the rising participation by as those of men are held constant or 
decline slightly.  
Risk-free interest rate 
The nominal interest rate is set at 5.75% and inflation at 2%. In chapter 10 we investigate how a 
different interest rate, respectively 1% higher or lower, changes the base case results. In chapter 
11 we consider in more detail the relation between population ageing and the interest rate and 
how the implementation of a more variable path for the interest rate taking account of this factor 
changes our base case results.   
The impact of the business cycle 
The government finance figures for the years 2001 and 2004 were taken from the OECD 
(2003a) and are not cyclically adjusted. As these figures mostly correspond to a time when all 
economies had low growth rates and thus larger government deficits than in a neutral economic 
environment, government finances and government debt would evolve more positively if we 
had taken the cyclically adjusted figures. But in general the effect would be very marginal and 
therefore we have chosen to use the unadjusted OECD figures.    
                                                 
11 Gradstein and Kaganovich (2003) argue that education expenditures may increase if enough people see 
the benefit of improved education on productivity. In an OLG economy with young people, persons of 
working age and the elderly, an expected increase in life expectancy may make the working-age 
population more aware of the need to increase productivity to pay for future pensions, as the period over 
which they receive a pension increases. This will increase their incentives to invest in education to boost 
productivity and may override the tendencies of elderly persons to cut education expenditures in order to 
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Part I 
n chapter 4 and the subsequent chapters in part II, projections of health-care expenditures, 
pension expenditures and government finances are carried out for the period from 2002 to 
2050. We concentrate on public expenditures in these fields and abstract from any 
developments in private expenditures, as we focus on the impact of population ageing on public 
finances. The main aim of these exercises is to show how population ageing affects these 
expenditures and how the sustainability of government finances is influenced by this process. In 
this chapter we calculate how the development of health-care expenditures and pension 
expenditures evolves for the 15 members of the EU using the demographic projections from 
Eurostat and the various macroeconomic assumptions, regarding, among others, labour force 
participation, the interest rate and productivity growth as made in chapter 3. No account is taken 
of any other factors that are frequently mentioned to influence health-care expenditures, such as 
the introduction of new medical technologies or the price development in medicines, as a result 
of the difficulty of modelling these processes. The projections that result from this exercise will 
be treated as the base case scenario with which other scenarios will be compared. They should 
give a first impression of the effect of population ageing on health-care expenditure, pension 
expenditure and government finances using the best data currently available. These projections 
broadly coincide with the projections made for pension and health-care expenditure in the EPC 
study. The projections of health-care expenditure differ from the EPC (2001) study owing to the 
inclusion of the cost of mortality. This will lead to lower expenditures than projected in the EPC 
scenario. Also, our division of the health-care profiles by five-year cohorts to the specific age 
cohorts within that group may influence final projections. In our projections, we assume that 
health-care expenditures grow yearly at the rate of 1.75%, which is about equal to the rate of 
GDP per worker in the EPC study.    
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Chapter 4 
Base case scenario 
4.1  Projections for health- and long-term care expenditures  
Health-care expenditures  
Table 4.1 shows the projected development in health-care expenditure until 2050 for 
expenditures on health care, long-term care and total health care and long-term care. The 
development in these costs follows from the methodology explained in chapter 2 for the cure 
and care components. The respective health-care profiles by age category also rise annually with 
the yearly growth of labour productivity, which is set at 1.75%, to keep the share of health-care 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP approximately constant. The first six columns display 
health-care expenditure/GDP ratios for a number of selected years. The last column presents the 
rate of increase in percentage points between 2002 and 2050.  
Health care 
Health-care expenditures, expressed as a percentage of GDP, varied widely among countries in 
2002, ranging from 3.9% in the UK to 6.5% in Germany and on average are some 5.4% of GDP 
in the EU. The EU average thus presents a weighted average of all EU countries. As Table 4.1 
shows, the amount of spending on health care will rise steadily for all EU countries, as 
measured as a percentage of GDP, as populations start ageing.  
The rise in expenditures varies from 0.6% in Denmark to 2.7% in Spain during the time period 
until 2050. For the EU as a whole these expenditures are expected to increase on average by 
1.7% and will in 2050 account for 7.1% of GDP. Looking at the figures more closely one can 
see that the steepest rise in health- and long-term care expenditures take effect in the period 
from 2010 until 2040, when the baby-boom generation in most EU countries is making full use 
of the health-care system and the increase in expenditures rises by some 0.5% of GDP every 10 
years in this period. From 2040 and onwards, expenditures rise at slower rates and one can see 
that expenditures in several countries, such as Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands 
actually start to decline, while expenditures in Finland, Germany and Italy have more or less 
stabilised at their 2040 level. Expenditures in Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
and the UK continue to grow however. A priori it is not straightforward to predict which 
countries will face the largest increases in expenditures on health care. This depends on 
demographic trends, the health-care profiles of each country and developments in the labour 
force participation of the population, which for a large part determines the development of the 
GDP. A comparison of respective increases in health-care expenditures between countries may 
also be troublesome because the definitions of which expenditure categories belong to health 
and which to long-term care differ somewhat among countries
1 and thus one should also look at 
the combined figures for health and long-term care. 
 
                                                 
1 This is especially relevant for those countries for which no long-term care figures are available and 
where part of the services belonging to this category is incorporated in the health-care profiles in the first 
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Table 4.1 Projections of public expenditure on health- and long-term care, base case scenario  
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050
Austria 5,1 5,5 6,1 7,0 7,5 7,7 2,5
Belgium 5,2 5,5 6,0 6,7 7,0 6,9 1,7
Denmark 4,0 4,2 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,6 0,6
Finland 4,8 5,3 6,0 6,5 6,7 6,7 1,9
France 5,5 5,8 6,3 7,0 7,3 7,4 1,9
Germany 6,5 6,8 7,5 8,3 8,9 8,9 2,4
Greece 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,5 6,0 6,1 1,4
Ireland 5,6 5,5 5,7 6,1 6,4 6,6 1,0
Italy 5,5 5,8 6,3 7,0 7,7 7,7 2,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,0 5,4 5,7 5,7 5,5 0,8
Portugal 5,3 5,6 5,8 6,2 6,8 7,0 1,7
Spain 6,2 6,4 6,8 7,6 8,6 8,9 2,7
Sweden 5,1 5,2 5,6 5,9 6,1 6,0 0,9
United Kingdom 3,9 3,9 4,1 4,5 4,8 4,9 0,9
EU average 5,4 5,6 6,1 6,6 7,1 7,1 1,7
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050
Austria 0,6 0,7 0,8 1,1 1,3 1,6 1,0
Belgium 0,7 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,5 1,6 0,9
Denmark 2,2 2,4 2,7 3,4 3,9 4,1 1,9
Finland 1,5 1,7 2,1 2,8 3,3 3,3 1,9
France 0,7 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,4 1,5 0,8
Germany 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,4
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,2 0,6
Italy 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,2 1,2 0,5
Luxembourg n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 2,8 3,2 3,9 4,4 4,5 1,9
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
S p a i n n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .n . a .
Sweden 2,4 2,5 2,7 3,5 4,1 4,3 2,0
United Kingdom 1,7 1,8 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,4 1,7
EU average 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,8 0,9
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050
Austria 5,8 6,2 6,9 8,1 8,9 9,3 3,5
Belgium 5,9 6,3 7,0 7,9 8,5 8,5 2,6
Denmark 6,2 6,6 7,1 8,1 8,6 8,7 2,5
Finland 6,3 7,0 8,1 9,3 10,0 10,0 3,7
France 6,2 6,6 7,3 8,1 8,8 8,9 2,7
Germany 6,7 7,1 7,9 8,8 9,4 9,5 2,8
Greece 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,5 6,0 6,1 1,4
Ireland 6,3 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,5 7,9 1,6
Italy 6,2 6,6 7,2 8,0 8,8 8,9 2,7
Luxembourg n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 7,8 8,6 9,6 10,1 10,0 2,7
Portugal 5,3 5,6 5,8 6,2 6,8 7,0 1,7
Spain 6,2 6,4 6,8 7,6 8,6 8,9 2,7
Sweden 7,5 7,8 8,3 9,5 10,1 10,4 2,9
United Kingdom 5,7 5,7 6,1 7,0 7,8 8,3 2,6
EU average 6,2 6,6 7,2 8,0 8,7 8,9 2,7  
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Long-term care  
The projections for long-term care expenditures until 2050, for the countries for which 
information is available, are shown in the second part of Table 4.1.
2  At the onset, total 
expenditures vary from 0.3% of GDP in Germany to 2.6% for the Netherlands and on average 
account for 0.9% of GDP in the EU. As shown in other studies, the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are those that historically provide 
formal care on a large scale such as in nursing homes and other institutions for the elderly and 
thus spend a large part of their GDP on this care component. The countries that face the largest 
increases in expenditure are respectively Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
UK. The average for the EU shows that long-term care expenditures are expected to double in 
the projection period under review. Looking at the figures in terms of GDP, Denmark, Sweden 
and the Netherlands will spend more than 4% of their GDP on long-term care in 2050. 
Expenditures on this care component will in time become almost equal in size to that of the cure 
component in these countries. This can be explained by the fact that the ageing of populations 
will lead to a greater increase in demand for care than for cure services. While cure expenditures 
tend to decline somewhat after 2040, this pattern is less obvious for long-term care as the 
development in the EU average from 1.7 to 1.8% in the period between 2040 and 2050 shows. 
But expenditures seem to stabilise in both Finland and Italy by 2040. In the other EU countries 
the rise in expenditures after 2040 is less steep than before this period, although the increases in 
Austria and the UK remain large, with respective increases of 0.3% and 0.4% of GDP during 
2040 and 2050. A comparison of the projected increases in expenditures between health- and 
long-term care shows that the relative increase in expenditures for long-term care are much 
larger than for health care, an increase of 103.4% for long-term care compared with an increase 
of 32.8% for health care. This can be explained by the fact that long-term care is used more 
intensively by elderly persons and is thus influenced more by the ageing process as reflected in 
the demography figures in Figure 3.1.  
Total health-care and long-term care expenditures  
Total health- and long-term care expenditure varies at the onset between 4.7% of GDP for 
Greece to 7.5% for Sweden and on average accounts for 6.2% of GDP for the EU. The countries 
that will face the largest increases in total health-care expenditure are expected to be Austria and 
Finland, which will see their expenditures rise by 3.5% and 3.7%. Most other countries will see 
their expenditures rise in the range of 2.5% to 2.9% with positive exceptions being Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. The EU average will grow by 2.7% during this period and reach 8.9% of 
GDP, with only a relatively small increase occurring in the period between 2040 and 2050. As a 
result of the unavailability of any information on long-term care for Greece and several other 
countries, it remains premature to accurately predict the development of expenditures on total 
health- and long-term care in these countries, as ageing especially influences the long-term care 
expenditures. For these countries the given projections should therefore be taken as minimum 
values. Overall figures tell us that total health-care expenditures have more or less stabilised 
after 2040 in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece and Italy, while those of 
the Netherlands actually decline after this period. Expenditures in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, 
                                                 
2 In the projections of long-term care, we have not taken account of any relation between the increase in 
the labour force participation of women and the associated reduction in capacity to provide care on an 
informal basis to, for example, their spouse or other relatives. Especially in countries where this informal 
care is important, such as in the southern European countries, an increase in the labour market 
participation of women may underestimate the projected increase in long-term care expenditures. These 
projections should therefore be taken as in the lower boundary of estimates.  ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 33 
Spain, Sweden and the UK will, however, continue to increase, mostly owing to extra 
expenditures on long-term care in these countries for which this information is available. 
The age structure  
The age structure of total health-care expenditures changes markedly through time as Table 4.2 
shows for an illustrative EU country.  
Table 4.2 Health-care expenditures by broad age groups  
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
0-19 1,9% 1,6% 1,2% 1,0% 0,9% 0,7%
20-64 16,5% 14,4% 12,2% 10,1% 8,0% 6,8%
65-89 68,3% 72,3% 70,2% 70,4% 72,1% 71,3%
90+ 13,2% 11,8% 16,4% 18,5% 19,1% 21,2%  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
The total amount of health-care expenditures accounted for by expenditures on the younger age 
groups, i.e. 0-19 and 20-64 declines rapidly through time, while expenditures on persons aged 
65 and over increases. The percentage of total expenditures flowing to the group aged 90+ 
increases substantially. In 2050, this group will on average incur three times the expenditures on 
health-care than the total group aged 0-64, i.e. 21.2% for the group aged 90+ compared with 
7.5% for the group aged 0-64. In 2000, the group aged 0-64 incurred on average 18.4% of the 
total expenditure outlays compared with 13.2% for the group aged 90+. 
4.2  Projections of public pension expenditures 
Public pension expenditures  
Table 4.3 shows the projection of pension expenditures in the base case scenario, which 
approximately coincides with the projections made by the individual members of the EPC, 
although the dynamics in the years between the start and end year of the projection differ. The 
population ageing effect captured by the demographic changes occurring in this period is in 
most countries the most important factor contributing to the increase in expenditures on 
pensions.
3 The strange result for the UK can be attributed to the indexation mechanism that is 
used in this country, in which pension benefits are linked to inflation (which grows at a slower 
rate than GDP). Ultimately this results in a lowering of the pension expenditures when 
compared with the base case scenario.
4 The countries that are most affected by the coming 
population ageing process are Greece, Spain and the Netherlands. Countries that are least 
affected by it are the UK, Italy, Sweden and Luxembourg, with projected increases of less than 
                                                 
3 The EPC (2001) study identifies four factors that drive the expected increase in expenditures on public 
pensions: a population ageing effect (reflecting changes in the ratio of persons aged 55 and over to the 
population aged 15 to 54); an employment effect (measuring changes in the share of the working-age 
population); an eligibility effect (measuring the share of the population who receive pensions); and a 
benefit effect (reflecting changes in the average pension benefit relative to output per worker). In the 
projection period, the population ageing effect will lead to an increase in pension expenditures. The 
employment and benefit effects will lower expenditures on public pensions while the eligibility effect 
shows mixed results among EU countries. The population ageing effect is, however, by far the most 
dominant factor contributing to the increase in expenditures on public pensions.  
4 The benefit effect in this country dominates the dependency effect. 34 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
2% in pension expenditures. As outlined in the EPC (2001) report, the main reason behind these 
relatively small increases for Italy and Sweden is the introduction of Notional Defined 
Contribution Schemes in the 1990s in these countries. These schemes not only directly link 
contributions and entitlements but also automatically adjust benefits to changes in life 
expectancy and thus reduce the burden of population ageing.  
Table 4.3 Expenditures on public pensions, base case scenario (% of GDP) 
2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050
Austria 14,5 15,0 16,2 18,8 18,5 17,0 2,5
Belgium 10,0 10,9 12,6 14,3 14,2 13,2 3,1
Denmark 10,6 12,3 13,5 14,7 14,6 13,1 2,5
Finland 11,5 14,1 16,3 17,0 16,4 15,8 4,3
France 12,1 13,2 15,1 16,8 17,1 16,4 4,2
Germany 11,9 12,6 14,4 17,1 17,6 16,8 4,9
Greece 12,8 14,0 16,1 18,9 22,7 24,7 11,9
Ireland 4,6 4,8 5,8 6,8 7,8 8,7 4,1
Italy 13,9 14,3 14,8 16,1 16,2 14,1 0,2
Luxembourg 7,4 8,2 9,3 10,6 10,4 9,2 1,7
Netherlands 8,1 9,6 12,0 14,1 14,2 13,5 5,4
Portugal 9,8 10,2 10,7 11,7 13,1 13,1 3,3
Spain 9,5 10,0 11,3 13,7 16,7 17,4 7,9
Sweden 9,0 9,6 10,4 11,0 11,0 10,6 1,6
United Kingdom 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,6 5,1 4,4 -1,0
EU average  10,5 11,1 12,2 13,8 14,2 13,4 2,9  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
One can see a clear distinction between countries that see their expenditures on pensions 
gradually decline in time, usually after 2030 or 2040, and those countries that continue to be 
confronted by increases in pension expenditures. This latter group includes Ireland, Greece and 
Spain. For the EU, pension expenditures are on average expected to increase by 2.9% in the 
period from 2002 to 2050, increasing from 10.5% to 13.4% of GDP in this period. Compared 
with the expected increase in total health-care expenditures, the increase in pension 
expenditures is somewhat larger than that for total health care and long-term care.   
4.3  Government finances  
From the projections for health and pension expenditure in the previous sections it could be seen 
that the demographic changes awaiting the EU until 2050 will influence public expenditures 
significantly. In this section we investigate how the development in these expenditures 
influences government finances and more specifically whether government finances are 
sustainable. The term ‘sustainability’ refers to the point that government finances in the future 
should be solvent under the continuation of current social policy rules. It thus requires that the 
present value of the government’s income is sufficient to cover the present value of its 
liabilities.  
On this theme we use two ways to find out if government finances are sustainable for the EU 
and its individual countries. The first is a more intuitive one and will show the debt 
developments of the countries during the projection period. If government finances are 
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indicate that expenditures and income are in balance. A rise in the debt level would, however, 
indicate that government finances are not sustainable and imply that expenditures are rising 
faster than income. The second measure we use to investigate whether government finances are 
sustainable is the so-called ‘sustainability gap’. As explained in chapter 2, the sustainability gap 
refers to the difference in the tax level in the starting year of the extrapolation of government 
finances and the level that is required to cover future public expenditure if current social policy 
rules remain unchanged. A positive sustainability gap would imply that taxes would have to be 
increased to cover future public expenditures and refers to a situation where government 
finances are not sustainable. A negative sustainability gap would refer to the opposite case and 
would imply that there may even be room to lower taxes without jeopardising the sustainability 
of government finances in the future.  
Before we look at the sustainability of government finances of the EU countries, Table 4.4 first 
sums up the expected increase in public expenditures as a result of changes in health-care and 
pension expenditures. Public expenditures in the first column refer to the expenditures on 
pension and health in the starting year and not to overall public expenditures. As already 
highlighted in the previous sections of this chapter, public expenditures expressed as a 
percentage of GDP will increase in the period between 2002 and 2050. While public 
expenditures in 2002 ranged from 7.4% to 20.2% for Luxembourg and Austria respectively, in 
2050 public expenditures on these categories will vary between 9.2% and 30.8% for 
Luxembourg and Greece. As the EU average shows, expenditures are generally expected to rise 
by 5.6% during the period between 2002 and 2050 from 16.7% of GDP to 22.3% of GDP. The 
expected contribution of pensions, as a percentage of GDP, to this increase is slightly higher 
than that for health-care expenditure, although the relative increase in health-care expenditure is 
higher than that for pension expenditure, as can be concluded from Tables 4.1 and 4.4, i.e. 
42.9% against 27.7%.   
Table 4.4 Net change in public expenditure on health and pension components (% of GDP) 
Public exp in 
2002
Total health 
care  Pensions Total 
Public exp. 
In 2050
Austria AT 20,2 3,5 2,5 6,0 26,2
Belgium BEL 16,0 2,6 3,1 5,7 21,6
Denmark DK 16,8 2,5 2,5 5,0 21,8
Finland FIN 17,7 3,7 4,3 8,0 25,8
France FRA 18,3 2,7 4,2 6,9 25,2
Germany GER 18,6 2,8 4,9 7,6 26,3
Greece GRE 17,5 1,4 11,9 13,3 30,8
Ireland IRE 10,8 1,6 4,1 5,7 16,6
Italy IT 20,0 2,7 0,2 3,0 23,0
Luxembourg LUX 7,4 n.a. 1,7 1,7 9,2
Netherlands NL 15,3 2,7 5,4 8,1 23,4
Portugal PORT 15,2 1,7 3,3 5,0 20,1
Spain SPA 15,7 2,7 7,9 10,6 26,3
Sweden SWE 16,5 2,9 1,6 4,5 21,0
United Kingdom UK 11,1 2,6 -1,0 1,6 12,7
EU average 16,7 2,7 2,9 5,6 22,3
Change in expenditures 
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Figures 4.1 to 4.4 show the debt developments of the EU countries in the period from 2002 to 
2050. Group A comprises the countries where the debt ratio declines; these countries do not 
have to worry about any sustainability problems. Group B is the group of countries that face 
small sustainability problems and slowly increasing debt profiles. Groups C and D are the 
countries with large and very troublesome sustainability problems – which have very striking 
debt profiles. From these figures it can be concluded that all countries, except Denmark and 
Sweden, face sustainability problems under a continuation of current social policy rules as the 
debt profiles increase sharply in most countries.  
Figure 4.1 Debt developments in group A 
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Figure 4.2 Debt developments in group B  
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Figure 4.3 Debt developments in group C  
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
2004 2011 2018 2025 2032 2039 2046
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
SPA IRE PORT NL LUX
 
Figure 4.4 Debt developments in group D  
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Table 4.5 shows the sustainability gaps for the EU or the increase in taxes that are needed to 
cover future public expenditures and to keep government finances sustainable. Countries are in 
group A if the required increase in taxes is less than 0%, in group B if the required increase in 
taxes is between 0 and 2%, in group C if the required increase in taxes is between 2 and 4.5% 
and in group D if it is above 4.5%. Under an unchanged social policy scenario, eight of the EU-
15 countries in our analysis will face large sustainability problems, while only two countries 
will not face any sustainability problems. Government finances are thus influenced in a 
significant way by the coming demographic shift. These figures obviously coincide with the 
patterns shown in the graphs in the sense that the countries with the steepest debt profiles are 
also the countries with the largest sustainability gaps. Looking at the EU average, taxes have to 
be increased by 3.15% in 2005 to keep government finances sustainable in the EU in our base 
case scenario. 
Table 4.5 Sustainability gaps in EU countries, base case scenario (% of GDP) 
Group A Denmark -1,44 Group C Ireland 3,80
Sweden -0,83 Luxembourg 2,64
Netherlands 3,52
Portugal 3,49
Spain 3,43
Group B Belgium  0,66 Group D France  4,92
Austria 1,32 Germany 5,14
Finland 0,67 Greece 5,78
Italy 1,61
United Kingdom 1,59
EU average 3,15  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
In its 2003 report, the EPC has also calculated sustainability gaps for all EU countries. It is 
tempting to compare these results with the results in this paper. We stress again that our results 
should not be taken as the best possible projections of the effects of population ageing. Indeed, 
we have modelled several aspects of pension schemes and public finances on a very global 
level. Furthermore, we did not take into account the most recent information on policies to be 
implemented in the near future. Our projections should be viewed as indicative and a framework 
for assessing the implications of living longer in better health. In particular, we can ascribe 
differences between the EPC (2003) study and our paper to the following features. 
First we incorporate the cost of mortality in our projections for health-care expenditure, leading 
to lower expenditures on health care when compared with the EPC study. Second, the EPC 
(2003) study uses different forecasts for pension expenditures than our study, which used the 
pension projections of the previous EPC (2001) study. Although the 2003 figures may 
incorporate more recent information, leading to lower projected expenditures on public pensions 
as the result of the inclusion of planned or enacted pension reforms, these figures have not yet 
been officially accorded and therefore we prefer to use the accorded figures of the earlier EPC 
(2001) study. Third, our method of extrapolating government finances and revenues differs from 
the EPC approach. We distinguish between more expenditure categories among others and 
explicitly incorporate the development of government revenues in our projections. Owing to 
these differences, the size of the sustainability gaps found by the EPC sometimes substantially 
differs from the sustainability gaps found in this paper. Nevertheless, the rank order of 
countries, when ordered from the countries with the lowest sustainability gaps to the countries 
with the highest sustainability gaps broadly correspond with each other. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 39 
Which countries are now generally better equipped to face the increase in expenditures on 
health and pensions as projected in Table 4.4? Are these by definition countries that have low 
debt levels at the beginning of the period or are countries that run large primary surpluses better 
situated to face the challenge confronting government finances by population ageing? In 
principle both effects matter. Countries with a low debt level do not face a large interest burden 
and should be able to control their government finances – and in particular the part that they are 
able to influence directly, that is expenditures, more easily. A look at the graphs in Figures 4.1 
to 4.4, however, shows that several EU countries with relatively low debt levels in the starting 
year of our projection, such as Luxembourg, Ireland, the UK, Spain and Finland, are expected to 
see their debt levels increase sharply in the period between 2002 and 2050. The low debt level 
alone will not be enough to alleviate the increase in expenditures that population ageing is 
expected to cause. While the original debt level will partly determine the ultimate level of debt 
at the end of the projection period, the development in the primary surplus that a country runs is 
more important in explaining the direction or slope of the debt profile and therefore also more 
important in calculating the sustainability gap or increase in taxes that is necessary to keep 
government finances sustainable. In calculating the sustainability gaps shown in Table 4.6, one 
can basically distinguish between three variables that determine the ultimate size of the 
sustainability gap and the development in the debt profiles.  
As discussed in chapter 2, the sustainability gap was calculated according to the following 
formula (equation 13): 
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The three aspects that determine the ultimate size of the sustainability gap are thus the original 
debt level 0 B , the present value of the sum of the primary deficits until 2050 (i.e. the second 
term in the square bracket) and the present value of the sum of the primary deficits after 2050 to 
say infinity (i.e. the third term in the square bracket). To show how important each of these 
terms is in determining the ultimate level or end value of the sustainability gap, we have 
calculated the contribution of each of these terms for the EU average. From these calculations it 
could be concluded that the original debt position is responsible for 25.7% of the size of the 
sustainability gap, the present value of the sum of primary deficits until 2050 for 30.5% and the 
sum of the third term accounts for 43.8% of this end value. The sum of the primary deficits 
together accounts for almost 75% of the sustainability gap. The development in the primary 
surplus thus seems to be a more important factor to keeping government finances sustainable 
than the size of the original debt level in the base case scenario. Yet the precise contribution of 
both factors differs by country. | 40 
Part II 
 
n this second part of the paper alternative projections are performed to measure the 
sensitivity of the outcome of the projections in the base case scenario to various assumptions 
regarding developments in life expectancy and health. In chapter 5 projections are run to 
show how changing demographic circumstances and thus different life expectancy hypotheses 
influence the projections. We specifically examine how a further increase in life expectancy will 
influence health-care and pension expenditures, above the increase in life expectancy already 
incorporated in the Eurostat demographic projections. This scenario is labelled the ‘living 
longer’ scenario and concentrates on the effect of population ageing on expenditures and public 
finances. In chapter 6 we investigate how the projection of health-care and pension expenditures 
is influenced by the expected change in health status during the projection period, leading to a 
scenario labelled ‘living in better health’. Demographic circumstances are in this scenario the 
same as in the base case. In chapter 7 we finally run a scenario that investigates how living 
longer in better health influences the base case projections in which both an increase in life 
expectancy and a change in health are incorporated in the scenario. Demographic circumstances 
in this scenario are equal to those of the living longer scenario. This scenario should give an 
answer to the question of whether an improvement in health is sufficient to counteract the 
expected increase in expenditures owing to an increase in life expectancy.  
Figure II.1 presents the four main scenarios that are analysed in this paper. The dimensions 
distinguished on the vertical axis relate to whether or not life expectancy will improve further 
compared with the Eurostat projections; those on the horizontal axis concern whether or not 
health effects are incorporated.  
Figure II.1 The four main scenarios 
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Chapter 5 
Living Longer Scenario 
s mentioned in chapter 1, population ageing seems to have played only a minor part in 
explaining increases in health-care expenditure in the past. These studies conclude that 
other factors are deemed to be more important when predicting future health-care 
expenditures. The introduction of new medical technologies, price developments in medicines, 
institutional changes,
1 evolutions in disease patterns and alternative health behaviour are for 
example all pointed out to be more significant drivers of health-care expenditure than the 
population ageing process. As a result of the difficulty of implementing these factors in a 
quantitative manner in our projections, no account was taken of them in our base case 
projections. In chapter 9 we give more attention to these factors to illustrate the degree to which 
uncertainties surround the accurate prediction of health-care expenditures.  
In this chapter we concentrate on only one aspect that determines total future health- and long-
term care expenditures, which is the ageing effect. In line with the central theme of this paper, 
we specifically look at how a further increase in life expectancy will influence health-care 
expenditures in the future. To this end, the mortality rates of persons in different age categories 
will be reduced above the reductions already inherent in the Eurostat projections that were used 
in the base case scenario.  
We distinguish between three scenarios, a low, middle and high scenario. In the low scenario 
the mortality rates for those aged 55 to 85 are shown as having declined by 20%, which takes 
effect in the period between 2000 and 2050 in gradual equal steps. This scenario corresponds to 
the belief that life expectancy may increase further in the future above the increase in life 
expectancy incorporated in the Eurostat demographic figures, but will not increase by very large 
margins. In the middle scenario the mortality rates are shown as having declined by 35.7% in 
the projection period and the reduction is applied to a broader age category, i.e. to those aged 
between 20 and 90. This scenario corresponds to the belief that life expectancy may 
significantly increase further in the future and that the mortality rates at older ages may decline 
at the same rate as those observed for young people. In the high scenario, the mortality rate is 
projected as having declined by 50% for those aged between 20 and 90;
2 just as in the previous 
simulations, this decline takes place in gradual equal steps in the projection period. This 
scenario corresponds to optimistic forecasts from demographers who state that the increase in 
life expectancy in the period between 2000 and 2050 will follow the same pattern as that 
depicted in the period between 1975 and 2000, in which life expectancy increased by some five 
years for the average person in the EU.
3 The latter scenario can also be seen as a proponent of 
the expansion theory of morbidity, which states that the maximum life span may increase 
further than the maximum ages observed until now.  
                                                 
1 See Jacobzone et al. (2000) and Newhouse (1992). 
2 This scenario follows the line of thinking in Vaupel (1998). Yet he argues that the decline in mortality 
rates for persons older than 80 may exponentially increase with age. The mortality rates for persons aged 
100 and over are thus expected to decline at higher rates than those for a person aged 85. He attributes 
this to the compositional change of the population as frailer individuals drop out of the population at 
earlier ages and only strong persons survive at late ages. The chosen decline in mortality rates in our 
middle and high scenarios may therefore underestimate the growth of the population of those aged 90 and 
over or the oldest old if Vaupel is right. The implications for total pension and health-care expenditure 
will nevertheless be marginal. 
3 See also Ahn et al. (2004b). 
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The three scenarios described thus all correspond with extra increases in life expectancy above 
the increase already incorporated into the base case scenario. Figure 5.1 shows the effect of this 
assumption on the survival probability of the EU population for the different scenarios, where 
BC refers to the base case scenario.  
Figure 5.1 Survival probability of EU population under different demographic scenarios 
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From Figure 5.1 it can be concluded that the larger the reduction in mortality rates compared 
with the base case scenario, the more the line representing the survival probability at specific 
ages becomes rectangularised. A complete rectangularisation of the figure would imply that 
almost no one would die before they reach the age of 90.  
The initiated declines in the mortality rate in the various scenarios, i.e. low, middle and high, 
correspond to an extra increase in life expectancy of 1.2, 3.2 and 4.8 years respectively at birth 
compared with the increase in life expectancy projected in the base case scenario in 2050 using 
the Eurostat projections. That is, the projected life expectancy of a person born in 2050 at birth 
is 82.6 years in the base case scenario, 83.8 years in the low scenario, 85.8 years in the middle 
scenario and 87.4 years in the high scenario. In Table A.6 of the appendix, the development of 
the life expectancy figures for the EU as a whole and its individual member states in the base 
case and the various living longer scenarios are given.  
Table 5.1 compares the projected expenditures in health and long-term care in the various living 
longer scenarios with those obtained in the base case scenario to see how a further increase in 
life expectancy influences health-care expenditures. The first three columns reflect the base case 
situation, the subsequent columns the respective living longer scenarios just mentioned and the 
last column reflects the extra increase in expenditures when comparing the living longer middle 
scenario with the outcomes presented in the base case scenario. This middle scenario is also the 
one that we use to calculate the impact of an increase in life expectancy on the sustainability of 
government finances later in the chapter and for our calculations in other chapters if a living 
longer scenario is incorporated in the projections.   ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 43 
Table 5.1 Projection of public exp. on health and long-term care, living longer scenario  
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
low middle high
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 2050 2050 extra incr
Austria 5,1 7,7 2,5 7,9 8,1 8,4 0,5
Belgium 5,2 6,9 1,7 7,0 7,3 7,4 0,4
Denmark 4,0 4,6 0,6 4,6 4,5 4,4 -0,1
Finland 4,8 6,7 1,9 6,8 6,9 7,1 0,3
France 5,5 7,4 1,9 7,6 7,8 7,9 0,4
Germany 6,5 8,9 2,4 9,1 9,5 9,8 0,6
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,3 6,6 6,8 0,4
Ireland 5,6 6,6 1,0 6,8 7,0 7,1 0,3
Italy 5,5 7,7 2,2 7,9 8,2 8,4 0,5
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,5 0,8 5,6 5,6 5,6 0,1
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 7,3 7,5 7,8 0,5
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,2 9,5 9,8 0,6
Sweden 5,1 6,0 0,9 6,1 6,1 6,1 0,0
United Kingdom 3,9 4,9 0,9 4,9 5,0 5,0 0,1
EU average 5,4 7,1 1,7 7,3 7,5 7,7 0,4
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
low middle high
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 2050 2050 extra incr
Austria 0,6 1,6 1,0 1,7 1,9 2,0 0,3
Belgium 0,7 1,6 0,9 1,7 1,9 2,1 0,3
Denmark 2,2 4,1 1,9 4,4 4,9 5,4 0,9
Finland 1,5 3,3 1,9 3,6 4,0 4,4 0,7
France 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,6 1,7 1,9 0,2
Germany 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,1
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 1,2 0,6 1,3 1,5 1,6 0,2
Italy 0,7 1,2 0,5 1,3 1,3 1,4 0,1
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 4,5 1,9 4,9 5,5 6,0 1,0
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2,4 4,3 2,0 4,7 5,3 5,8 1,0
United Kingdom 1,7 3,4 1,7 3,7 4,1 4,4 0,7
EU average 0,9 1,8 0,9 2,0 2,2 2,4 0,4
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
low middle high
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 2050 2050 extra incr
Austria 5,8 9,3 3,5 9,6 10,0 10,4 0,8
Belgium 5,9 8,5 2,6 8,8 9,2 9,5 0,7
Denmark 6,2 8,7 2,5 9,0 9,4 9,8 0,8
Finland 6,3 10,0 3,7 10,4 11,0 11,4 1,0
France 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,2 9,5 9,8 0,6
Germany 6,7 9,5 2,8 9,8 10,2 10,6 0,7
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,3 6,6 6,8 0,4
Ireland 6,3 7,9 1,6 8,1 8,4 8,7 0,5
Italy 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,2 9,5 9,8 0,6
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 10,0 2,7 10,4 11,1 11,7 1,1
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 7,3 7,5 7,8 0,5
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,2 9,5 9,8 0,6
Sweden 7,5 10,4 2,9 10,8 11,4 11,8 1,0
United Kingdom 5,7 8,3 2,6 8,6 9,1 9,5 0,8
EU average 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,2 9,7 10,1 0,8
Base case  Living longer 
Base case  Living longer 
Base case  Living longer 
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5.1  Projections for health- and long-term care expenditures  
Health-care expenditures  
A further increase in life expectancy in all countries (except for Denmark in the middle and high 
scenarios) will lead to an increase in health-care expenditures. Here it can be observed that the 
larger the projected reduction in mortality rates is, the larger the increase in health-care 
expenditures. Concentrating on the middle scenario we can see that an extra increase in life 
expectancy will have the greatest impact on expenditures in Spain and Germany, where 
expenditures rise by an additional 0.6% when compared with the base case scenario. For the EU 
they will on average increase by 0.4%. Countries that are least influenced by a possible further 
increase in life expectancy are Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK respectively. 
Why a decrease in mortality rates leads to an increase in expenditures for this expenditure 
category is more explicitly analysed in Box 5.1, which shows the dynamics at work for an 
illustrative EU country. 
Box 5.1 The effect of an increase in life expectancy on health-care expenditures 
As shown in Table 5.1, an increase in life expectancy will lead to an increase in health- and long-term 
care expenditures. The outcome of this result is, however, not as straightforward as it seems. A decline 
in mortality rates leads in principle to two opposing effects. First of all, fewer people die and this leads 
to a reduction in mortality costs and thus a decline in expenditures on health- and long-term care as the 
costs of those who die are assumed to be higher than the cost of survivors. This could be seen in Figure 
3.7. Second, the reduction in mortality rates will lead to an increase in the number of people, as fewer 
people die, who consume health for a longer period of time, the latter being equal to the expected 
increase in life expectancy. This increase in population will thus lead to an increase in total health- and 
long-term care expenditure. The balance between on the one hand a reduction in costs owing to a 
decrease in the number of mortalities and on the other hand an increase in the population with a related 
increase in health-care expenditure determines the amount that expenditures will rise or decline. The 
amount of savings or extra expenditures varies by age and by respective year, as the example below for 
an illustrative EU country shows.  
We calculate the difference in health-care expenditure owing to a 20% decline, i.e. the low scenario, in 
mortality rates at two dates, the year 2000 (which is the first year in which this effect will take place) 
and the year 2050 (which is the last year for which health-care expenditures are projected). Table B.1 
illustrates the dynamics at work for the year 2000. In the first and second columns the change in the 
number of mortalities and total population are shown. In the third, fourth and fifth columns the cost 
profiles for the average person are shown, in terms of Figure 3.7 D, UH and UL respectively. In the 
year 2000, a decline in mortality rates of 20% will lead to a reduction of the number of mortalities in 
the group aged 55-85 and a similar increase in total population. In the very first year of this simulation 
the demographic effect is relatively small and will lead to a reduction in the number of mortalities and 
an increase in the population of 484 persons. As mortality rates increase with age, a decline in these 
rates at higher ages will lead to larger effects on the number of mortalities and total population as age 
increases.  
Changes in health-care expenditure and long-term care expenditure can now be calculated in columns 
six and seven by multiplying the change in the number of mortalities and total population with their 
respective cost components in the previous columns. As the mortality costs are subtracted from the 
health- and long-term care components by percentages, which differ by age (see Table 2.1), these 
changes cannot straightforwardly be calculated from the table itself, which only shows the health-care 
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Table B.1 Decomposition of the effect of a 20% decline in the mortality rate of persons aged 55-85 on 
health-care expenditures in 2000 
2000
Change in 
number of 
deaths
Change in 
total 
population 
Costs of 
death per 
person 
Health care 
exp. per 
person
Long term 
care exp. per 
person
Change in 
health care 
expenditure
Change in 
long term 
care exp.
Total impact on 
health costs (mln 
euros) 
Age 
55 -5 5 14617 1405 136 0,06 0,00 0,06
56 -5 5 14617 1395 135 0,07 0,00 0,07
57 -6 6 14617 1386 135 0,07 0,01 0,08
58 -7 7 14617 1385 135 0,08 0,01 0,09
59 -8 8 14617 1375 134 0,09 0,01 0,10
60 -8 8 14617 1667 168 0,10 0,01 0,11
61 -9 9 14617 1653 167 0,11 0,01 0,11
62 -9 9 14617 1641 166 0,11 0,01 0,12
63 -10 10 14617 1634 166 0,12 0,01 0,13
64 -11 11 14617 1624 165 0,13 0,01 0,14
65 -11 11 21926 2051 401 0,20 0,02 0,22
66 -11 11 21926 2016 398 0,20 0,02 0,22
67 -12 12 21926 2012 397 0,22 0,02 0,24
68 -13 13 21926 1989 395 0,24 0,02 0,27
69 -15 15 21926 1963 393 0,27 0,02 0,30
70 -16 16 21926 2470 716 0,27 0,03 0,30
71 -17 17 21926 2446 713 0,29 0,03 0,32
72 -18 18 21926 2392 707 0,31 0,03 0,34
73 -19 19 21926 2357 703 0,33 0,04 0,36
74 -20 20 21926 2310 698 0,35 0,04 0,39
75 -21 21 21926 2817 1604 0,31 0,06 0,38
76 -22 22 21926 2773 1594 0,33 0,07 0,40
77 -24 24 21926 2714 1582 0,36 0,07 0,43
78 -26 26 21926 2642 1567 0,39 0,08 0,47
79 -27 27 21926 2541 1547 0,41 0,08 0,49
80 -22 22 21926 2733 3224 0,27 0,09 0,36
81 -19 19 21926 2622 3187 0,23 0,08 0,31
82 -19 19 21926 2737 3225 0,23 0,08 0,31
83 -22 22 21926 2722 3220 0,26 0,09 0,35
84 -25 25 21926 2680 3206 0,31 0,10 0,41
85 -28 28 29234 2777 6174 0,40 0,18 0,59
86 0 0 29234 2428 6013 0,00 0,00 0,00
87 0 0 29234 2213 5914 0,00 0,00 0,00
88 0 0 29234 1867 5754 0,00 0,00 0,00
89 0 0 29234 1617 5639 0,00 0,00 0,00
90 0 0 29234 1979 7739 0,00 0,00 0,00
91 0 0 29234 1697 7516 0,00 0,00 0,00
92 0 0 29234 1379 7264 0,00 0,00 0,00
93 0 0 29234 1059 7010 0,00 0,00 0,00
94 0 0 29234 630 6670 0,00 0,00 0,00
95 0 0 29234 2823 5374 0,00 0,00 0,00
96 0 0 29234 2700 4641 0,00 0,00 0,00
97 0 0 29234 2628 4212 0,00 0,00 0,00
98 0 0 29234 2424 2998 0,00 0,00 0,00
99 0 0 29234 2087 991 0,00 0,00 0,00
Total -484 484 7,1 1,3 8,5 
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Table B.2 Decomposition of the effect of a 20% decline in the mortality rate of persons aged 55-85 on 
health-care expenditures in 2050 (cumulative effects after 50 years) 
2050
Change in 
number of 
deaths
Change in 
total 
population 
Costs of 
death per 
person 
Health care 
exp. per 
person
Long term 
care exp. per 
person
Change in 
health care 
expenditure
Change in 
long term 
care exp.
Total impact on 
health costs (mln 
euros) 
Age 
55 -136 271 14617 1405 136 3,57 0,25 3,81
56 -153 439 14617 1395 135 3,55 0,23 3,79
57 -171 625 14617 1386 135 3,52 0,22 3,74
58 -188 824 14617 1385 135 3,43 0,20 3,63
59 -211 1060 14617 1375 134 3,41 0,18 3,59
60 -228 1281 14617 1667 168 2,34 0,04 2,38
61 -250 1536 14617 1653 167 2,09 0,00 2,09
62 -269 1782 14617 1641 166 1,78 -0,05 1,73
63 -293 2068 14617 1634 166 1,47 -0,10 1,36
64 -319 2377 14617 1624 165 1,15 -0,16 0,99
65 -349 2729 21926 2051 401 3,29 -0,98 2,30
66 -383 3131 21926 2016 398 3,23 -1,19 2,04
67 -426 3609 21926 2012 397 2,99 -1,44 1,55
68 -466 4084 21926 1989 395 2,87 -1,68 1,19
69 -515 4645 21926 1963 393 2,82 -1,96 0,85
70 -558 5161 21926 2470 716 -4,79 -5,39 -10,18
71 -613 5796 21926 2446 713 -5,69 -6,10 -11,79
72 -673 6505 21926 2392 707 -6,25 -6,85 -13,10
73 -737 7280 21926 2357 703 -7,11 -7,70 -14,80
74 -805 8114 21926 2310 698 -7,77 -8,58 -16,35
75 -883 9068 21926 2817 1604 -24,84 -25,38 -50,21
76 -948 9969 21926 2773 1594 -27,19 -27,93 -55,13
77 -1048 11282 21926 2714 1582 -30,21 -31,56 -61,77
78 -1156 12775 21926 2642 1567 -33,23 -35,60 -68,83
79 -1234 14049 21926 2541 1547 -34,71 -38,87 -73,57
80 -1337 15695 21926 2733 3224 -56,33 -99,15 -155,48
81 -1407 17226 21926 2622 3187 -59,35 -108,32 -167,68
82 -1459 18680 21926 2737 3225 -71,94 -120,38 -192,32
83 -1487 20279 21926 2722 3220 -80,83 -132,15 -212,98
84 -1449 21509 21926 2680 3206 -88,05 -141,65 -229,71
85 -1381 22794 29234 2777 6174 -97,61 -298,83 -396,44
86 1611 17071 29234 2428 6013 -165,44 -297,70 -463,14
87 1572 14441 29234 2213 5914 -140,87 -254,73 -395,60
88 1523 12124 29234 1867 5754 -116,31 -215,38 -331,68
89 1488 9807 29234 1617 5639 -98,47 -179,27 -277,75
90 1358 7789 29234 1979 7739 -79,66 -199,89 -279,55
91 1173 6011 29234 1697 7516 -61,27 -155,97 -217,25
92 1006 4652 29234 1379 7264 -46,90 -121,77 -168,68
93 844 3487 29234 1059 7010 -35,24 -92,67 -127,91
94 683 2552 29234 630 6670 -25,16 -68,30 -93,47
95 550 1807 29234 2823 5374 -20,15 -54,70 -74,85
96 413 1250 29234 2700 4641 -14,02 -37,44 -51,46
97 314 848 29234 2628 4212 -9,85 -26,45 -36,30
98 229 551 29234 2424 2998 -6,48 -16,95 -23,43
99 170 334 29234 2087 991 -4,10 -10,44 -14,54
Total  -8599 319368 -1418 -2833 -4251 
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Box 5.1 cont’d. 
As the last column shows, a decline in mortality rates leads to a reduction in both health-care and long-
term care expenditures, where a positive sign indicates a saving and a minus sign indicates an increase 
in expenditures, and thus total expenditures for all ages. The reduction in the number of mortalities and 
its associated costs thus outweigh the increase in health-care expenditure owing to an increase in 
population in the first year of the projection.  
Table B.2 shows the expected change in health-care expenditure by its various components at the end 
of the projection period. As the demographic situation has changed considerably in the period until 
2050, the population aged 55 and over has increased substantially compared with the base case 
scenario. A decline in the mortality rate at the beginning of the projection period will lead to a 
cumulative process of changes in the population and number of mortalities during the projection 
period. A decrease in mortality rates at the year 2000 for persons aged 55 will notably not only lead to 
more persons in the next year, who are then aged 56, but also the year after that and so on. As mortality 
rates stay the same for those aged 86 and over, an increase in population through time caused by a 
reduction in mortality rates between ages 55 and 85 will from that age on lead to a larger number of 
mortalities as can be seen in the table. This will thus lead to an increase in expenditures on health care 
as the costs of mortality are higher than the cost of survivors at these ages. For a person aged 86, the 
cost of mortality is for example €29,234 while the combined health-care and long-term care costs for a 
survivor are only €8,441.  
As can be seen in Table B.2, the number of mortalities in 2050 and the increase in population are very 
different from each other. The total number of mortalities is 8,599 persons less in 2050 compared with 
the base case scenario. A decline in the number of mortalities from age 55 to 85 is, however, countered 
by increases in the number of mortalities of persons aged 86 and over. The population increases by 
319,368 persons if we compare the population in 2050 with that in the base case scenario. When 
looking at the development in health-care expenditure it can be seen that these expenditures decline for 
people aged 55 to 69 and increase for those aged 70 and over. These expenditures reach a peak at age 
86 and from there on the difference in expenditures decreases.  
For long-term care expenditures we see a similar pattern, although the age at which a reduction in 
mortality rates leads to less expenditure only applies for those aged 55 to 61. We can also see that 
while most of the reduction in expenditures can be attributed to savings on health-care expenditures, 
the increase in expenditures can mostly be attributed to increases in long-term care spending. This 
follows from Table 2.1, which shows that the cost of mortality until the age of 90 largely consists of 
expenditure on health care and not on expenditure on long-term care. If we look at age 85 for example, 
we can see that while health-care expenditures can be expected to increase by €97.6 million, those of 
long-term care are expected to increase by almost triple this figure, €298.8 million. Looking at the total 
figures, health-care expenditures are expected to increase by €4.3 billion in 2050 if mortality rates 
develop as sketched. Figure B.1 shows the expected development of the change in health-care, long-
term care and total health-care costs until 2050. 
Figure B.1 shows that in the first years – 2009 for health-care expenditure, 2003 for long-term care 
expenditure and 2006 for total health-care expenditure – a decline in mortality rates will lead to a 
reduction in health-care expenditure. After that initial period, health-care expenditures will increase 
substantially. The increase in total health-care expenditure is mainly driven by the increase in long-
term care expenditures as depicted in the figure.  
To detect how sensitive the chosen reduction in mortality rates was to the outcome of the above result, 
we also ran four other scenarios, with varying rates of decline and increase in mortality rates. Not 
surprisingly, it turned out that the higher the rate of decline in mortality rates was, the higher the 
increase in expenditures. An increase in mortality rates on the other hand (a reduction in life 
expectancy), would lead to a reduction in total health-care expenditure. The picture sketched in Tables 
5.3 and 5.4 would in this case be reversed. The number of mortalities would increase and this will 
result in a smaller population over time as fewer people will survive during consecutive years. The 
amount of savings would thus increase with time. 
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Figure B.1 Development of the difference in health-, long-term and total health-care expenditures 
when mortality rates are projected as having declined by 20% compared with the base 
case scenario 
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Long-term care expenditures  
Long-term care expenditures are expected to increase on the same scale as those of health-care 
expenditures, but the results differ much more widely among countries. Although the projected 
increase in life expectancy in the middle scenario only marginally influences long-term care 
expenditures in Germany and Italy, it significantly influences these expenditures in the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. In the latter group of countries long-term care 
expenditures will increase by approximately 1%. If we compare expenditures on health care and 
long-term care for Denmark we can now see that the long-term care expenditures in the middle 
scenario are larger than those of health-care expenditures. As already seen in the base case 
scenario, long-term care expenditures are more sensitive to the ageing process than health-care 
expenditures. A further decline in mortality rates will in almost all countries for which 
information is available lead to a doubling of long-term care expenditures in the year 2050 when 
compared with the base case scenario in the starting year.  
Total health- and long-term care expenditures 
Compared with the base case scenario, total health- and long-term care expenditures will 
increase on average by 0.8% for the EU, ranging from 0.4 percentage points in Greece to 1.1 
percentage points in the Netherlands. When we look at the percentage of GDP that is spent on 
health care, Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are expected to spend 
more than 10% of their GDP on total health- and long-term care in 2050 in the middle living 
longer scenario. A further increase in life expectancy will thus significantly increase total 
health- and long-term care expenditures.  
5.2  Projection of public pension expenditures  
Table 5.2 presents the influence of a decline in mortality rates on pension expenditures, as 
incorporated in the respective low, middle and high scenarios described earlier. A decline in 
mortality rates will lead to an increase in expenditures in all countries as the number of persons 
who are eligible for pension benefits increases and they will receive pensions over a longer 
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arrangements that lower pension benefits when life expectancy increases, which, as was pointed 
out in section 4.2, are important elements of the pension systems in Sweden and Italy. Just as 
was the case for health-care expenditures, the greater the postulated reduction in mortality rates 
is, the greater the expected increase in pension expenditures. The postulated decline in mortality 
rates in the middle scenario will have the greatest impact on Germany, Greece and Spain, where 
pension expenditures would increase by 1.9%, 2.5% and 1.8% respectively if life expectancy 
was to improve further. Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK on the other hand are the countries 
that would be least affected by a further increase in life expectancy. Compared with the base 
case scenario, the postulated decline in mortality rates will lead to an increase of 1.4% in 
pension expenditures for the average EU country.  
Table 5.2 Public pension expenditures, living longer scenario (% of GDP) 
Low Middle High 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 14,5 17,0 2,5 17,7 18,7 19,6 1,7
Belgium 10,0 13,2 3,1 13,7 14,5 15,1 1,3
Denmark 10,6 13,1 2,5 13,8 14,7 15,5 1,5
Finland 11,5 15,8 4,3 16,4 17,2 17,9 1,5
France 12,1 16,4 4,2 16,9 17,7 18,3 1,3
Germany 11,9 16,8 4,9 17,6 18,6 19,5 1,9
Greece 12,8 24,7 11,9 25,7 27,2 28,4 2,5
Ireland 4,6 8,7 4,1 9,1 9,6 10,0 0,9
Italy 13,9 14,1 0,2 14,7 15,5 16,3 1,5
Luxembourg 7,4 9,2 1,7 9,6 10,1 10,6 0,9
Netherlands 8,1 13,5 5,4 14,2 15,1 16,0 1,7
Portugal 9,8 13,1 3,3 13,7 14,4 15,1 1,4
Spain 9,5 17,4 7,9 18,2 19,2 20,1 1,8
Sweden 9,0 10,6 1,6 11,0 11,6 12,1 1,0
United Kingdom 5,4 4,4 -1,0 4,6 4,9 5,1 0,5
EU average 10,5 13,4 2,9 14,0 14,8 15,5 1,4
Living longer Base case 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
5.3  Government finances  
As could be seen in the previous paragraphs, a further decline in mortality rates will increase 
expenditures on total health- and long-term care as well as pensions. In this section we 
investigate how this will impact on the sustainability of government finances following the 
same approach that was used in section 4.3. The projected increase in expenditures here refers 
to the increase in life expectancy as postulated in the middle living-longer scenario. Table 5.3 
sums up the difference in the increase in public expenditures between the base case and this 
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Table 5.3 Net change in public expenditures compared with base case scenario (% of GDP) 
Public exp. In 
2002, Base 
case
Total increase in 
expenditures 
Base case 
Health 
and long 
term care  Pensions Total 
Public exp. In 
2050, Living 
longer scenario
Austria 20,2 6,0 0,8 1,7 2,5 28,8
Belgium 16,0 5,7 0,7 1,3 2,0 23,6
Denmark 16,8 5,0 0,8 1,5 2,3 24,1
Finland 17,7 8,0 1,0 1,5 2,4 28,2
France 18,3 6,9 0,6 1,3 1,9 27,1
Germany 18,6 7,6 0,7 1,9 2,6 28,9
Greece 17,5 13,4 0,4 2,5 2,9 33,8
Ireland 10,8 6,3 0,5 0,9 1,5 18,6
Italy 20,0 3,0 0,6 1,5 2,1 25,1
Luxembourg 7,4 1,7 n.a. 0,9 0,9 10,1
Netherlands 15,3 8,1 1,1 1,7 2,8 26,2
Portugal 15,2 5,1 0,5 1,4 1,9 22,2
Spain 15,7 10,6 0,6 1,8 2,4 28,7
Sweden 16,5 4,5 1,0 1,0 2,0 23,0
United Kingdom 11,1 1,6 0,8 0,5 1,3 14,0
EU average 16,7 5,6 0,8 1,4 2,2 24,5
Change in expenditures 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
An increase in life expectancy of 3.2 years will on average lead to a 2.2% increase in public 
expenditures. Luxembourg and the UK are the countries that are least affected by the postulated 
increase in life expectancy, while Greece and the Netherlands will face the greatest increase in 
expenditures. Looking at the contributions of the health and pension components to this increase 
one can depict that the increase in pensions is on average almost twice as large as that of total 
health- and long-term care, i.e. 1.4% compared with 0.8%. This result differs from that in the 
base case scenario, where health-care expenditures and pension expenditures contributed 
equally to the total increase in public expenditures. As explained in Box 5.1, this can partly be 
ascribed to the fact that a decline in mortality rates leads to two opposing effects on health-care 
and long-term care expenditures. On the one hand a decline in mortality rates will lead to a 
reduction in health-care costs as fewer people will die and on the other hand it will lead to an 
increase in health-care costs for the respective components as total population and thus total 
health consumption increases. Pensions are affected in a direct manner and in only one way. An 
increase in life expectancy will lead to more years of pensions being paid out and thus an 
increase in total expenditures. As previously mentioned, no account is taken of any correction 
mechanisms that may reduce the benefit level of pensions as a response to the projected increase 
in life expectancy and this may also influence the projected increase in public pension 
expenditures. 
Table 5.4 shows the change in sustainability gaps caused by the projected increase in life 
expectancy in our middle scenario compared with that of the base case scenario. To keep 
government finances sustainable in this alternative demographic scenario, taxes have to be 
increased by an additional 0.89% for the average EU country. If we look at the individual 
countries we can see that the Netherlands, Greece and Germany would have to increase their 
taxes the most to keep their government finances sustainable. This corresponds to the findings 
in Table 5.3, where those same countries showed the highest increase in public expenditures in 
the middle living-longer scenario. As explained there, most of the necessary adjustment in 
sustainability gaps can be attributed to the increase in pension expenditures. The UK and 
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life expectancy. In the UK the required adjustment in taxes can mainly be attributed to the 
increase in health-care expenditures, while the figures for Luxembourg are not very reliable 
owing to the lack of essential information on the development of health- and long-term care 
expenditures.  
Table 5.4 Change in sustainability gaps in EU countries in the living longer scenario (% of 
GDP)  
Group A Denmark 1,00 Group C Ireland 0,87
Sweden 0,91 Luxembourg 0,47
Netherlands 1,49
Portugal 0,85
Spain 0,97
Group B Belgium  0,86 Group D France  0,89
Austria 1,00 Germany 1,10
Finland 1,02 Greece 1,38
Italy 0,74
United Kingdom 0,46
EU average 0,89  
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Chapter 6 
Living in Better Health 
n this chapter we investigate how an improvement in health will impact on the projections 
of health-care and pension expenditures and government finances in the base case scenario. 
As outlined in chapter 3 and shown in Table A1.5 in the appendix, the Eurostat 
demographic projections show that life expectancy will continue to increase in the near future. 
Part of this can be explained by the evolution of medical technologies and the introduction of 
new and better medicines. It seems plausible, however, that part of this increase in life 
expectancy can also be attributed to the fact that health, without any medical intervention, 
genuinely improves as a result of changed health behaviour and nutrition, for example. If so, 
this improvement in health may dampen the projected increase in health and pension 
expenditures as sketched in our base case scenario.  
In the case of health care, healthier people can be assumed to need less medical attention and an 
increase in the average health status of a population could thus lead to savings on health-care 
expenditures. Regarding pension expenditures, better health may postpone early retirement, 
retirement in general and is expected to reduce the inflow into disability schemes. Better health 
will therefore increase the labour force participation rate and will reduce the number of persons 
aged 55 and over who are dependent on benefits. An improvement in the average health status 
of a population may therefore have quite a significant impact on both health-care and pension 
expenditures. In this chapter we investigate how large this impact is, using the assumptions we 
have made in chapter 3 and using the methodology described in chapter 2. Although it is clear 
that an improvement in the health status of a population will lead to less expenditure, as follows 
from our assumptions, the more interesting question is to what extent this effect may dampen 
the projected increase in expenditures as pictured in the base case scenario. Following 
Jacobzone et al. (2000), in this sense it is interesting to seek an answer the following question: 
Is the health of people in the EU improving fast enough to compensate for population ageing? 
6.1  Projections for health- and long-term care expenditures  
As outlined in chapter 3 we assume that health improves according to the variable life 
expectancy in good health, the development of which is shown in Table 3.3. As reported in 
chapter 3, we assume relatively low elasticities guiding the relation between health changes and 
health-care expenditures, assuming an elasticity of -0.3 for the ages 0-64 and -0.2 for the ages 
65 and over. A 10% increase in the average health status of the population will thus lead to a 3% 
decline in health- and long-term care expenditures for persons aged 0 to 64 and 2% less 
expenditure for those aged 65 and over. As an improvement in health will lead to higher labour 
force participation and thus an increase in GDP and more generally in welfare, we assume that 
health- and long-term care expenditures will rise in line with this welfare increase. This relation 
follows from earlier studies, which show a clear link between health-care expenditure and 
welfare. This effect thus partly offsets the reduction in expenditures owing to better health. 
Table 6.1 shows the projections of health- and long-term care expenditures when the above-
mentioned features are incorporated into the projections. The respective scenario is labelled the 
‘living in better health scenario’.  
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Table 6.1 Projections of public expenditure on health- and long-term care (% of GDP), living in 
better health scenario 
 
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
Base case Living in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,1 7,7 2,5 6,9 -0,8
Belgium 5,2 6,9 1,7 6,4 -0,5
Denmark 4,0 4,6 0,6 4,3 -0,3
Finland 4,8 6,7 1,9 6,0 -0,6
France 5,5 7,4 1,9 6,7 -0,7
Germany 6,5 8,9 2,4 7,5 -1,3
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 5,6 -0,5
Ireland 5,6 6,6 1,0 6,2 -0,4
Italy 5,5 7,7 2,2 6,6 -1,0
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,5 0,8 5,1 -0,3
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 5,6 -1,5
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,3 -0,6
Sweden 5,1 6,0 0,9 5,5 -0,6
United Kingdom 3,9 4,9 0,9 4,6 -0,3
EU average 5,4 7,1 1,7 6,3 -0,8
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
Base case Living in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 0,6 1,6 1,0 1,4 -0,2
Belgium 0,7 1,6 0,9 1,5 -0,1
Denmark 2,2 4,1 1,9 3,8 -0,3
Finland 1,5 3,3 1,9 2,9 -0,4
France 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,3 -0,2
Germany 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,5 -0,1
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 1,2 0,6 1,1 -0,1
Italy 0,7 1,2 0,5 1,0 -0,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 4,5 1,9 4,1 -0,3
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2,4 4,3 2,0 3,7 -0,6
United Kingdom 1,7 3,4 1,7 3,1 -0,3
EU average 0,9 1,8 0,9 1,6 -0,2
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
Base case Living in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,8 9,3 3,5 8,3 -1,0
Belgium 5,9 8,5 2,6 7,8 -0,7
Denmark 6,2 8,7 2,5 8,1 -0,6
Finland 6,3 10,0 3,7 8,9 -1,1
France 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,1 -0,9
Germany 6,7 9,5 2,8 8,0 -1,5
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 5,6 -0,5
Ireland 6,3 7,9 1,6 7,3 -0,5
Italy 6,2 8,9 2,7 7,7 -1,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 10,0 2,7 9,3 -0,7
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 5,6 -1,5
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,3 -0,6
Sweden 7,5 10,4 2,9 9,2 -1,2
United Kingdom 5,7 8,3 2,6 7,7 -0,6
EU average 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,0 -0,9  
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Health-care expenditures 
An improvement in health will lead to a decrease in health-care expenditures when compared 
with the base case scenario. On average, expenditures will decrease by 0.8% for this category 
for the EU. The effect differs by country, and the reduction in expenditures will be greatest in 
those countries with the largest expected health improvement (which are Germany, Italy and 
Portugal as can be gauged from Table 3.3).  
Long-term care expenditures 
An improvement in health will likewise lead to a reduction in expenditures on long-term care. 
For the EU average, Table 6.1 shows that expenditures in the living in better health scenario will 
be 0.2% lower than those in the base case scenario. As those aged 65 and over use these 
services, the conditions that apply to this group determine the impact of an improvement in 
health on long-term care expenditures. Relatively speaking, the reduction in expenditures is 
smaller than that for health care, which can be attributed to the lower elasticity between health 
and health-care expenditures for persons aged 65 and over. Nevertheless, the expected 
improvement in health can in some countries lead to substantial savings on long-term care 
expenditures, especially in the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and the UK.  
Total health- and long-term care expenditures 
Total health- and long-term care expenditures will on average decline by 0.9% for the EU when 
compared with the base case scenario. An improvement in health will thus require less public 
expenditure on health care, i.e. 8.0% of GDP instead of 8.9% of GDP in the base case scenario 
in 2050. Yet as one can see from Table 6.1, the expected improvement in health is not large 
enough to offset the impact of population ageing as highlighted in the base case scenario in the 
first three columns. It will, however, lead to a rosier picture on the development of these 
expenditures.    
6.2  Projection of public pension expenditures  
Table 6.2 shows the projected pension expenditures in the living in better health scenario. As 
previously explained, an improvement in health will lead to a decline in the number of 
recipients and thus less expenditure on pension benefits. Here we abstract from any direct link 
between the number of years worked and the amount of the pension benefit, as we do not want 
to digress into any tedious calculations about the actuarial fairness of pension systems in the 
respective EU countries for which we perform projections. An improvement in health will lead 
to a decline in expenditures on pensions of 0.9% compared with the base case scenario for the 
average EU country. The countries that will benefit most from the incorporation of a health 
trend in the projections are once again the countries with the largest health improvements. This 
can of course be attributed to our assumption of equal elasticities for all EU countries. The 
projected decline in expenditures is about equal in size to the projected reduction in 
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Table 6.2 Expenditures on public pensions in the living in better health scenario (% of GDP) 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 14,5 17,0 2,5 16,0 -0,9
Belgium 10,0 13,2 3,1 12,4 -0,8
Denmark 10,6 13,1 2,5 12,4 -0,7
Finland 11,5 15,8 4,3 14,7 -1,1
France 12,1 16,4 4,2 15,1 -1,2
Germany 11,9 16,8 4,9 15,7 -1,1
Greece 12,8 24,7 11,9 23,6 -1,0
Ireland 4,6 8,7 4,1 8,2 -0,4
Italy 13,9 14,1 0,2 13,4 -0,7
Luxembourg 7,4 9,2 1,7 8,2 -1,0
Netherlands 8,1 13,5 5,4 12,4 -1,0
Portugal 9,8 13,1 3,3 11,5 -1,6
Spain 9,5 17,4 7,9 16,7 -0,7
Sweden 9,0 10,6 1,6 9,9 -0,7
United Kingdom 5,4 4,4 -1,0 4,0 -0,4
EU average  10,5 13,4 2,9 12,4 -0,9
Living in better health  Base case 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
6.3  Government finances  
Table 6.3 shows the impact of an improvement in health on total public expenditures compared 
with the base case scenario. It sums up the conclusions reached in the previous two paragraphs. 
The first two columns summarise the situation in the base case. The second column shows the 
total change in expenditures in the projection period in the base case scenario, i.e. in the period 
between 2002 and 2050. The third and fourth columns show the respective changes in 
expenditures in health care and pensions compared with the base case scenario if health 
improves according to our living in better health scenario. The sixth column shows total public 
expenditures in 2050 in our living in better health scenario.  
An improvement in health when measured at the end of the projection period will lead to a 1.9 
percentage point decline in GDP on expenditures for health- and long-term care and pensions. 
Public expenditures will, however, still increase on average by 3.7% during the period between 
2002 and 2050 when the projected improvement in health is incorporated. As can be concluded 
from the table, the results vary widely among countries. Especially Portugal, Germany, Finland 
and France will benefit from an improvement in health as can be seen in column five of the 
table. The results for these countries can mainly be attributed to the fact that the expected health 
of men and women will improve rapidly and following our premises this will lead to less 
expenditure on health care and pensions. While the pension and health- and long-term care 
components contribute equally to the decline in total public expenditures, this is not the case for 
all countries. For Germany, Italy and Sweden, for example, the reduction in public expenditures 
can mostly be attributed to the decline in health- and long-term care expenditures. On the other 
hand, for the Netherlands, Greece and France, the projected decline in expenditures is mostly 
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Table 6.3 Net change in public expenditures (% of GDP) 
Public exp. In 
2002, Base case
Total increase in 
expenditures 
Base case 
Health 
and long 
term care  Pensions Total 
Public exp. In 2050, 
Living in better 
health scenario
Austria 20,2 6,0 -1,0 -0,9 -1,9 24,3
Belgium 16,0 5,7 -0,7 -0,8 -1,5 20,2
Denmark 16,8 5,0 -0,6 -0,7 -1,3 20,6
Finland 17,7 8,0 -1,1 -1,1 -2,1 23,6
France 18,3 6,9 -0,9 -1,2 -2,1 23,1
Germany 18,6 7,6 -1,5 -1,1 -2,5 23,7
Greece 17,5 13,4 -0,5 -1,0 -1,5 29,3
Ireland 10,8 6,3 -0,5 -0,4 -1,0 16,2
Italy 20,0 3,0 -1,2 -0,7 -1,9 21,1
Luxembourg 7,4 1,7 n.a. -1,0 -1,0 8,2
Netherlands 15,3 8,1 -0,7 -1,0 -1,7 21,7
Portugal 15,2 5,1 -1,5 -1,6 -3,1 17,2
Spain 15,7 10,6 -0,6 -0,7 -1,3 25,0
Sweden 16,5 4,5 -1,2 -0,7 -1,9 19,1
United Kingdom 11,1 1,6 -0,6 -0,4 -1,0 11,7
EU average 16,7 5,6 -0,9 -0,9 -1,9 20,4
Change in expenditures
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Sustainability gaps in the living in better health scenario  
Compared with the base case scenario, the living in better health scenario will lead to less 
pressure on government finances. Table 6.4 shows the corresponding change in sustainability 
gaps. All countries show much more favourable government finances and on average the 
sustainability gap will decline by 0.65%, i.e. from 3.15% in the base case scenario to 2.50% in 
the living in better health scenario. If the respective changes in the sustainability gaps are 
subtracted from the base case figures for the individual countries, one can see that in the living 
in better health scenario four countries would face no sustainability problems. Besides the 
countries already mentioned in the base case scenario (Denmark and Sweden), Finland and 
Belgium would also not have to increase their taxes in light of the increase in expenditures 
caused by the ageing of the population. Notwithstanding this improvement, the sustainability of 
government finances will remain a serious problem for the EU.    
Table 6.4 Change in the sustainability gaps in the living in better health scenario (% of GDP) 
compared with the base case scenario   
Group A Denmark -0,48 Group C Ireland -0,22
Sweden -0,67 Luxembourg 0,23
Netherlands -0,66
Portugal -0,73
Spain -0,43
Group B Belgium  -0,66 Group D France  -0,67
Austria -0,88 Germany -1,12
Finland -0,95 Greece -0,52
Italy -0,83
United Kingdom 0,00
EU average -0,65  
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Chapter 7 
Living in Worse Health 
n a sense, this chapter considers the opposite question of that in the previous chapter. It 
focuses on the implications of a worsening of the health status of the population. The 
motivation for such a scenario is the rise in obesity that has occurred since 1980 in the US 
and also in other industrialised countries. Sturm (2002) calculates that in 1998 obesity 
accounted for a 36% increase in inpatient and outpatient spending. Finkelstein et al. (2003) finds 
that more than 9% of American medical spending must be attributed to weight problems. As 
obesity has become more widespread, its contribution to medical spending has grown over time. 
Indeed, the proportion of the growth in medical spending over the 1987-2001 period that must 
be attributed to both the increasing number of people with weight problems and the rise in 
spending on obese persons relative to those of normal weight is more than 25% (Thorpe et al., 
2004). 
If these trends in body mass continue in the future, we can expect to see more individuals with 
weight problems, more persons reporting fair or poor health and higher rates of medical 
spending (Sturm et al., 2004). That is not to say that medical spending per se will go up. The 
trend of a decline in disability rates over more than 10 years time (Manton et al., 1997) may 
continue in the future as well and outweigh the effects of the increase of persons with weight 
problems. But the opposite may also be true. As especially young cohorts suffer from weight 
problems, the impact of this trend may grow over time as the older cohorts, which have 
relatively large numbers of persons, with normal weight gradually die off (Lakdawalla et al., 
2003). 
Although there is some evidence now on the effects of obesity and being overweight, there is 
still far too little to derive an estimate of the likely rate of growth of disability rates over the 
coming decades in the EU area. Therefore, we have simply taken the change in health status 
over time that underlies the calculations in the previous chapter and reversed its sign. The 
elasticities that describe the relation between health status on the one hand and health-care 
expenditure, labour force participation and the use of social security on the other hand are 
identical to the ones used in the previous chapter. 
7.1  Projections for health- and long-term care expenditures  
Tables 7.1 through 7.3 show the projections of health- and long-term care expenditures when 
the above-mentioned features are incorporated into the projections. The respective scenario is 
labelled as the ‘living in worse health scenario’. 
The worsening of the health status increases acute health-care expenditure. On average, the ratio 
of acute health-care expenditure to GDP will increase by 0.8%. Worse health will likewise 
increase the spending on long-term care. For the EU, this effect amounts to 0.2 percentage 
points of GDP. 
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Table 7.1 Projections of public expenditure on health care, living in worse health scenario, 
acute health-care expenditure (% of GDP) 
  Base case             Living in worse health
 2002 2050 2002-50
  Incr. in exp.
2050 Extra increase
Acute health-care expenditure        
Austria 5.1  7.7 2.5 8.5 0.8
Belgium 5.2  6.9 1.7 7.4 0.5
Denmark 4.0  4.6 0.6 4.9 0.3
Finland 4.8  6.7 1.9 7.3 0.6
France 5.5  7.4 1.9 8.1 0.7
Germany 6.5  8.9 2.4 10.2 1.3
Greece 4.7  6.1 1.4 6.6 0.5
Ireland 5.6  6.6 1.0 7.0 0.4
Italy 5.5  7.7 2.2 8.7 1.0
Luxembourg n.a.  n.a – – –
Netherlands 4.7  5.5 0.8 5.8 0.3
Portugal 5.3  7.0 1.7 8.4 1.4
Spain 6.2  8.9 2.7 9.5 0.6
Sweden 5.1  6.0 0.9 6.5 0.5
United Kingdom  3.9  4.9 0.9 5.2 0.3
EU average  5.4  7.1 1.7 7.8 0.7
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 7.2 Projections of public expenditure on health care, living in worse health scenario, 
long-term care expenditure (% of GDP) 
  Base case             Living in worse health
 2002  2050 2002-50 
Incr. in exp.
2050 Extra increase
Long-term care expenditure       
Austria 0.6  1.6 1.0 1.8 0.2
Belgium 0.7  1.6 0.9 1.7 0.1
Denmark 2.2  4.1 1.9 4.4 0.3
Finland 1.5  3.3 1.9 3.7 0.4
France 0.7  1.5 0.8 1.7 0.2
Germany 0.3  0.6 0.4 0.7 0.1
Greece n.a.  n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0.7  1.2 0.5 1.3 0.1
Italy 0.7  1.2 0.5 1.4 0.2
Luxembourg n.a  n.a
Netherlands 2.6  4.5 1.9 4.8 0.3
Portugal n.a.  n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a.  n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2.4  4.3 2.0 4.9 0.6
United Kingdom  1.7  3.4 1.7 3.7 0.3
EU average  0.9  1.8 0.9 2.0 0.2
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Table 7.3 Projections of public expenditure on health care, living in worse health scenario, total 
health- and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP) 
  Base case             Living in worse health
 2002  2050 2002-50 
Incr. in exp.
2050 Extra increase
Total health- and long-term care expenditure       
Austria 5.8  9.3 3.5 10.3 1.0
Belgium 5.9  8.5 2.6 9.2 0.7
Denmark 6.2  8.7 2.5 9.3 0.6
Finland 6.3  10.0 3.7 11.1 1.1
France 6.2  8.9 2.7 9.8 0.9
Germany 6.7  9.5 2.8 11.0 1.5
Greece 4.7  6.1 1.4 6.6 0.5
Ireland 6.3  7.9 1.6 8.4 0.5
Italy 6.2  8.9 2.7 10.1 1.2
Luxembourg n.a  n.a – n.a. –
Netherlands 7.3  10.0 2.7 10.7 0.7
Portugal 5.3  7.0 1.7 8.4 1.4
Spain 6.2  8.9 2.7 9.5 0.6
Sweden 7.5  10.4 2.9 11.6 1.2
United Kingdom  5.7  8.3 2.6 8.9 0.6
EU average  6.2  8.9 2.7 9.8 0.9
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
7.2  Projection of public pension expenditures  
Table 7.2 shows the projected pension expenditure in the living in worse health scenario. A 
worsening of health will reduce labour market participation and increase the number of persons 
living on social security. It will also lead to an increase in expenditures on pensions of 0.9% 
compared with the base case scenario for the average European country. The projected increase 
in expenditure is therefore about equal in size to the projected increase in expenditure on health 
care in Table 7.1. 
7.3  Government finances  
Table 7.4 shows the impact of worse health on total public expenditures compared with the base 
case scenario. The first two columns summarise the base case scenario. The second column 
shows the total change in expenditures in the projection period in the base case scenario. The 
third and fourth columns show the respective changes in expenditures in health care and 
pensions compared with the base case scenario if health deteriorates according to our living in 
worse health scenario. The sixth column shows total public expenditures in 2050.  
A worsening of health when measured at the end of the projection period will imply a 1.9 
percentage point increase of GDP in expenditure for health care and pensions. Public 
expenditure will on average increase by 7.6 percentage points of GDP during the period 
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Table 7.4 Expenditures on public pensions, living in worse health scenario (% of GDP) 
  Base case             Living in worse health
 2002  2050 2002-50 
Incr. in exp.
2050 Extra increase
Austria 14.5  17.0 2.5 18.0 1.0
Belgium 10.0  13.2 3.1 14.1 0.9
Denmark 10.6  13.1 2.5 13.8 0.7
Finland 11.5  15.8 4.3 16.9 1.1
France 12.1  16.4 4.2 17.8 1.4
Germany 11.9  16.8 4.9 17.9 1.1
Greece 12.8  24.7 11.9 25.8 1.1
Ireland 4.6  8.7 4.1 9.2 0.5
Italy 13.9  14.1 0.2 15.2 0.8
Luxembourg 7.4  9.2 1.7 10.3 1.1
Netherlands 8.1  13.5 5.4 14.6 1.1
Portugal 9.8  13.1 3.3 14.9 1.8
Spain 9.5  17.4 7.9 18.1 0.7
Sweden 9.0  10.6 1.6 11.4 0.8
United Kingdom  5.4  4.4 − 1.0 4.9 0.5
EU average  10.5  13.4 2.9 14.3 0.9
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 7.5 Net change in public expenditures (% of GDP) 
 Public 
exp.  
in 2002 
Base case  
Total 
increase in 
exp. 
 Base case 
Health 
care 
Pensions  Total  Public exp. in 2050, 
living in worse 
health scenario 
Change in expenditures 
Austria 20.2  6.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 28.2
Belgium 16.0  5.7 0.7 0.9 1.6 23.3
Denmark 16.8  5.0 0.6 0.7 1.3 23.1
Finland 17.7  8.0 1.1 1.1 2.2 27.9
France 18.3  6.9 0.9 1.4 2.3 27.5
Germany 18.6  7.6 1.5 1.1 2.6 28.8
Greece 17.5  13.4 0.5 1.1 1.6 32.5
Ireland 10.8  6.3 0.5 0.5 1.0 18.1
Italy 20.0  3.0 1.2 0.8 2.0 25.0
Luxembourg 7.4  1.7 n.a. 1.1 1.1 10.2
Netherlands 15.3  8.1 0.7 1.1 1.8 25.2
Portugal 15.2  5.1 1.4 1.8 3.2 23.5
Spain 15.7  10.6 0.6 0.7 1.3 27.6
Sweden 16.5  4.5 1.2 0.8 2.0 23.0
United Kingdom  11.1  1.6 0.6 0.5 1.1 13.8
EU average  16.7  5.6 0.9 0.9 1.8 24.1
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Sustainability gaps in the living in worse health scenario  
Compared with the base case scenario, the living in worse health scenario puts a larger pressure 
on public finances. Table 7.6 shows the corresponding change in sustainability gaps. All 
countries show less favourable public finances and on average the sustainability gap will 
increase by 0.7%, i.e. from 3.3% in the base case scenario to 4.0% in the living in worse health 
scenario. Not surprisingly, worsening health aggravates public finance problems in all the EU 
countries considered.  
Table 7.6 Change in the sustainability gaps in the living in worse health scenario (% of GDP) 
compared with the base case scenario 
Group A  Denmark 0.36  Group C  Ireland 0.24 
  Sweden 0.53    Luxembourg 0.05 
  – –   Netherlands 0.54 
  – –   Portugal 0.85 
  – –   Spain 0.37 
Group B  Belgium 0.52      
 Austria  0.78  Group D  France 0.73 
 Finland  0.83    Germany  1.18 
 Italy  0.81    Greece 0.45 
 United 
Kingdom 
0.06   –  – 
  EU 
average 
0.71   –  – 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Chapter 8 
Living Longer in Better Health 
n this chapter we combine the scenarios we ran in chapters 5 and 6 to present a living longer 
in better health scenario. We thus assume that people will live longer than the already 
inherent increase in life expectancy incorporated in the Eurostat demographic projections as 
postulated in the middle living-longer scenario, but also assume that their health improves 
according to the premises made in chapter 6.  
8.1  Projections for health- and long-term care expenditures 
Table 8.1 shows the projections for health- and long-term care expenditures in the living longer 
in better health scenario when compared with the base case scenario. Just as in chapter 6 we 
assume that the increase in health will lead to a higher growth of GDP and that health-care 
expenditures will grow in line with this extra increase in welfare.  
Health-care expenditures 
Living longer in better health will lead to a decline in expenditures on health care if compared 
with the base case scenario. The reason behind this decline is the fact that the positive health 
effect dominates the negative living longer effect in terms of expenditures. This can readily be 
seen when looking at Tables 5.1 and 6.1. By comparing these tables we can note that the effect 
of an improvement in health has a much greater effect on health-care expenditures (a decline of 
0.8% of GDP in expenditures) than the impact of an increase in life expectancy in the living 
longer scenario (an increase of 0.4% in expenditures). This of course depends on the specific 
scenario we have chosen for demography, i.e. a general increase in life expectancy of 3.2 years. 
As can be seen in Table 8.1, living longer in better health will lead to a decline in expenditures 
of 0.4%.  
Long-term care expenditures 
Long-term care expenditures will on the other hand increase in the living longer in better health 
scenario, although only by a very small margin, i.e. 0.1% for the average EU country. As 
outlined in chapters 5 and 6, the living longer effect dominates the improvement in health effect 
for long-term care expenditures. The living longer effect leads to an increase of 0.4% of GDP in 
expenditures, while the improvement in health leads to a decline of 0.2% of GDP in 
expenditures. The results differ widely among countries. It is interesting in this sense that in 
some countries the living longer in better health scenario will lead to a decline in long-term care 
expenditures when compared with the base case scenario. This is the case for Germany and 
Italy, countries with large projected health improvements. The increase in long-term care 
expenditures on the other hand is largest in the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Total health- and long-term care expenditures  
The combination of living longer in better health will lead to a 0.3% decline in expenditures 
compared with the base case scenario. For the EU average the health effect thus dominates the 
living longer effect.  
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Table 8.1 Projections of public expenditure on health and long-term care in the living longer in 
better health scenario 
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
Living longer in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,1 7,7 2,5 7,3 -0,4
Belgium 5,2 6,9 1,7 6,7 -0,2
Denmark 4,0 4,6 0,6 4,2 -0,4
Finland 4,8 6,7 1,9 6,3 -0,4
France 5,5 7,4 1,9 7,0 -0,4
Germany 6,5 8,9 2,4 8,0 -0,8
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,0 -0,1
Ireland 5,6 6,6 1,0 6,5 -0,2
Italy 5,5 7,7 2,2 7,1 -0,6
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,5 0,8 5,3 -0,2
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 5,9 -1,2
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,8 0,0
Sweden 5,1 6,0 0,9 5,5 -0,5
United Kingdom 3,9 4,9 0,9 4,7 -0,2
EU average 5,4 7,1 1,7 6,6 -0,4
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
Living longer in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 0,6 1,6 1,0 1,6 0,0
Belgium 0,7 1,6 0,9 1,7 0,1
Denmark 2,2 4,1 1,9 4,5 0,5
Finland 1,5 3,3 1,9 3,5 0,2
France 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,5 0,0
Germany 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,6 -0,1
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 1,2 0,6 1,3 0,1
Italy 0,7 1,2 0,5 1,1 -0,1
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 4,5 1,9 5,1 0,6
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2,4 4,3 2,0 4,5 0,2
United Kingdom 1,7 3,4 1,7 3,8 0,4
EU average 0,9 1,8 0,9 1,9 0,1
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
Living longer in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,8 9,3 3,5 8,9 -0,3
Belgium 5,9 8,5 2,6 8,4 0,0
Denmark 6,2 8,7 2,5 8,8 0,1
Finland 6,3 10,0 3,7 9,8 -0,2
France 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,6 -0,3
Germany 6,7 9,5 2,8 8,6 -0,9
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,0 -0,1
Ireland 6,3 7,9 1,6 7,8 -0,1
Italy 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,2 -0,7
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 10,0 2,7 10,3 0,4
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 5,9 -1,2
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,8 0,0
Sweden 7,5 10,4 2,9 10,1 -0,3
United Kingdom 5,7 8,3 2,6 8,4 0,2
EU average 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,6 -0,3
Base case 
Base case 
Base case 
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Again, the results differ widely among countries. Overall the EU countries can be divided into 
three groups. First there are those countries that will see their expenditures increase in the living 
longer in better health scenario, as is the case for the Netherlands, the UK and Denmark. This 
can largely be attributed to the increase in long-term care expenditures caused by population 
ageing. Second, there is a group in which the positive health and negative living longer effect 
cancel each other out, which is the case for Belgium and Spain. Third, we have a group of all 
the other countries in which the improvement in health is larger than the negative effect of an 
increase in life expectancy and the combination of both trends leads to a decline in expenditures 
on health and long-term care. This is especially true for Germany, Portugal and Italy.   
8.2  Projections of public pension expenditures  
Table 8.2 shows the projections for pension expenditure for the living longer in better health 
scenario using the premises made in chapters 5 and 6 regarding demography and health. For 
convenience of comparison, we again include the projections of pension expenditure in the base 
case in the first three columns of the table.  
Table 8.2 Public pension expenditures in the living longer in better health scenario (% of GDP) 
Living longer in better health 
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 14,5 17,0 2,5 17,7 0,7
Belgium 10,0 13,2 3,1 13,6 0,4
Denmark 10,6 13,1 2,5 13,9 0,8
Finland 11,5 15,8 4,3 16,1 0,3
France 12,1 16,4 4,2 16,3 0,0
Germany 11,9 16,8 4,9 17,5 0,7
Greece 12,8 24,7 11,9 26,0 1,4
Ireland 4,6 8,7 4,1 9,1 0,4
Italy 13,9 14,1 0,2 14,8 0,7
Luxembourg 7,4 9,2 1,7 9,1 -0,1
Netherlands 8,1 13,5 5,4 14,0 0,5
Portugal 9,8 13,1 3,3 12,7 -0,4
Spain 9,5 17,4 7,9 18,4 1,0
Sweden 9,0 10,6 1,6 10,9 0,3
United Kingdom 5,4 4,4 -1,0 4,4 0,0
EU average  10,5 13,4 2,9 13,7 0,4
Base case 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Table 8.2 shows that living longer in better health will for the average European country lead to 
a 0.4% increase in expenditures on pensions when compared with the base case scenario. As 
outlined in chapters 5 and 6, the combination of an increase in life expectancy and an 
improvement in health yields quite direct effects. The first factor leads to an increase in 
expenditures on pensions (of 1.4%), the second factor to a decline (of 0.9%), resulting in an 
overall increase of 0.4% in expenditures. Greece and Spain would suffer the largest increase in 
expenditures on public pensions in this scenario, while Luxembourg and Portugal would see 
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Contrary to the results we found for total health care and long-term care in the previous 
paragraph, the negative living longer effect dominates the improvement in health effect for 
pension expenditures. As reported in chapter 6, an improvement in health has an approximately 
similar positive effect on a reduction in pension and health-care expenditures, of which the 
difference can be attributed to the increase in life expectancy. As discussed, this stems from the 
fact that while an increase in life expectancy will lead to a direct increase in expenditure on 
pension benefits, the effect of living longer on health-care expenditures is more complex. On the 
one hand it will lead to a reduction in expenditures, as fewer people die; on the other hand an 
increase in life expectancy will lead to more health-care consumption in time and therefore lead 
to an increase in expenditure. An increase in life expectancy will therefore have a much greater 
impact on pension expenditures when compared with that of health-care expenditures.  
8.3  Government finances  
Table 8.3 sums up the effect of the living longer in better health scenario on public expenditures 
and specifically the change in expenditures compared with the increase in expenditures in the 
base case scenario. In general, living longer in better health will not lead to any increase in 
expenditures when compared with the base case scenario for the average European country. 
Although total expenditures on health and long-term care decline in the living longer in better 
health scenario, this decline is exactly balanced by an increase in expenditures on public 
pensions. When looking at the individual EU countries that benefit most from the described 
developments, one can see that only Portugal, France, Germany, Sweden and Luxembourg 
would see their public expenditures decline. In the other countries the increase in expenditures 
caused by living longer far outweighs the benefits of the reduction in expenditures caused by 
health improvements.  
Table 8.3 Change in public expenditures in the living longer in better health scenario 
Public exp. 
In 2002, 
Base case
Total increase 
in expenditures 
Base case 
Health 
and long 
term care  Pensions Total 
Public exp. In 2050, 
Living longer in better 
health scenario
Austria 20,2 6,0 -0,3 0,7 0,4 26,7
Belgium 16,0 5,7 0,0 0,4 0,4 22,0
Denmark 16,8 5,0 0,1 0,8 0,9 22,7
Finland 17,7 8,0 -0,2 0,3 0,1 25,9
France 18,3 6,9 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 24,9
Germany 18,6 7,6 -0,9 0,7 -0,2 26,1
Greece 17,5 13,4 -0,1 1,4 1,3 32,1
Ireland 10,8 6,3 -0,1 0,4 0,4 17,6
Italy 20,0 3,0 -0,7 0,7 0,0 23,0
Luxembourg 7,4 1,7 n.a. -0,1 -0,1 9,1
Netherlands 15,3 8,1 0,4 0,5 0,9 24,3
Portugal 15,2 5,1 -1,2 -0,4 -1,6 18,7
Spain 15,7 10,6 0,0 1,0 1,0 27,3
Sweden 16,5 4,5 -0,3 0,3 -0,1 20,9
United Kingdom 11,1 1,6 0,2 0,0 0,2 12,9
EU average 16,7 5,6 -0,3 0,4 0,0 22,3
Change in expenditures 
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Sustainability gaps, living longer in better health scenario  
Table 8.4 shows the sustainability gaps in this scenario. Compared with the base case scenario, 
the sustainability gap for the average EU country will increase by 0.2%. As previously 
discussed, the sustainability gap declined by 0.65% in our living in better health scenario while 
it increased by 0.89% in the living longer scenario. Contrary to the results found in Table 8.3, 
which reveals that four countries would see their public expenditures decline in the living longer 
in better health scenario, Table 8.4 shows that only two countries would see their government 
finances improve.  
This result seems especially strange for Portugal, which saw its expenditures decline in the 
living longer in better health scenario by 1.6% of GDP, but sees its sustainability gap increase 
by 0.05%. One can be recalled, however, that most other expenditures and revenues rise in line 
with economic growth as previously discussed in chapter 3. An improvement in health will lead 
to higher labour force participation and therefore economic growth. These effects will in turn 
lead to a rise in expenditures and revenues. In the beginning year of the projection, i.e. the year 
2005, expenditures in Portugal were much larger than revenues; Portugal ran a government 
deficit of more than 3% of GDP and therefore an increase in economic growth has a greater 
impact on expenditures than on revenues. For Portugal, it is thus the case that the decline in 
expenditures on health and long-term care and pensions is outweighed by the increase in 
expenditures on other items. The same reasoning applies to other countries with the same 
characteristics. 
Table 8.4 Change in the sustainability gaps of EU countries in the living longer in better health 
scenario  
Group A Denmark 0,50 Group C Ireland 0,63
Sweden 0,19 Luxembourg 0,70
Netherlands 0,80
Portugal 0,05
Spain 0,51
Group B Belgium  0,17 Group D France  0,19
Austria 0,08 Germany -0,08
Finland 0,03 Greece 0,84
Italy -0,14
United Kingdom 0,46
EU average 0,20  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 8.1 shows the debt development for the average EU country in the four scenarios 
discussed so far. As can be seen in the figure, the debt development and thus the sustainability 
problems are respectively the highest and severest in the living longer scenario. It is obviously 
the best in the living in better health scenario.  ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 67 
Figure 8.1 Debt developments – EU average in four scenarios 
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Compared with the base case scenario, the debt ratio in the living in better health scenario will 
be some 55% lower, which is a debt of 233% in 2050 compared with one of 288% in the base 
case. Figure 8.1 also shows, however, that the EU will face large sustainability problems if 
current social policies remain unchanged. 
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Part III 
 
n this third part of the analysis we first investigate how population ageing may affect the 
interest rate and the rate of productivity growth to determine how sensitive the results in the 
base case scenario are to assumptions about these crucial variables. This is done in chapter 
9. We compare the outcome of these tests with the results we obtained in part II of this paper to 
see if the incorporation of possible demographic and health trends really influence the 
projections of health care and pension expenditure or if these results are overshadowed by 
uncertainties regarding assumptions in the interest rate and productivity growth. In chapter 10 
we investigate how a change in the labour force participation rate influences the base case 
results and we also present a best- and worst-case scenario. In chapter 11 we finally consider 
some other factors that may influence the development of health-care expenditures and 
specifically focus on the role of medical technology. In that chapter we also run a scenario 
where health-care expenditures grow at a faster rate than productivity growth (with an elasticity 
higher than 1 with respect to GDP), to see how this influences our base case results.  
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Chapter 9 
Effect of Population Ageing on the 
Interest Rate and Productivity Growth 
n the projections that have been performed so far we have assumed that the interest rate 
remained constant during the whole projection period at a nominal rate of 5.75%. In this 
chapter we explore the relation between population ageing and the interest rate more 
thoroughly and investigate how societal ageing influences the development of the interest rate 
during the projection period. Instead of a constant interest rate, the interest rate will thus vary 
year by year depending on how population ageing affects certain macroeconomic variables and 
especially how it influences saving and investment decisions, which ultimately determine the 
amount of the interest rate. Likewise we pay some attention to the effect of population ageing 
on labour productivity, which until now we have also assumed to grow at a constant rate of 
1.75% per year, but the main focus will be on the effect of population ageing on the interest 
rate.  
For this purpose we use the results from studies that have undertaken similar investigations. 
These studies do not reach a conclusive agreement on how population ageing ultimately affects 
the amount of the interest rate in the period until 2050. The French INGENUE group (2001) for 
example predicts that ageing will lead to a lowering of the interest rate in the period between 
now and 2050. Fehr et al. (2003) conclude otherwise and state that societal ageing may lead to a 
higher interest rate in the same period. De Mooij and Tang (2003) developed four different 
scenarios to show how the future of Europe may evolve and conclude that population ageing 
may either lead to a lower or higher interest rate depending on the specific scenario involved. 
We discuss each of these studies to see which assumptions underlie their outcomes and use the 
results found in the studies with regard to the development of the real interest rate and labour 
productivity in our projections. From this we are then able to infer how a different interest rate 
and productivity rate path will influence the size of the sustainability gaps as obtained in our 
base case scenario. Here we wish to emphasise that we only use the projected changes in the 
path of the interest rate and productivity rate and will not alter any other assumptions that may 
differ between this and the above mentioned studies.   
9.1  The INGENUE study 
The INGENUE group uses a computable, general equilibrium, multi-regional overlapping-
generations model to simulate how population ageing will affect international capital flows in 
the world economy. The world economy in their model is divided into six regions. These are 
three developed and three developing regions. Their focus, however, is specifically targeted on 
the impact of population ageing on the world as a whole, where world markets are assumed to 
be perfectly integrated. In their model labour supply is exogenous and determined by the 
demographic projections for each region. Labour is also assumed to be immobile among 
regions. An important feature in their model is that given the labour supply there are decreasing 
returns to capital; an increase in the capital labour ratio in each region will thus lead to a decline 
in the return on investment or capital. Capital is mobile and will flow to the region where the 
return on investment is highest.
1 Owing to the different time paths of demographic transition in 
                                                 
1 As Canton et al. (2003) argue, international capital may not be that mobile between developed and 
developing countries. For example, they assert that domestic investment rates closely follow domestic 
savings rates, that the share of foreign assets in investment portfolios is small and interest rate 
differentials between developed and developing countries continue to exist. The explanations they offer 
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the various regions there are thus opportunities for countries that start their population ageing 
process early, such as Europe and Japan, to invest their savings in regions that still have rising 
working-age populations (which are not invested in their own domestic economy because of a 
decline in the labour force). In the baseline scenario the world real interest rate is expected to 
gradually decline from approximately 4.25% to 3.6% in 2030, after which it gradually recovers 
to 3.75% in 2050.  
The development in the world interest rate can both be explained by changes in the demand and 
the supply of capital. As a result of perfect capital mobility and the different time path of 
demographic transition between regions, the demand for capital will not fluctuate much and 
therefore the decline in the interest rate can mostly be explained by changes on the supply side 
of the capital market. In this regard the various fluctuations in the regional savings rates are 
important. Following the life cycle hypothesis, people save during their working lives and 
especially between the ages of 45 and 65 and dissave when they retire, that is after age 65. 
Combining this feature with the observed demographic changes in the various regions leads to 
the observed path of the world interest rate. In the period up to 2025 the world capital supply 
increases as the rise in the working-age population is greater than the rise in the number of 
elderly persons. After 2025 it will increase marginally as the old-age dependency ratio will then 
increase at a faster rate than the working-age population. At 2050 the real interest rate will have 
stabilised at a rate of 3.75% and compared with the year 2000 will have declined by 0.5%. 
With regard to productivity, the INGENUE study predicts that the annual growth rate of GDP 
will decline from 2.2% in 2000 to 1% in 2025 for the EU. From 2025 to 2050 it will rise 
gradually to 1.5% in 2040 and keep this level until 2050. The profile of this path can largely be 
explained by the changes in the working-age population that take place during this period. No 
specific attention is paid to the separate effect of population ageing on labour productivity. 
9.2  Fehr et al.  
Fehr et al. (2003) use a dynamic, intergeneration and interregional demographic life cycle 
model to study among others how population ageing may affect national income, the capital 
stock, the effective labour supply, the interest rate and the rates of wage and social 
contributions. In their model they distinguish between three regions, the US, Europe and Japan, 
whereby we concentrate on the simulations they have performed for the EU as a closed 
economy.
2 A striking feature of the outcomes of their simulations is that the effective labour 
supply increases, despite population ageing in Europe. This can be attributed to the fact that 
they incorporate labour-augmenting technical progress in their model, which increases the 
effective labour supply every year and in total by 61% in 2050. This more than compensates for 
the decline in the participation rate of the population in Europe. The capital stock on the other 
hand is expected to decline, which is caused by the expectation that the pressure on public 
budgets because of increases on spending on public pensions and health care (among others) has 
to be financed by tax increases. This tax increase will come at the expense of lower savings, 
which will lead to an increase in the cost of capital and a decline in its stock. There is thus a 
shortage of capital to accommodate the rise in the effective labour supply and that will lead to 
an increase in the real interest rate over time. In their closed economy version, the real interest 
                                                                                                                                               
for this limited capital mobility are restrictions on international trade in capital, the imperfect integration 
of goods markets and asymmetric information between domestic and foreign investors.  
2 Their focus in this study is actually concentrated on the question of how immigration and a reform of the 
pension system from PAYG to a funded system in Europe will influence the development of the macro-
economic variables mentioned here. From their baseline scenario for a closed economy, however, the 
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rate under these assumptions will increase by 4% for the EU during the period between 2000 
and 2050. The majority of this increase, i.e. 3.3%, takes place during 2030 and 2050. A crucial 
assumption that determines these results is of course their assumption about labour-augmenting 
technical progress. Although not shown in their results, the effect of population ageing on 
productivity in their simulations is obviously negative, as the effective labour supply increases 
and the capital stock declines. 
9.3  The CPB’s four futures study  
In the Four Futures of Europe (de Mooij and Tang, 2003), four different scenarios for the future 
of Europe are sketched. These are “strong Europe”, “regional communities”, “global economy” 
and “transatlantic market”. The various scenarios can be broadly described as pertaining to the 
following dimensions. The first dimension concerns how Europe will respond to the various 
challenges it will be confronted with regarding its public sector, such as population ageing, 
policy competition, the divide between low- and high-skilled labour, individualisation and so 
on. Will Europe in this sense opt for strong public responsibilities or put more emphasis on 
private responsibilities? A second sphere relates to the issue of how countries will succeed in 
international cooperation to deal adequately with cross-border issues, such as EU integration, 
trade relations with the world, the stance against immigration and so on. In this sense, 
governments can choose between international cooperation in these fields or treasure their 
national sovereignty. Figure 8.1 shows how the above-mentioned scenarios can be divided 
according to these lines of reasoning.  
Figure 9.1 The four scenarios on the future of Europe  
International cooperation
Strong Europe Global Economy 
Public responsibilities Private responsibilities 
Regional Communities  Transatlantic Market 
National sovereignty   
Source: De Mooij and Tang (2003). 
For a detailed description of these scenarios we refer to the report. In this regard, it is important 
for our study that the economic growth and the development of the interest rate show large 
divergences across the four scenarios depending on the assumptions underlying the various 
scenarios. We look more closely at two of these scenarios where the effect of population ageing 
and other assumptions is greatest on the development of the interest rate. These are the regional 
communities and transatlantic markets scenarios. These scenarios correspond to a situation 
where public expenditures on pensions and health care increase significantly owing to the 
ageing of populations just as in our scenarios.  72 | PELLIKAAN & WESTERHOUT 
9.4  Regional communities scenario  
In the regional communities scenario a context is projected where on the issue of international 
cooperation the integration of new European countries in the EU is not successful and the EU 
fails to reform its institutions. In the field of trade, the world is characterised by a number of 
trade blocks and multilateral cooperation is modest. At the level of the public sector, 
governments are unsuccessful in the reform of their welfare systems and public expenditures on 
health care and pensions rise significantly because of population ageing. The overall lack of 
competition on products, labour markets and government policy in general leads to a low 
projection of productivity growth. The real interest rate in this scenario is expected to decline 
from 3.6% in 2000 to 2.6% in 2050. The development of the interest rate in this scenario once 
again depends on changes in the demand and supply of capital. On the demand side the demand 
for capital depends on the cost of capital and its marginal productivity. The latter is largely 
dependent on developments in the labour market.  
Population ageing will cause employment growth to be negative, as the participation rate will 
decline. The capital labour ratio will thus increase, reducing the marginal productivity of labour 
and this will lower the rate of return on investment. Investment and thus the demand for capital 
will decline, leading to a lower interest rate. On the supply side, the ageing of the population 
will lead to a lower savings rate and this may exert some upward pressure on the interest rate. 
The demand effect however dominates the supply effect and the interest rate will decline by 
approximately 1% until 2050 in a rather gradual manner. Labour productivity will decline by 
0.75% in the same period. This is not so much the result of population ageing but rather a lack 
of innovation and competition in the economy.  
9.5  Transatlantic market scenario  
In the transatlantic market scenario, EU countries limit the role of the state and rely more on 
market exchange. Nevertheless, the reform of a large public sector is problematic and efficiency 
gains are not universally achieved. Elderly persons use their political power and make sure that 
the provision of health-care services and pensions do not deteriorate. This comes at the expense 
of intra- and intergenerational equity. In the international dimension, EU countries focus on 
their national sovereignty and the integration of new members in the EU fails as a result. 
Consequently, the EU intensifies its relations with the US and agrees upon deeper transatlantic 
economic integration, increasing welfare on both sides of the Atlantic. On the economic front 
the intensified competition will lead to higher labour productivity growth, mostly driven by 
rapid technological change. Reforms of welfare programmes contribute to increased labour 
force participation and longer working hours, increasing overall employment, which also 
enhances economic growth. The real interest rate in this scenario will increase from 3.6% at the 
onset to 4.5% in 2050. This can be explained by the fact that on the supply side the elderly will 
dissave because of ageing, while on the demand side high GDP growth will stimulate 
investments and thus increase the demand for capital. Both effects thus reinforce each other, 
leading to a relatively gradual rise in the interest rate in the period between 2000 and 2050 of 
0.9%. Labour productivity growth will rise by 0.4% in the period between 2000 and 2020, while 
it will marginally decline by 0.1% in the period until 2050. As previously mentioned, this higher 
labour productivity can mainly be attributed to relatively high investments in the ICT sector, 
which also positively influences productivity in other sectors and especially those in the services 
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9.6 The effect of population ageing on sustainability gaps when 
implementing the predicted change in interest and productivity rates 
from other studies  
Table 9.1 shows the combined effect of implementing a variable path for the interest and 
productivity rates in our base case scenario as implied by the direction both variables follow in 
the period between 2000 and 2050 in the discussed studies. We wish to emphasise here the 
relatively simple nature of this exercise as we only use the specified changes in the interest rate 
and productivity growth in the respective studies without worrying about other assumptions in 
these models that may differ substantially from our own study. In the Fehr et al. (2003) study 
for example, the expected increase in the interest rate is a direct consequence of their 
assumption that if government finances get out of hand this will lead to an increase in taxes. 
This will limit the amount people will be able to save and thus exerts an upward pressure on the 
interest rate. Owing to the great importance of this assumption in their study, we choose not to 
show the effect of the Fehr et al. assumptions in Table 9.1, as their assumptions differ too much 
from those in our own study.  
Table 9.1 Change in the sustainability gaps from other studies in our base case scenario when 
implementing the interest rate and productivity rate paths  
Base case 
scenario  INGENUE
Four Futures, 
Regional 
Communities 
Four Futures, 
Transatlantic 
markets
Austria 1,32 -0,14  -0,21  0,21
Belgium 0,66 -0,03 -0,15  0,27
Denmark -1,44 0,01 -0,05  -0,44 
Finland 0,67 -0,13  -0,12  -0,18 
France 4,92 -0,34  -0,36  0,87
Germany 5,14 -0,36  -0,30  0,81
Greece 5,78 -0,38  -0,03  0,36
Ireland 3,80 1,48 2,23 0,03
Italy 1,61 0,78 0,81 0,78
Luxembourg 2,64 1,79 2,35 0,17
Netherlands 3,52 -0,13  -0,27  0,76
Portugal 3,49 -0,23  -0,20  0,57
Spain 3,43 2,10 2,98 -0,11 
Sweden -0,83  0,01 0,09 -0,26 
United Kingdom 1,59 0,60 0,73 0,32
EU average 3,15                  0,20 0,34 0,53  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As can be seen in the table, insertion of the predicted paths of the interest and productivity rates 
by INGENUE (2001) in our base case scenario only marginally increases the sustainability gap 
compared with the base case scenario. The predicted decrease in the productivity rate will lead 
to an increase in the sustainability gap, as many pension schemes in Europe are indexed to price 
inflation and expenditures on pensions will thus not decline when productivity declines. The 
predicted decline in the interest rate on the other hand will improve government finances, 
although the results differ widely among countries. As the effect of productivity on the 
sustainability gap (0.43%) is slightly greater than the effect of the interest rate (-0.23%), the 
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the regional communities scenario, where the predicted decline in productivity growth will lead 
to an increase in the sustainability gap, but this is again partly compensated for by the positive 
effect of a decline in the interest rate on the sustainability gap. Because of the relatively larger 
decline in productivity growth, the sustainability gap increases at a relatively higher rate than in 
the INGENUE study. The insertion of the respective interest and productivity paths from the 
transatlantic market scenario has the biggest influence on the sustainability gap. Although the 
predicted increase in productivity will only lead to a marginal increase in the sustainability gap, 
the increase in the interest rate will worsen government finances further, leading in total to a 
0.53% increase in the sustainability gap for the average EU country. This is the only scenario 
where both effects reinforce each other. 
If we compare the outcome of these exercises with the change in sustainability gaps found in 
chapters 5 and 6, where the influences of living longer and living in better health on the 
sustainability gap were investigated, the following conclusions can be drawn. In chapters 5 and 
6 we found that an increase in life expectancy increased the sustainability gap by 0.89%, while 
the incorporation of an improving health trend decreased the sustainability gap by 0.65%. The 
results of implementing a more variable path for the interest rate and productivity growth will 
thus not significantly alter these indications if we only compare the size of the changes in the 
sustainability gaps. Yet, as the transatlantic market scenario shows, the combination of a 
possible decrease in productivity and a rise in the interest rate may substantially increase the 
need to raise taxes and significantly reduce the effect of savings on health-care expenditures and 
pensions if health improves. The results, however, differ widely  between countries as the 
respective figures in Table 9.1 show and therefore it is difficult to draw general implications.   
 | 75 
Chapter 10 
Projection of Health-Care Expenditures by 
Varying Cost Assumptions 
able 5.1 showed that the process of population ageing will lead to higher expenditures on 
health care. The magnitude of the increase in expenditures, however, depends on the 
specific demographic transition that will take place. As could be seen in Table 5.1 a 
substantial reduction in mortality rates will lead to significant increases in health-care 
expenditures. But how does this compare with other factors that influence the development of 
total health costs? As reported in other studies the introduction of new medical technologies, 
price changes in medicines and institutional changes that influence the supply and demand for 
medical services have been found to be more important factors in determining total health- and 
long-term care expenditure in the past than population ageing. The transition for example from a 
budget-oriented approach in which expenditures are determined by the use of health-care 
services compared with a managed care system that puts a ceiling on medical expenditures will 
have a big influence on the development of health-care expenditures in the future. It is 
nevertheless very difficult to take account of such changes in policy behaviour, as it is not 
certain how these policy processes develop. Societal preferences are also likely to be a 
determining factor behind institutional changes and such preferences may differ widely among 
countries.  
Likewise expenditures on long-term care are influenced by factors other than population ageing 
alone. Next to gender and race, marital status, the number of children and their location, income 
and wealth are important factors that drive these expenditures. Wealthier individuals for 
instance are able to live longer in their own home, while a larger increase in the life expectancy 
of men compared with women will lead to reductions in the time spent in widowhood and the 
need for public long-term care services. All of the above factors were not incorporated in the 
projections made in chapter 4 but are mentioned here to emphasise the complex nature of 
accurately projecting future health-care expenditures. 
Prior to implementing a scenario that may, although imperfectly, take account of such factors 
we first elaborate a bit more on the relation between medical technological progress, economic 
growth and health-care expenditure. 
10.1 Economic growth and medical technological progress 
Apart from demographic factors, growth in medical expenditure may be driven by GDP and 
medical technological progress. The elasticity of health-care expenditure with respect to GDP is 
often found to be larger than 1, suggesting health care is a luxury good (Gerdtham et al., 1992). 
The role of medical technological progress is also often found to be large. There is much 
uncertainty about whether population ageing will affect GDP, the size of the income elasticity 
of health care demand and at what pace medical technological progress will develop. To make 
this explicit, we perform a sensitivity analysis on these issues. 
To assess the effect upon GDP, note that because of population ageing, labour market 
participation will decline as there will be fewer persons aged 20 to 64. Worldwide population 
ageing may depress interest rates and increase wage rates (Turner et al., 1998; Miles, 1999). 
Chapter 11 further elaborates on this. The implication of these factors is that whereas the 
number of workers will decrease, GDP per worker may increase. What will happen to GDP is 
then unknown. Nevertheless, using numerical simulations, Miles (1999) is able to tell the sign 
of the total effect. He finds that the effect of reduced labour supply is much larger than that of 
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higher labour productivity, from which it follows that per capita GDP will fall. Other numerical 
simulation exercises confirm this prediction (Turner et al., 1998; Hviding and Mérette, 1998). 
Cutler et al. (1990) argue that labour scarcity as reflected in high wage rates may also foster 
technological change. Hence, population ageing may speed up economic growth and possibly 
increase per capita GDP after some time. Fougère and Mérette (1999) elaborate on the idea that 
the combination of falling interest rates and increasing wage rates fosters the accumulation of 
human capital. They confirm that GDP may achieve higher levels because of population ageing. 
Yet they also show that this effect would occur only after about 100 years. Moreover, during the 
first decades the fall of GDP could be larger as human capital formation requires resources that 
cannot be used for production. 
We conclude that GDP may decline, which may reduce health-care expenditure. What is the 
role of medical technological growth? As stressed by the literature on endogenous growth 
models, the production of new technologies is driven by the prospects of reaping the benefits 
from the use of new technologies. Hence, market size determines how many entrepreneurs will 
invest in innovations. If ageing causes health care markets to grow, this would induce more 
research and development in medical technologies. Acemoglu and Linn (2003) present 
empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis for pharmaceutical markets. New technologies 
will be included in insurance packages. Hence, through the channel of technological growth, 
population ageing may increase health-care expenditure (Weisbrod, 1991). 
Jones (2003) develops a model in which health-care expenditures and life expectancy are 
endogenous variables driven by technological progress. Using this model he tries to give an 
explanation as to why health-care expenditures as a share of GDP have risen so much since 
1960 in the OECD and specifically in the US. In the US, health-care expenditures have for 
example risen from 5.1% to 13.6% of GDP. Like Newhouse (1992), he finds that the major part 
of this increase, about 50%, can be attributed to what he calls the “march of science” and 
medical advances. Although the role of GDP growth is important in explaining the rise in 
health-care expenditures and the introduction of new medical technologies, he argues that a 
critical determinant of health-care expenditures as a share of GDP is the willingness of society 
to transfer resources to persons near the end of life. In his model the latter group is the biggest 
consumer of new medical innovations and health-care expenditure in general, absorbing some 
25% of total medical expenditures. As long as governments impose no restrictions on this 
transfer rate, health-care expenditures as a share of GDP will continue to grow. If restrictions 
are applied, health-care expenditures as a share of GDP will stabilise in the long term. A cap of 
this kind may come at the expense of increased mortalities and limit the possible increases in 
life expectancy that may occur if the technologies are adopted. Despite having run several 
simulations, he consistently finds that large differences in aggregate health-care expenditures 
are typically associated with only marginal differences in life expectancy. The latter fact can be 
attributed to differences in other factors that influence life expectancy, such as health behaviour, 
environment, nutrition and so on. 
Ideally, we would like to run different scenarios to show the influence of for example the 
introduction of new medical technologies on total health- and long-term care expenditure. This 
is, however, very tedious and no studies to date have been able to model this correctly. Cutler 
and Sheiner (2001) elaborate on the various aspects that have to be taken in account if one 
wants to forecast the rate of technological change in medicine or treatment. As they explain, one 
would not only need insight into which diseases would in the future be curable and currently are 
not, one would also need to take account of possible shifts in treatment and prevention and the 
costs associated with both practices. For many diseases it is usually only after a considerable 
time period that knowledge about the treatment of a disease can ultimately be used to prevent it. 
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instance will usually involve far more persons and probably cost more than treating patients 
who suffer from this disease, although that does not imply that prevention is not valuable.  
Yet the introduction of new medical technologies may in time lead to a decline in health-care 
expenditures if these technologies are able to cure very costly diseases. As Thomas (1999) 
argues, the speed at which new chemical entities are screened and tested to identify and treat 
disease is increasing seven-fold in the US. If this research leads to major advances in 
understanding and treating disease it may eventually reduce health-care expenditures. In this 
respect the difference between partial and fully developed technologies is important. Partial 
technologies do not prevent or cure disease, but they do treat the symptoms, although usually at 
a considerable cost. Fully developed technologies on the other hand offer the prevention or 
complete cure of diseases, decrease the burden of disease and may in time lead to substantial 
savings on health-care expenditures if these technologies are really introduced.  
For a number of reasons, health-care expenditure may increase at a faster pace than can be 
derived from the application of our projection method. In our sensitivity analysis, we therefore 
present some alternative calculations. 
Until now we have let total health-care expenditures grow by 1.75% annually in line with the 
increase in the rate of labour productivity growth. To see the influence of an increase in the 
percentage of this cost factor, or the assumption of an elasticity higher than 1 with respect to 
GDP, we increase this percentage to 2% or by an extra 0.25% annually and assume all other 
conditions to be as in the base case. We thus take account of a variation of the Baumol effect 
and let health-care expenditures grow at a faster rate than GDP. This experiment can give us 
some insight into the importance of this cost factor in determining total health-care 
expenditures. We can then use the results of this exercise and view it alongside the results 
obtained in section 5.1, i.e. the living longer scenario, to see how both effects compare. 
The introduction of medical technologies could likewise be projected in this manner, although 
imperfectly. Following the above arguments it seems most likely that the cost increase would 
generally impact (an increase) health-care expenditures as long-term care expenditures are 
expected to be less influenced by technological developments. Also the effect would differ by 
age, with higher increases on expenditure for medical technology for older persons. We do not, 
however, take account of these aspects in our simulation. Table 10.1 shows the effect of an 
increase in expenditures of 0.25% above the annual productivity growth rate of 1.75% for all 
ages in the base case scenario. The first three columns reflect the situation in the base case 
scenario. The fourth column shows expenditures if those on health care grow by an extra 0.25% 
annually. The last column reflects the extra increase in expenditures if this assumption is 
applied when compared with the base case scenario. 
10.2 Health-care expenditures 
As can be concluded from Table 10.1, a 0.25% extra increase in the yearly cost parameter for 
the health-care sector leads to a significant increase in health-care expenditures. For the EU they 
will on average increase by 0.9% of GDP – from 7.1% of GDP to 8.0% of GDP. The increase in 
health-care expenditures is the same in all countries but the extra increase differs among 
countries as a result of deviations in the amount of the original figures for health care. If we 
compare the results in Table 10.1 with those found in Table 5.1 in the living longer scenario, we 
find that an increase in the cost parameter by 0.25% will have a significantly greater effect on 
health-care expenditures than the initiated reduction in mortality rates in the middle living 
longer scenario, which corresponded to an extra increase in life expectancy of 3.2 years for the 
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Table 10.1 Projection of public expenditure on health- and long-term care, increasing cost 
scenario (% of GDP) 
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,1 7,7 2,5 8,7 1,0
Belgium 5,2 6,9 1,7 7,8 0,9
Denmark 4,0 4,6 0,6 5,2 0,6
Finland 4,8 6,7 1,9 7,6 0,9
France 5,5 7,4 1,9 8,4 1,0
Germany 6,5 8,9 2,4 10,1 1,2
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 7,0 0,8
Ireland 5,6 6,6 1,0 7,5 0,9
Italy 5,5 7,7 2,2 8,7 1,0
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,5 0,8 6,2 0,7
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 8,0 0,9
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 10,1 1,2
Sweden 5,1 6,0 0,9 6,8 0,8
United Kingdom 3,9 4,9 0,9 5,5 0,6
EU average 5,4 7,1 1,7 8,0 0,9
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 Extra incr.
Austria 0,6 1,6 1,0 1,8 0,2
Belgium 0,7 1,6 0,9 1,8 0,2
Denmark 2,2 4,1 1,9 4,6 0,5
Finland 1,5 3,3 1,9 3,8 0,4
France 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,7 0,2
Germany 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,1
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 1,2 0,6 1,4 0,2
Italy 0,7 1,2 0,5 1,4 0,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 4,5 1,9 5,1 0,6
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2,4 4,3 2,0 4,9 0,6
United Kingdom 1,7 3,4 1,7 3,8 0,5
EU average 0,9 1,8 0,9 2,1 0,2
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 Extra incr.
Austria 5,8 9,3 3,5 10,5 1,2
Belgium 5,9 8,5 2,6 9,6 1,1
Denmark 6,2 8,7 2,5 9,8 1,2
Finland 6,3 10,0 3,7 11,3 1,3
France 6,2 8,9 2,7 10,1 1,2
Germany 6,7 9,5 2,8 10,8 1,3
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 7,0 0,8
Ireland 6,3 7,9 1,6 8,9 1,1
Italy 6,2 8,9 2,7 10,1 1,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 10,0 2,7 11,3 1,3
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 8,0 0,9
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 10,1 1,2
Sweden 7,5 10,4 2,9 11,8 1,4
United Kingdom 5,7 8,3 2,6 9,4 1,1
EU average 6,2 8,9 2,7 10,1 1,2
Base case
Base case
0,25% incr.in cost
0,25% incr.in cost
Base case 0,25% incr.in cost
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10.3 Long-term care expenditures 
Long-term care expenditures will increase in a similar fashion albeit to a lesser degree than 
those of health-care expenditures. This can be attributed to the fact that in many countries the 
health-care profile for long-term care shows no expenditure for those aged 0-54 and thus 
expenditures on long-term care are less influenced by changes in the cost parameter than health-
care expenditures. For the European Union average they will increase by 0.2%, i.e. from 1.8% 
of GDP to 2.1% of GDP. If we compare the results once again with those found in Table 5.1, we 
can now see that expenditures in the living longer scenario increase to a greater extent than 
those in the increasing-cost parameter scenario. This can be explained by the fact that an 
increase in life expectancy will impact expenditures on long-term care the most. The 
incorporated population ageing effect in the living longer scenario will thus have a larger impact 
on long-term care expenditures than possible increases in the cost parameter above productivity 
growth.  
10.4 Total health- and long-term care expenditures  
Overall, the postulated increase in the cost parameter will lead to an increase in expenditures on 
health care of 1.2% of GDP compared with the base case. A relatively small increase in the rate 
of growth in total health- and long-term care expenditures above the annual rate of labour 
productivity thus influences the development of expenditures in quite a significant way and to a 
larger extent than the results found in the middle living longer scenario in Table 5.1. This result 
can of course partly be attributed to the fact that an increase in the cost parameter of 0.25% 
influences health-care expenditures in a direct way. As previously explained in Box 5.1, that is 
not the case for the effect of an increase in life expectancy on health-care expenditures where 
two opposing forces are at work. Indeed, the cost parameter could be the effect that especially 
makes other factors more important to the development of health-care expenditures than 
population ageing. 
10.5 Government finances  
Table 10.2 shows the effect of this postulated increase in the cost parameter on the sustainability 
of government finances. As pension expenditures are not influenced by any cost parameter 
changes, the change in sustainability gaps compared with the base case scenario can solely be 
attributed to the increase in expenditures on health care. For the average EU country the 
sustainability gap will have to increase by 0.7% to keep government finances sustainable. If 
health-care expenditures increase at a faster rate than GDP, it will significantly increase the 
sustainability problems for the European Union countries in the future. If we compare the 
change in the required adjustment in the sustainability gap in Table 10.2 with that found in the 
living longer scenario in Table 5.4, we can see that the necessary increase in taxes is higher in 
the living longer scenario. It is important to recall, however, that the living longer scenario also 
included the effect of an increase in life expectancy on expenditures on public pensions and that 
the latter expenditure outweighed the increase in expenditures on both health care and long-term 
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Table 10.2 Change in the sustainability gaps in the increasing-cost parameter scenario 
 compared with the base case scenario (% of GDP) 
Group A Denmark 0,73 Group C Ireland 0,88
Sweden 0,88 Luxembourg 0,00
Netherlands 0,92
Portugal 0,61
Spain 0,66
Group B Belgium  0,68 Group D France  0,75
Austria 0,68 Germany 0,72
Finland 0,75 Greece 0,51
Italy 0,61
United Kingdom 0,68
EU average 0,70  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Chapter 11 
Several More Scenarios 
n this chapter we explore the effect of different assumptions about the development in the 
labour force participation rates on the sustainability gaps and present a best- and worst-case 
scenario.  
With regard to the labour force participation rate, we assume that the participation rate increases 
relatively by an extra 5%, which gradually takes place in the projection period. An increase of 
5% during the projection period of 50 years thus amounts to a 0.1% increase in the labour force 
participation each year. We apply this increase to all age groups and make no difference 
between genders.  
11.1 Effect of changes in the labour force participation rate 
The effect of a gradual, relative increase of the labour force participation rate of 5% on the 
sustainability gap is shown in the second column of Table 11.1. An increase in the labour force 
participation rate will lead to a decline in the sustainability gap for all EU countries, except 
Luxembourg. For the average EU country, the sustainability gap will decline by 0.26%. This 
result follows from the fact that an increase in labour force participation will have a bigger 
effect on government revenues than on expenditures and thus alleviates the financial burdens of 
governments. An increase in the labour force participation rate will for instance lead to a higher 
wage base and thus an increase in revenues from direct taxes. On the expenditure side, health-
care costs are not related to any change in the labour force participation rate; disability benefits 
for those persons younger than 55 will fall and pension expenditures will decline if labour force 
participation increases at older ages as we have assumed. In this regard one should recall that 
pension expenditures also comprise expenditures on other public replacement schemes such as 
disability benefits and unemployment benefits for those aged 55 and over.  
Table 11.1 Change in the sustainability gaps compared with the base case for various scenarios  
Base case 
5% incr. In labour 
force part. 
Worst case 
scenario 
Best case 
scenario 
Austria 1,32 -0,36 2,10 -1,76
Belgium 0,66 -0,31 1,91 -1,31
Denmark -1,44 -0,31 2,11 -1,02
Finland 0,67 -0,45 2,30 -1,93
France 4,92 -0,21 1,90 -1,47
Germany 5,14 -0,31 2,18 -2,41
Greece 5,78 -0,31 2,25 -1,02
Ireland 3,80 -0,05 1,88 -0,72
Italy 1,61 -0,29 1,68 -1,78
Luxembourg 2,64 0,10 0,37 0,33
Netherlands 3,52 -0,40 2,91 -1,38
Portugal 3,49 -0,15 1,67 -2,04
Spain 3,43 -0,27 1,94 -0,91
Sweden -0,83 -0,30 2,17 -1,69
United Kingdom 1,59 -0,13 1,34 -0,32
EU average 3,15 -0,26 1,90 -1,47  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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As can be seen in Table 11.1, Finland, the Netherlands and Austria would benefit most from an 
increase in the labour force participation rate. Luxembourg is the only country that would not 
benefit from any increase in the labour force participation rate. This is also the only country for 
which we do not have any information on expenditures on health care; these costs are thus part 
of the category of other expenditures that grow at the same rate as economic growth. The result 
for Luxembourg can therefore be attributed to poor data. 
11.2 Worst-case scenario  
This section explores future budgets in a pessimistic scenario. Compared with the base case 
scenario, we replace a number of assumptions with those that will entail more of a burden to 
government finances. The first deviation is that we assume that life expectancy will increase 
further, following the demographic scenario as postulated in the middle living longer scenario. 
Second, we assume that health-care expenditures will grow faster than GDP by 0.25%, as 
postulated in chapter 9. Third, we assume that the labour force participation rate will decrease 
relatively by 5% for all ages in a gradual manner as presented in Table 11.1, although the 
change is now in the opposite direction. Fourth, we assume that health will not improve in the 
projection period. Table 11.1 shows the impact of these assumptions on the change in the 
sustainability gaps compared with the results in the base case scenario.  
As expected, government finances show a substantial deterioration in this scenario when 
compared with the base case. The sustainability gap will have to be increased by 1.9% to 5.05% 
to keep government finances sustainable.  
11.3 Best-case scenario  
In this section future budgets in a best-case scenario are assessed. More specifically, we assume 
that the health improvements as shown in Table 3.3 will improve at an even faster rate and will 
show a relative increase of an extra 20%. Second, we assume that the impact of a health 
improvement on labour force participation is stronger, with an elasticity of 1 instead of 0.8. 
Third, we assume that the relation between health changes and health-care expenditures is 
stronger. The latter assumption implies that an improvement in health will be achieved with less 
medical intervention. To realise this we have increased the elasticities guiding the relation 
between a health improvement and the associated reduction in health- and long-term care 
expenditures by 0.2% respectively for the distinguished age groups. Table 11.1 shows the 
change in the sustainability gaps in this scenario compared with those of the base case. 
A further improvement in health will lead to substantially lower sustainability gaps. For the EU 
average, this gap will decline by 1.47% compared with the base case scenario. The positive 
effect of a health improvement on government finances can mostly be attributed to savings on 
health-care expenditures. Pension expenditures will also decline for all EU countries but at 
slower rates. But the increase in labour force participation that stems from a health improvement 
will also lead to increases on other expenditure categories and will tend to worsen government 
finances. Luxembourg and the UK are most affected by the latter tendency as can be seen by the 
difference in the sustainability gaps compared with the base case scenario. (For the explanation 
of an increase in the sustainability gap for Luxembourg, see section 11.1.) 
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Chapter 12 
Summary and Conclusions 
his report has investigated the effect of population ageing on public health- and long-
term care expenditures, public pension expenditures and government finances in EU 
countries in the projection period 2002-50. We have paid specific attention to new 
insights about the development of demography and health on these projections. In this regard, 
the view has been expressed that people may live substantially longer in the future than 
estimated by current demographic projections, and may spend part of these additional years in 
better health. Both developments have obvious implications for the correct projection of public 
expenditures on health and long-term care, pensions and public finances. To assess the effects of 
living longer in better health, we developed four core scenarios: a base case and scenarios for 
living longer, living in better health and living longer in better health.  
The base case scenario serves as a benchmark against which the calculations in the other 
scenarios can be judged. It is not meant to be taken literally, since it does not include all the 
recent institutional details in the countries covered that may be relevant for the purpose of 
assessing fiscal sustainability. For calculations that offer this perspective, we refer to the EPC 
(2001) study, which is to our knowledge the most comprehensive and accurate report presenting 
projections on health care and pensions for the EU. Our study focuses on the impact of life 
expectancy and health status, relative to a general base case scenario, which in itself is only 
relevant for the study. 
Our analysis also contains a number of new elements. First, we include the costs incurred during 
the last years of life in our projections. The inclusion of these costs is important because an 
increase in life expectancy will postpone these costs to later ages. Hence, our calculations 
correct for the overestimation of future health-care expenditure that arises when no account is 
made for mortality-related costs. Second, we decompose the cost of mortality into a health- and 
long-term care component, which differs by age. Third, we explicitly incorporate tax revenues 
into our projections for government finances. Using all of the above information we are able to 
project government finances in the future and more specifically consider whether government 
finances are sustainable under current social policy rules. To this end we use a measure – the 
sustainability gap – that is also used in other studies and which indicates whether government 
finances are sustainable or not. If the sustainability gap is positive, sustainability problems are 
expected to arise.  
The living longer scenario differs from the base case scenario in its assumption about future 
possible demographic developments. There is huge uncertainty about how demography may 
develop in the future. We run three scenarios to take account of this uncertainty, respectively 
labelled the ‘low’, ‘middle’ and ‘high living longer scenario’. All scenarios assume that life 
expectancy will increase further than standard projections have suggested so far, which is 82.6 
years at birth in an average European country. This is realised by reducing the mortality rates 
for specific ages. In the low scenario, life expectancy at birth increases further by 1.2 years, 
assuming that the reduction in mortality rates does not take place at old ages, which is above age 
85. In the middle scenario, life expectancy increases further by 3.2 years and the reduction in 
mortality rates then takes place at relatively older ages, i.e. above 85 years old. The high 
scenario assumes that life expectancy increases further by 4.8 years. Here, the assumptions are 
those of the middle scenario, except that the rate of reduction in mortality rates is higher.  
The living in better health scenario uses the same assumptions as the base case scenario, except 
that it incorporates a positive trend in the health status of the population. This follows the 
reasoning of many authors who have found that the disability rate or occurrence of specific 
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health problems has been falling through time, implying that health on average has been 
improving. An improvement in health will not only influence expenditures on health, but also 
on pensions. Healthier persons are assumed to need less medical attention and are able to work 
longer. To incorporate the effect of an improvement in health on pension and health-care 
expenditures, we use the results found in the literature where this relation is directly or 
indirectly estimated. For health-care expenditures, we have made use of estimates of the 
elasticity of health-care expenditure with respect to health status. For pension expenditures, we 
have used estimates of the elasticity representing the relation between a change in health and 
outflow from the labour market. Coupled with projections of the development of life expectancy 
in good health, the influence of health on health-, long-term care and pension expenditures can 
then be calculated. 
The living longer in better health scenario finally combines the demographic and health status 
assumptions made in the living longer and living in better health scenarios respectively. Table 
12.1 shows the results of the projected increase in health- and long-term care expenditures, 
pension expenditures, total expenditures and the sustainability gap for the various scenarios for 
the EU average as measured in the period between 2002 and 2050. Except for the base case 
scenario, the scenarios reflect changes in the previously mentioned variables compared with the 
base case. 
Table 12.1 Change in expenditures in the projection period between 2002 and 2050 (% of GDP) 
Base case  Living longer
Living in 
better health 
Living longer in 
better health 
2050 2050 2050 2050
Health and long term care expenditures  2,7 0,8 -0,9 -0,3
Pension expenditures  2,9 1,4 -0,9 0,4
Total expenditures 5,6 2,2 -1,9 0
Sustainability gap  3,2 0,9 -0,7 0,2 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As shown in the base case scenario, population ageing will significantly increase both total 
health-care and pension expenditures and make government finances unsustainable, reflected in 
the fact that taxes have to be increased by 3.2% of GDP to achieve sustainability. A further 
increase in life expectancy, as postulated in the living longer scenario, will lead to higher 
expenditures and thus a deterioration of government finances, reflected by the fact that taxes 
will have to be increased by an additional 0.9%. Note that the positive effect of higher life 
expectancy upon health-care expenditure is not trivial. Indeed, an increase in life expectancy 
exerts two opposite effects upon health-care expenditure. The reduction in the number of 
mortalities reduces health-care expenditure, as decedents are much more expensive than 
survivors in terms of health-care costs. On the other hand, the expansion of the population that a 
rise in life expectancy brings about increases health-care expenditure considerably. In our 
numerical simulations, however, the latter effect strongly dominates the former effect 
throughout most of the simulation period. 
An improvement in health will lower expenditure on total health- and long-term care and 
pensions and will improve government finances by 0.7%. Living longer in better health finally 
has rather moderate effects upon total expenditure, and the sustainability gap in the living longer 
in better health scenario is more or less the same as in the base case scenario. The fiscal impact ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HEALTH, LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE | 85 
of better health is thus similar to that of a higher life expectancy. Nevertheless, the same does 
not hold true for health care and pension expenditures separately. Although expenditures on 
health care are expected to decline, expenditures on pensions are held to increase. 
The ageing of the population will thus significantly increase expenditures on public health- and 
long-term care and pensions. The widespread belief that people may live longer, but are on 
average also healthier, will only marginally change the base case projections if the expected 
increase in life expectancy and health develops according to our premises. It has to be 
emphasised, however, that how both demography and health will develop in the future is very 
uncertain. Further, as we have seen, a larger than expected health improvement may have 
profound effects on the sectoral structure of a country as it can shift resources away from the 
health-care sector and reallocate them towards other sectors in the economy. A further increase 
in life expectancy will have the opposite effect.  
Two final remarks are appropriate. Our calculations have emphasised the effect of population 
ageing. It is obvious that many more factors are relevant and possibly even more important than 
the ageing of the population itself. Thus the projections should not be misinterpreted as 
projections of the most likely future developments. Furthermore, all calculations were carried 
out in a policy-neutral environment. It can be argued that the projected effects will provoke 
important policy changes, but no account has been taken of possible reactions in this field.  
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Appendix A.1 
Table A1.1 Total population, base case scenario (millions of persons) 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 8,1 8,1 8,2 8,1 7,9 7,6
Belgium 10,2 10,4 10,5 10,5 10,4 10,1
Denmark 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,6
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,1 4,9
France 59,2 61,4 62,9 63,6 63,5 62,1
Germany 82,1 83,4 83,3 82,0 79,6 76,0
Greece 10,5 10,8 10,8 10,7 10,6 10,2
Ireland 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8
Italy 57,6 57,3 56,0 54,0 51,5 48,1
Luxembourg 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
Netherlands 16,0 16,7 17,3 17,6 17,7 17,6
Portugal 10,0 10,3 10,5 10,7 10,8 10,7
Spain 39,4 39,9 39,5 38,6 37,3 35,2
Sweden 8,9 9,0 9,1 9,3 9,2 9,2
United Kingdom 59,5 60,9 62,2 63,2 62,9 61,8
EU total  376,3 383,4 386,0 384,5 377,4 364,4  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table A1.2 Total population, living longer scenario (low) (millions of persons) 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 8,1 8,2 8,2 8,2 8,0 7,7
Belgium 10,2 10,4 10,5 10,6 10,5 10,3
Denmark 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,6
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,2 5,0
France 59,2 61,4 63,0 64,0 64,0 62,9
Germany 82,1 83,5 83,6 82,6 80,6 77,3
Greece 10,5 10,8 10,8 10,8 10,7 10,4
Ireland 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,6 4,8 4,8
Italy 57,6 57,3 56,2 54,4 52,1 48,9
Luxembourg 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
Netherlands 16,0 16,7 17,3 17,8 17,9 17,9
Portugal 10,0 10,3 10,6 10,7 10,9 10,8
Spain 39,4 39,9 39,7 38,9 37,8 35,8
Sweden 8,9 9,0 9,1 9,3 9,3 9,3
United Kingdom 59,5 61,0 62,4 63,6 63,6 62,7
EU total  376,3 383,9 387,4 387,1 381,6 370,0  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A1.3 Total population, living longer scenario (middle) (millions of persons) 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 8,1 8,2 8,2 8,3 8,1 7,9
Belgium 10,2 10,4 10,6 10,7 10,7 10,5
Denmark 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,8
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,1
France 59,2 61,5 63,3 64,6 65,0 64,2
Germany 82,1 83,7 84,1 83,5 81,9 79,2
Greece 10,5 10,8 10,9 10,9 10,8 10,6
Ireland 3,8 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,8 4,9
Italy 57,6 57,4 56,5 55,0 53,0 50,1
Luxembourg 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
Netherlands 16,0 16,8 17,4 17,9 18,2 18,2
Portugal 10,0 10,3 10,6 10,8 11,0 11,1
Spain 39,4 40,0 39,9 39,2 38,4 36,7
Sweden 8,9 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,4 9,5
United Kingdom 59,5 61,1 62,7 64,2 64,5 64,1
EU total  376,3 384,5 389,4 390,8 387,5 378,4  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table A1.4 Total population, living longer scenario (high) (millions of persons) 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 8,1 8,2 8,3 8,3 8,2 8,1
Belgium 10,2 10,4 10,6 10,8 10,8 10,7
Denmark 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,8 5,9 5,9
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,2
France 59,2 61,6 63,5 65,0 65,7 65,1
Germany 82,1 83,8 84,5 84,2 82,9 80,8
Greece 10,5 10,8 10,9 11,0 11,0 10,8
Ireland 3,8 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,0
Italy 57,6 57,5 56,7 55,4 53,7 51,1
Luxembourg 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6
Netherlands 16,0 16,8 17,5 18,1 18,4 18,6
Portugal 10,0 10,4 10,7 10,9 11,2 11,2
Spain 39,4 40,0 40,0 39,5 38,9 37,4
Sweden 8,9 9,0 9,2 9,5 9,5 9,6
United Kingdom 59,5 61,1 62,9 64,6 65,3 65,2
EU total  376,3 384,9 390,8 393,7 392,2 385,3  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A1.5 Life expectancy developments in the EU  
Scenario
Low Middle High 
Life expectancy at age 0 0 0 0 0
Year 2000 2050 2050 2050 2050
Austria 78,0 83,4 84,5 86,4 87,9
Belgium 77,7 82,5 83,6 85,6 87,2
Denmark 76,5 80,9 82,3 84,4 86,2
Finland 77,4 82,4 83,6 85,6 87,3
France 78,7 83,3 84,4 86,5 88,0
Germany 77,8 82,4 83,6 85,7 87,3
Greece 78,2 82,9 84,1 86,1 87,7
Ireland 76,5 81,5 82,8 84,8 86,5
Italy 78,8 83,4 84,6 86,5 88,0
Luxembourg 77,8 82,7 83,8 85,8 87,4
Netherlands 78,1 81,0 82,3 84,4 86,2
Portugal 75,5 81,0 82,1 84,2 85,9
Spain 78,5 81,9 83,1 85,2 86,9
Sweden 79,6 83,9 85,0 86,7 88,2
United Kingdom 77,4 82,4 83,7 85,7 87,4
EU average  78,0 82,6 83,8 85,8 87,4
Base case  Living longer 
 
 
Scenario
Low Middle High 
Life expectancy at age 65 65 65 65 65
Year 2000 2050 2050 2050 2050
Austria 16,8 20,1 21,1 22,5 23,7
Belgium 16,5 19,5 20,5 21,9 23,2
Denmark 15,8 18,5 19,6 21,1 22,5
Finland 16,5 19,5 20,6 22,0 23,3
France 18,1 20,8 21,7 23,0 24,2
Germany 16,6 19,5 20,5 22,0 23,3
Greece 16,7 19,9 20,9 22,4 23,7
Ireland 15,2 18,5 19,6 21,1 22,5
Italy 17,4 20,3 21,3 22,7 23,9
Luxembourg 17,0 19,7 20,7 22,1 23,3
Netherlands 16,5 18,4 19,5 21,0 22,4
Portugal 15,3 18,5 19,5 21,0 22,3
Spain 17,5 19,5 20,6 22,0 23,3
Sweden 17,5 20,3 21,2 22,6 23,7
United Kingdom 15,9 19,2 20,3 21,9 23,3
EU average  16,9 19,7 20,7 22,2 22,6
Base case  Living longer 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix A.2 
Calculation of mortality rates by specific age category for the group aged 90+ 
As mentioned in chapter 3, the demographic data by Eurostat only give population and mortality 
data for the age categories of 0 to 90+. For an accurate prediction of health and pension 
expenditures, however, we are also interested in the specific breakdown of the age category 90+ 
into the ages of 90 to 99. To achieve this we used recent realised population and mortality 
figures for this group, which for most countries can be found in the Human Mortality Database 
and the Kannisto-Thatcher database from the Max Planck Institute. While this data would not 
give us information about the trend in these figures until 2050, it would give a good indication 
of what the population and mortality figures look like in the most recent years by specific age 
category and could serve as base figures. We then used this information and observable trends 
in mortality figures for the 90+ age group for those EU countries for which we did have the 
required age split until 2050, as well as observable trends in the age groups just under the age of 
90 (ages 85 to 89), to project future mortality rates for other EU countries. Although the 
mortality rates differ by specific age category, we assumed that the change in the mortality rates 
in the period to 2050 was equal for the specified age groups for computational convenience. 
Using these mortality rates, population figures for the oldest old can be calculated in the manner 
that was presented in chapter 2. There we explained that the population in a given year can be 
calculated from the population in a previous year by adjusting this population figure for any 
mortality changes and net migration. As we have population figures in the base year and 
mortality figures for the whole projection period, future populations by age category can now 
easily be calculated. We abstracted from any migration flows as these can be expected to be 
close to zero at the higher ages.  
Thus from the development of the mortality rates population figures can easily be deduced. As 
we did have original estimates from Eurostat for the total size of the population aged 90+, we 
adjusted the mortality figures for each country to enable the population figures we obtained to 
resemble the Eurostat population figures as much as possible and allowed an error margin of no 
more than 3%. While the mortality rates were adjusted on the basis of trial and error, we tried to 
keep the procedure as simple as possible by allowing no more than two different rates of 
adjustment from the realised figures we used as base figures. Depending on whether our 
population projections for these specific age categories were either higher or lower than the 
Eurostat prediction, mortality rates were increased or decreased by a respective percentage for a 
certain period to correct for this difference. Such an exercise could for instance lead to a 7% 
relative gradual decline in mortality rates during the first 10 years and a 10% relative gradual 
decline during the remaining years to correct for differences in population figures. The mortality 
rates obtained in this manner differ by country and by period.   
One shortcoming of this approach is that no difference is made between changes in the gradual 
decline of mortality rates by respective age. As shown by the figures for the Netherlands for 
example, the expected decline in mortality rates do differ by age category and turn out to be 
higher for the group of those aged 98 than for the group of those aged 91. The application of 
uniform rates that reflect this decline may thus slightly underestimate the development of the 
population in the higher range, i.e. the group of those aged 95-98. Because these age groups 
comprise only a very small part of the population, however, they will only marginally affect 
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Appendix A.3 
Relevance of cost of mortality in projecting health-care expenditures 
To see how relevant the concept of the cost of mortality and its variation over the different age 
categories is, two other scenarios were run with different costs of mortality. Recall that in our 
base case scenario the cost of mortality followed a u-shaped curve. In the first scenario it is 
assumed that the cost of mortality for all ages equals the costs for the group aged 35-64, which 
is equal to the benchmark cost of a person aged 95 years. This would imply a lower cost of 
mortality for all other ages compared with the base case scenario. The second scenario assumes 
no costs of mortality at all. This will tell us just how important the inclusion of the costs 
incurred during the last years of life is for the projections of health care for the different EU 
countries. These scenarios can therefore be thought of as a test to measure how sensitive the 
results of the projections of health-care expenditures are to the assumptions made in the base 
case scenario with regard to the cost of mortality. Table A3.1 shows the projected expenditure 
paths for health and long-term care until 2050 for the EU countries for both scenarios. For 
convenience, the first three columns show the results from the base case scenario as presented in 
Table 4.1.   
Projections of health- and long-term care expenditures with lower costs of 
mortality  
A lower cost of mortality for all age groups, except for those aged 35-64 (which stays the same), 
will lead to higher expenditures on total health and long-term care for all EU countries. The 
difference in percentage points in terms of GDP is small however; the increase in total 
expenditures varies between 0 and 0.3% of GDP. Both categories of expenditures contribute to 
this rise in total expenditures. The conclusion that a lowering of the cost of mortality increases 
expenditure on health care and long-term care may at first sight seem counterintuitive. Yet it can 
be explained by the fact that the costs of mortality are part of the average cost of health care per 
person and as explained in chapter 2 are subtracted from the respective health-care and long-
term care components. A lowering of the cost of mortality thus leads to higher cost profiles for 
health care and long-term care for the survivors. As relatively few people die before the age of 
85, a large number of persons make use of health care and long-term care services and a relative 
increase in these costs will offset a decline in mortality costs by which only a relatively small 
number of people are affected. We have also calculated how this lower cost of mortality would 
impact government finances and found that the sustainability gap for the average EU country 
would have to increase by 0.1% to keep government finances sustainable.  
Likewise an increase in the cost of mortality (not shown in the table) will lead to a lowering of 
expenditures on health and long-term care, albeit at the same small percentages that were found 
when the costs of mortality were lowered. The level of the cost of mortality among age groups 
thus only marginally seems to influence total health- and long-term care expenditures. The 
impact will obviously increase the larger the deviation, i.e. a lower or higher cost of mortality 
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Table A3.1 Projection of public expenditures on health- and long-term care with various 
assumptions about the amount of the mortality costs  
Health care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr. 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,1 7,7 2,5 7,8 0,1 8,0 0,4
Belgium 5,2 6,9 1,7 7,0 0,1 7,2 0,3
Denmark 4,0 4,6 0,6 4,8 0,2 5,1 0,5
Finland 4,8 6,7 1,9 6,8 0,2 7,1 0,4
France 5,5 7,4 1,9 7,5 0,1 7,6 0,2
Germany 6,5 8,9 2,4 9,0 0,1 9,1 0,2
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,2 0,0 6,2 0,1
Ireland 5,6 6,6 1,0 6,7 0,1 6,9 0,3
Italy 5,5 7,7 2,2 7,7 0,1 7,8 0,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 4,7 5,5 0,8 5,6 0,1 5,7 0,2
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 7,1 0,0 7,2 0,1
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,9 0,0 9,0 0,1
Sweden 5,1 6,0 0,9 6,2 0,2 6,5 0,5
United Kingdom 3,9 4,9 0,9 5,1 0,2 5,4 0,5
EU average 5,4 7,1 1,7 7,2 0,1 7,4 0,3
Long term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr. 2050 extra incr.
Austria 0,6 1,6 1,0 1,7 0,1 1,8 0,2
Belgium 0,7 1,6 0,9 1,7 0,1 1,8 0,2
Denmark 2,2 4,1 1,9 4,1 0,1 4,2 0,2
Finland 1,5 3,3 1,9 3,4 0,1 3,5 0,2
France 0,7 1,5 0,8 1,6 0,0 1,6 0,1
Germany 0,3 0,6 0,4 0,7 0,0 0,7 0,1
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 0,7 1,2 0,6 1,3 0,0 1,3 0,1
Italy 0,7 1,2 0,5 1,3 0,0 1,3 0,1
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 2,6 4,5 1,9 4,5 0,0 4,6 0,1
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Spain n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sweden 2,4 4,3 2,0 4,4 0,1 4,5 0,2
United Kingdom 1,7 3,4 1,7 3,5 0,1 3,6 0,3
EU average 0,9 1,8 0,9 1,9 0,1 2,0 0,1
Total health and long-term care expenditure (% of GDP)
2002 2050
% incr. Exp 
2002-2050 2050 extra incr. 2050 extra incr.
Austria 5,8 9,3 3,5 9,5 0,2 9,8 0,5
Belgium 5,9 8,5 2,6 8,7 0,2 9,0 0,5
Denmark 6,2 8,7 2,5 8,9 0,2 9,3 0,6
Finland 6,3 10,0 3,7 10,2 0,2 10,6 0,6
France 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,0 0,1 9,2 0,3
Germany 6,7 9,5 2,8 9,6 0,1 9,9 0,4
Greece 4,7 6,1 1,4 6,2 0,0 6,2 0,1
Ireland 6,3 7,9 1,6 8,0 0,1 8,3 0,4
Italy 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,0 0,1 9,1 0,2
Luxembourg n.a n.a  n.a n.a  n.a 
Netherlands 7,3 10,0 2,7 10,1 0,1 10,3 0,3
Portugal 5,3 7,0 1,7 7,1 0,0 7,2 0,1
Spain 6,2 8,9 2,7 8,9 0,0 9,0 0,1
Sweden 7,5 10,4 2,9 10,6 0,2 11,0 0,6
United Kingdom 5,7 8,3 2,6 8,6 0,3 9,0 0,8
EU average 6,2 8,9 2,7 9,1 0,2 9,3 0,4
Low None 
Low None 
Base case Death costs 
Low None 
Base case Death costs 
Base case Death costs 
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Projections of health- and long-term care expenditures without the inclusion 
of the cost of mortality  
As outlined in chapter 1, other studies have highlighted the importance of including the costs of 
mortality for accurately projecting health-care expenditures. If the costs of mortality or costs 
incurred during the last years of life were included in the projections, expenditures were 
projected to be significantly lower than if these costs were calculated by using the standard 
approach. The last two columns in Table A3.1 show the results of not including the cost of 
mortality in this study for the individual countries of the EU. As one can see the projections that 
do not take account of the cost of mortality all lead to higher expenditures on health care and 
long-term care for each EU country, although at different magnitudes. The projections of health-
care expenditure are most influenced in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK where the 
inclusion of the cost of mortality will lead to lower expenditures on health care by 0.3%. On 
average, health-care expenditures are 0.2% lower for the EU if the mortality costs are included. 
The inclusion of the cost of mortality likewise leads to lower expenditures on long-term care; 
for the EU this will lead to a decline in expenditures of 0.1%. When looking at total health-care 
and long-term care expenditure, the inclusion of the cost of mortality will lead to declines in 
expenditures of 0.6% and more for Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK. Overall the 
inclusion of the cost of mortality seems very relevant for making accurate projections of health-
care expenditures for the EU countries. 
We have also calculated the sustainability gaps for the EU countries when mortality costs are 
not included in the health care projections and found that the sustainability gap would increase 
by 0.22% for the EU average. These changes in sustainability gaps are shown in Table A3.2. As 
could be concluded in the previous paragraph, the countries that benefit most in terms of 
sustainability are Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK.  
Table A3.2 Change in the sustainability gaps if the cost of mortality argument was excluded (% 
of GDP)  
Group A Denmark 0,44 Group C Ireland 0,33
Sweden 0,40 Luxembourg 0,00
Netherlands 0,23
Portugal 0,09
Spain 0,06
Group B Belgium  0,33 Group D France  0,21
Austria 0,28 Germany 0,22
Finland 0,39 Greece 0,07
Italy 0,12
United Kingdom 0,53
EU average 0,22  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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future economic consequences. This project was motivated by an interest in verifying 
whether people are not only living longer but also in better health. It aims at analysing 
how the economic impact of population ageing could vary when not only demographic 
factors, but also health developments are taken into consideration. The project started in 
January 2002 for a period of three years.  
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different cohorts of the population; 
•  analyse retirement decisions and the demand for health care as a function of age, 
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Programme of the 5
th EU Research Framework Programme. The project is coordinated 
by Jorgen Mortensen, Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. For further information, 
contact him at: jorgen.mortensen@ceps.be. 
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